174. Memorandum From Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Yarmolinsky) to Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)1
I–23, 124/66
Washington, May 9, 1966.
SUBJECT
Without consulting Ambassador Bunker or other representatives on the Ad Hoc Committee,
Garcia Godoy dispatched a
personal emissary to the various Latin American capitals and Washington
(arriving on June 14) to urge a “unanimous meeting of the minds” that
the IAPF be withdrawn from the
Dominican Republic before the installation of a constitutional
government. This move was probably taken by Godoy with an eye towards the 1970 election (when he
could campaign as the man who got the IAPF out of the Dominican Republic). It would confront the
newly-elected President, however, with the choice of requesting the
continued presence of the IAPF or
automatically foregoing the security it affords and the new government
may badly need.
[Page 407]
To take the initiative away from Godoy, the State Department has circulated for comment a
proposed OAS resolution dealing with the
withdrawal of the IAPF. The State
proposal (Tab A), together with the reaction of the Embassy at Santo
Domingo, CINCLANT and the Joint
Chiefs, is described below.
State proposes an OAS Resolution that would call for the withdrawal of the
IAPF unless the newly-elected
government decides by June 15th that the IAPF should stay on. The State proposal assumes that the
Dominican military and police will be capable of keeping peace and
order. It also assumes that the Dominican military will accept Bosch (unless he begins to govern
ineptly or tries to eliminate the military). It notes the possibility,
however, that Bosch might try to
keep the IAPF for an extended period as
an umbrella to protect him while he revamps the Dominican military to
his liking and to place him in a better position in dealing with the
US on economic assistance.
The Embassy argues against the State proposal on
the grounds that no Dominican politician could afford the risk of
requesting, after the election, that the IAPF stay on. The Embassy believes that both Balaguer and Bosch would want the IAPF to remain for the first few months, and it urges that
it is in the US interest to assist the
new government, no matter who is elected, to get off to a proper start.
The Embassy endorses a formula under which a decision on whether the
IAPF stays or goes would be taken
by the 10th Meeting of Foreign Ministers, after the election and
following consultation among the Ad Hoc Committee, Garcia Godoy and the successful
candidate. This formula, the Embassy believes, would give the OAS and the newly-elected President the
flexibility they both need.
CINCLANT
disagrees with State and Santo Domingo. He proposes a
resolution calling for the withdrawal of the IAPF immediately following the elections. CINCLANT would not give the elected
President an option to retain the IAPF.
He argues that the mission of the IAPF
will have been fulfilled with the holding of elections and fears that
Bosch, if elected, would
retain the IAPF so that he could revamp
the Dominican military along leftist lines. Without the IAPF, CINCLANT believes that Bosch would be forced to seek an accommodation with the
military. CINCLANT challenges
Stateʼs assumption re the abilities of the Dominican security
forces.CINCLANT considers that
the Dominican forces would be adequate up to a point where military-type
action might become involved. If the latter should occur, he feels that
at least 20% of the Dominican security forces would defect and that we
would be confronted with another April 1965. In CINCLANTʼs judgment, the Dominican
security forces cannot be fully trained or equipped before January
1967.
The Joint Chiefs favor a variation of the State
formula. They propose an early OAS
Resolution calling for the withdrawal of the IAPF
[Page 408]
to begin at the earliest practicable date
following the election. The speed of withdrawal under this proposal
would depend upon the degree of stability shown by the new government.
The Joint Chiefs share CINCLANTʼs
assessment of the ability (or inability) of the Dominican security
forces to maintain peace and order. The Chiefʼs position is at Tab
B.2
We agree with the Chiefʼs proposal, but believe it would be improved by
adding a statement to the Resolution that the rate of withdrawal would
be determined by the OAS (through the Ad
Hoc Committee) after discussion with the newly-elected government. This
addition would avoid the criticism that the IAPF might be withdrawn precipitately immediately following
the elections.
I recommend that you approve the State Department proposal as modified by
the JCS and ISA changes noted above.3 Both changes are shown in Tab A.
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson4
SUBJECT
- Withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the
Dominican Republic
Recommendation:
“That the United States seek an OAS
resolution at the earliest possible date to commence withdrawal of
the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) from the Dominican Republic at the earliest
practicable date following the election of 1 June and that the
phasing of the withdrawal will be determined by the OAS (through the Ad Hoc Committee) in
consultation with the President-elect.”
Discussion:
Communist Risk
From the point of view of the security of the United States the
IAPF should remain in the
Dominican Republic after a newly elected government is inaugurated
only if the Dominican police and military [Page 409] are unable to maintain internal security and
prevent a Communist takeover of the government. As a result of the
training and equipment we have provided to the Dominican police and
military over the last several months, it is the view of the
Departments of State and Defense that these forces are now capable
of maintaining internal security in the Dominican Republic. We
should, however, continue our stepped-up training program and
provide such other equipment as may be considered necessary to keep
these forces in an adequate state of readiness.
The continued presence of the IAPF
in the Dominican Republic provides a lightning rod for extremists
and in a sense strengthens their position. It is a continued
political liability to the United States.
It is recognized that the extreme left in the Dominican Republic has
substantial arms in its possession. It is unlikely that these arms
will be collected in the near future, certainly not within the time
limit which the Hemisphere in general would consider acceptable for
the continuance of the IAPF in the
Dominican Republic. We must be prepared to accept the risk that the
Communists, at one time or another, will make a further play for
power in the Dominican Republic. The best method for dealing with
this risk is adequate training and equipping of the Dominican police
and military establishment. We could not hope to continue an IAPF in the Dominican Republic
indefinitely for the purpose of dealing with this risk.
Balaguer as President
The election of Balaguer as
President of the Dominican Republic would provide reasonable
assurance of a satisfactory working relationship between the
civilian government and the Dominican armed forces. It can also be
expected that Balaguer will
take appropriate action to avoid infiltration of his government by
Communists and Communist sympathizers. The Communists and extreme
left can be expected to agitate against a government headed by
Balaguer, but such
agitation can be handled so long as Balaguer and the armed forces work harmoniously
together and the United States provides a reasonable level of
assistance to the government. It is expected that Balaguer would request the
withdrawal of the IAPF very soon
after his election.
Bosch as President
A government headed by Juan
Bosch will have difficulty maintaining good relations
with the Dominican armed forces and police. But the armed forces
leaders have made clear that they will accept the election results.
Difficulties between Bosch and
the armed forces would arise if he governed as ineptly as he did in
1963, or if he took action which the armed forces interpret as an
effort to eliminate them. Bosch has indicated in some of his remarks and
through third parties that he [Page 410] might like to keep the IAPF in the Dominican Republic after
his election as a counterpoise to the Dominican military and
police.
The possibility exists that we will be asked to remove the IAPF by the newly elected president at
a time of his choosing. In the case of Juan Bosch, there may be an equivocal situation in
which he would seek to keep the IAPF as a trump card to be used by him against the
Dominican armed forces. This contingency could involve the United
States and the IAPF continuously in
Dominican politics. Moreover, the recent speeches of Bosch on economic matters suggest
that there may be considerable difficulty in working out a
satisfactory self-help program under Alliance criteria. With our
continued commitment in the Dominican Republic through the IAPF, however, we might be forced to
provide continuing economic assistance on a basis which we regard as
unsatisfactory.
The OAS commitment, and therefore
ours, is to help restore a normal situation in the Dominican
Republic and to carry the country to elections. By extension, it
might also be said that this includes inauguration of the elected
president. Thus, if the IAPF
remains in the Dominican Republic long enough to assure the
installation of a president, we would have fulfilled the objectives
we set out to achieve in April 1965.
The decision on withdrawal of the IAPF should be made before the election. If Juan Bosch should win and the
decision is delayed until after the election, we will be under
pressure from certain elements in the United States to keep the
IAPF in the Dominican Republic
to assure that Juan Bosch
stays in office. If we nevertheless decide at that stage to withdraw
the force, we may be charged with leaving Juan Bosch to the mercy of the Dominican military
forces.
