192. Intelligence Memorandum1
THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT
Summary
Political tensions are on the rise in Santo Domingo and the situation is sufficiently fragile in the Dominican Republic that the regimeʼ stability could be threatened with little warning. There are no signs at present, however, that anti-Balaguer elements plan to move during the Presidentʼ attendance at the hemisphere summit conference in Uruguay next week.2 There are, however, deep tensions in the country that are certain to cause Balaguer serious trouble in the near future.
1. Balaguerʼ scheduled journey to the summit conference next week in Punta del Este comes at a time when Dominican political tensions are on the rise. The attempted assassination of Antonio Imbert on 21 March and its aftermath have added new dimensions to the divisive issue of “trujilloism” that could disrupt the regimeʼ fragile political stability.
The Aftermath of the Imbert Affair
2. The attack on Imbert, one of Trujilloʼ assassins, followed a series of charges—some of them well founded—that Balaguer was employing “trujillista” personnel and tactics in his government. The Communist and non-Communist left have made such accusations the focal point of their criticism since last fall. Recently, elements of the anti-Trujillo right—the political aggregation that governed the country during the 1962 Council of State and during the Reid administration that preceded the 1965 revolt—have picked up the theme. Thus, the attack on Imbert produced expressions of distress, consternation, and outrage from these elements; moreover suspicions immediately developed that the assailants were in or sheltered by the government.
3. Balaguer moved quickly to forestall immediate serious antigovernment repercussions from the incident. He announced that a special, high-level commission would investigate the assault, established a [Page 450] $25,000 reward for information on the would-be assassins, and voiced his personal repudiation of the attack. His most dramatic step, however, was the appointment of the other surviving assassin of Trujillo, Luis Amiama Tio, to the sensitive post of minister of interior and police. Amiama, who saw in the attack a danger to his own personal security, agreed to take the post on condition that he be given a free hand to conduct the investigation.
4. Although the appointment at least temporarily silenced criticism of Balaguer from most quarters, it planted the seeds of discord within the government. Amiama, who is not identified with the more extreme and intractable right, had become increasingly disenchanted with Balaguer over the last few months. He has privately voiced concern over the Presidentʼ methods and tactics, which he finds reminiscent of those of the late dictator, and has demonstrated a deep sensitivity over the presence in the government of some unsavory leftovers from the Trujillo era. In particular, he has singled out Balaguerʼ coterie of palace aides for criticism. At the top of Amiamaʼ “bad guy” list is controversial presidential aide Colonel Nivar, but close behind are “special intelligence adviser” Perez–Sosa and legal adviser Polibio Diaz. The background of Balaguerʼ personal bodyguard and adviser, Melido Marte, suggests why Amiama and others are upset. In 1961 Marte was described as “a poorly educated strong-arm thug who is trusted by the Trujillo family.” Although Balaguer occasionally has voiced dissatisfaction over the often independent conduct of such aides as these, he apparently regards such long-time supporters as completely loyal to him and is reluctant to sever ties with them.
5. In accepting the cabinet post, Amiama said he would work for the elimination or downgrading of “trujillista” officials. He quickly came into conflict with one enemy, police chief Tejeda, whom he accused of “unjustifiable errors” in the investigation of the Imbert shooting and in effect pressed Balaguer to dismiss him. The replacement, General Soto, however, was once police chief under Trujillo, is considered incompetent and dishonest, and has had close ties with those officials Amiama finds so objectionable. It may well be that Balaguer named Soto to balance Amiamaʼ influence. In any event, Amiamaʼ handling of the investigation and the direct control he would like to exercise over the police seems likely to bring him into conflict with Soto, who has already said he is unaware of any police deficiencies in the Imbert case.
6. The new minister of interior and police has already come into conflict with Balaguer over the disposition of outgoing police chief Tejeda. Amiama has threatened to resign unless Balaguer, who had named Tejeda to his palace staff, removes the ex-police chief from active duty. If Amiama resigns, this might be followed by the resignation of his brother—Foreign Affairs Minister Fernando Amiama Tio (who [Page 451] is slated to be a member of the Dominican summit delegation)—and be accompanied by a great glare of publicity and bitter recriminations. Some weeks before the attack on Imbert, Amiama threatened that if Balaguer forced an open break with him he would have no alternative but to make common cause with other anti-“trujillista” elements of both the left and right—including the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the Communists. In fact, Amiama already has held a series of meetings with the PRD secretary general over the past two months.
7. Imbert himself may pose additional political problems as he recovers from his wounds. Even more rightist and opportunistic than Amiama, he had been sounding out various political elements with regard to an anti-Balaguer coalition when the assassination attempt boosted his popular image. Imbertʼs heroics after the attack—such as the driving of his own car to the hospital while wounded in both shoulders—probably elicited admiration in certain circles, including the military. Amiamaʼ concern over Imbertʼs ambitions may have been behind his suggestion to the US Embassy that Imbert be invited to the US for medical treatment. Such a move would remove one irritant from the scene, at least for a while.
Attitudes Among the Military
8. The attack and resulting investigation has introduced an element of strain into Balaguerʼ relations with the military. Minister of Defense Perez has said that the intense investigation Amiama has conducted within the armed services has produced some resentment among military officers who remain jealous of their prerogatives and privileges. This could provide an opening for disgruntled military officers, such as those whose political cliques have been disrupted by Balaguer or who had been removed from choice assignments, to coalesce under the guise of protecting the military establishment. Another factor for instability would develop if military elements came to believe that Balaguerʼ performance in a period of political turmoil showed irresolution and vacillation.
Other Political Factors
9. These various charges and maneuvers on the issue of trujilloism are taking place against a mixed pattern of other developments, some favorable and some adverse for the Balaguer government. On the one hand, the left-of-center political parties—particularly those on the extreme left—are in serious disagreement and disarray. On the other hand, they have been keeping up a drumfire of criticism of Balaguer for the failure of his government to control and prevent violence. Particularly active in this role are the radical leaders of the PRD who succeeded Juan Bosch when he went into voluntary exile in Europe. [Page 452] Government officials continue to provide the left with new ammunition for their charges; most recently the governmentʼ director of telecommunications was accused of armed assault for entering a PRD-oriented radio station on 29 March and destroying transmitting equipment.
10. Balaguer has had considerable success in reducing the influence of the PRD and of the extreme leftist parties in the labor movement. There is strong labor resentment, however, over the governmentʼ wage freezes. The Dominican President has managed to wean some moderates away from the PRD, and so far the small Revolutionary Social Christian Party has adhered to a policy of “constructive opposition.” On the other hand, the Social Christians have recently suggested they would abandon that policy unless Balaguer allows their party a more influential role, and the PRD has said it will not support the government in the event of a coup.
The Economic Scene
11. Economic developments have not helped to offset Balaguerʼ political problems. In fact, available signs indicate that the pace of economic activity has been disappointing thus far this year. This sluggishness has taken place against a background of high and chronic unemployment, and potentially explosive social conditions, particularly in Santo Domingo. Further, the persistent balance of payments deficit has recently shown signs of getting worse and the inflation potential may be growing because of the current trend toward increased government deficits. These economic problems will require politically difficult policy choices involving further import restrictions, higher taxes, and devaluation. Uncertainties over the economyʼ short-term future compound the problem of choosing among these alternatives.
The Outlook
12. All things considered, the difficulties facing Balaguer seem serious but not yet critical. There are no indications that antigovernment elements are planning to take advantage of Balaguerʼ expected absence during the summit meeting, but there are deep currents of tension and emotion within the government that could suddenly surface without warning. In addition, Vice President Lora is neither widely respected nor considered to possess great political acumen, and someone could try to test his control of the situation.
13. Balaguer probably believes that he can reap domestic political dividends from the summit trip in the form of favorable publicity; he may hope to establish an image as a recognized hemisphere statesman. He is likely to seek assurances of continued US economic and political backing—a factor that carries considerable weight with many potential Dominican dissidents.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XVII. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA and coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports, the Office of National Estimates, and the clandestine services.↩
- President Johnson was 1 of 20 Chiefs of State who attended the American Chiefs of State Conference at Punta Del Este, Uruguay, April 12–14.↩