136. Intelligence Memorandum1

OCI No. 2328/65

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY—A BALANCE SHEET

A.
Garcia Godoyʼs actions as Provisional President have roused the expectations of the left in the Dominican Republic and created bitter resentments among the military and moderate political elements. During his first weeks in office he has continually made concessions [Page 328] to the rebel camp—concessions that have been seen by the military chiefs as threatening to their position and by the moderates as insuring institutional advantages which would bring about an election victory for the left.
B.
Garcia Godoy has made no progress on re-integration of the rebel zone and little on arms collection. He apparently feels he must go “softly” with the rebels on these issues so as to be able to solve them without resort to force. As time passes, however, the rebels have felt encouraged to depict themselves as the victors in the civil war and to make increasing demands on Garcia Godoy at the expense of their opponents.
C.
In these circumstances the outlook for political stability will change rapidly when IAPF leaves the country. Departure of the IAPF is already becoming a heady political issue. Garcia Godoy is suspicious and distrustful of the military and unwilling to become dependent on them for fear of seriously compromising his political future. This leaves him no alternative but to solicit voluntary cooperation from the left, an almost hopeless task, and the formulation of policies calculated to develop popular support.
D.
Unless the provisional regime makes an effective effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the contending factions, longer term political stability is unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept the results of elections if the other wins and both are bent on insuring that the “suspended revolution” reaches a conclusion.

[Omitted here are sections entitled: “Introduction,” “Garcia Godoy as President,” “Garcia Godoyʼs Motives and Tactics,” “Concessions to the Rebels,” “Appointments,” “Opposition,” and “Insurgency.”]

Outlook

16.
The outlook for political stability will change drastically when the IAPF leaves the Dominican Republic. This provisional government will be under increasing domestic pressure to effect the IAPFʼs departure in the next few months. In the meantime, the extreme left can be counted on to create incidents to embarrass the provisional government over the IAPF presence. Even moderate politicians will use the presence of the IAPF as a campaign issue. The demonstrations of 27 September over IAPF occupation of school buildings were the first of such incidents. Bosch has already indicated that the IAPF presence will be a major campaign issue and has called for strikes to bring about its withdrawal. Even relatively conservative Joaquin Balaguer has said the continued IAPF presence offends national “sovereignty.”
17.
If the provisional government were to ask for the IAPFʼs removal it would be difficult for Latin American nations in the OAS, many of them still sensitive over the US intervention, to fail to comply. Garcia Godoy might exploit such a request in order to win popular [Page 329] backing. He has already displayed a sensitivity over the OAS resolution calling for joint OAS-provisional government determination of the date of IAPF withdrawals. He has said that domestic politics demand a statement that the provisional government would prefer to make the decision on withdrawal. In a recent interview with a Mexican magazine, Garcia Godoy reportedly said that he hopes the IAPF will leave “soon” and that the election campaign should be conducted without the presence of foreign troops.
18.
Until some decision is reached on the IAPF, the paramount problem relating to security and stability will be the conduct of the provisional government. The present trend is toward further concessions to the rebels. Garcia Godoy clearly is reluctant to resort to any action that might entail use of force. He is suspicious and distrustful of the military and unwilling to become dependent on them for fear of seriously compromising his political future. This leaves him no alternative but to solicit voluntary cooperation from the left, an almost hopeless task, and the formulation of policies calculated to develop popular support.
19.
Unless the provisional regime makes an effective effort to resolve the bitter enmity existing between the contending factions, longer term political stability is unlikely. Neither side is presently reconciled to accept the results of elections if the other wins and both are bent on insuring that the “suspended revolution” reaches a conclusion.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. XI, 9/65–10/65. Secret; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA.