202. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Dominican Situation
This is in response to your concern over how things are going in the Dominican Republic.
The Background
Up until March 21—when unknown assailants tried to kill Imbert—Balaguer was making slow but steady progress in consolidating his political position. Months of relative stability had given the business community a new confidence and the economy was starting to gather some momentum.
Since March, the political and economic climate has changed and Balaguerʼs position weakened. Failure to solve the Imbert case—followed by a series of other murders and attempted murders—has made the public apprehensive. The economic sector is uneasy and cautious. And anti-Balaguer elements on the right and left have launched a campaign to pin the “Trujillista” label on him. As might be expected the PRD is in the forefront of this effort.
[Page 484]Balaguerʼs Strength and Weaknesses
Balaguerʼs situation is not critical, but his hold has been shaken. He still has going for him:
- —the support of most Dominicans who long for tranquillity.
- —basic military support.
- —our strong backing.
- —confidence in himself.
Working against him are:
- —his vulnerability to the “Trujillista” charge because of certain elements around him.
- —his lack of political sophistication in dealing with the noncommunist opposition.
- —the violence which continues to plague the country.
- —his inability to delegate authority and the poor management capacity of his administration.
- —a difficult balance of payments and fiscal situation.
What we can do
I met with the Dominican Review Group (Gordon, Vance, FitzGerald, Kohler and Ambassador Crimmins) two weeks ago to review the situation. We agreed on a set of short-term courses of action (copy attached)2 which Crimmins is carrying out.
The most important of these is to persuade Balaguer to curb terrorism and restore public confidence. He has taken two steps in this direction:
- —a strong public statement that he will not tolerate terrorism and will take energetic measures to stamp it out, and
- —appointment of a high level committee to make a thorough investigation of the National Police Force, which is suspected of being involved in some of the terrorism. (Unfortunately, Balaguer did not include distinguished people from outside the government—another example of his lack of political judgment.)
Ambassador Garcia Godoy called on Bill Bowdler Wednesday3 evening prior to going to Santo Domingo. He too was concerned about trends. He will talk to Balaguer about political strategy in dealing with terrorism. He will also try to persuade the PRD to moderate its opposition. Bill encouraged him to do this. Garcia Godoy said he would give us his impressions as soon as he got back. He expressed deep appreciation for your action on a special sugar quota for the DR. He noted that this strong US support for Balaguer would be a stabilizing factor.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret. An “L” on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
- Entitled “Short Term Courses of Action in the Dominican Republic,” May 5, it is a duplicate of the attachment to Document 200 minus the “Background” section.↩
- May 17; no record of this conversation has been found.↩