194. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
142. 1. During my recent peregrinations in Saigon, Washington, Honolulu and Bangkok, I had numerous discussions with interested officials concerning Lao corridor. Because these talks covered various aspects of the problem at various stops, I consider it might be useful to record in one message the view which I have expressed orally.
2. First of apb, [all?] I have indicated some concern that we define our objectives as best we can in the various categories of interdiction, harassment and intelligence. Any actions we would intend to take towards any one of these ultimate objectives will have its effect on each of the other two.
3. Starting with interdiction, which would be the ideal end result, I think it has to be conceded from the start that we do not have adequate resources in Laos to accomplish true interdiction against a determined Viet Minh effort to keep the corridor open. Similarly, it is most improbable that we could interdict by air action alone. Therefore, if we really intend to interdict, we have to think in terms of large numbers of ground forces moving into Lao territory from Vietnam in order to occupy the terrain. CINCPAC estimated these numbers at approximately two U.S. divisions.
4. In considering such an enterprise, the probable military results have to be measured against the predictable political costs. These costs, which would involve the overt violation of the 1962 agreements on Laos, would involve far more than just a question of principle. There would be very real practical consequences as well. These could develop in either of two directions:
- A.
- Our invasion would have to be done contrary to Souvanna’s wishes. (This would be most likely circumstance.) In this case, we would have to decide to defy him, to establish a puppet government with military backing, and take the consequences. In effect, we would have to repeat the 1961 scenario. It is doubtful that the outcome would be any more satisfactory this time around.
- B.
- Our action could be undertaken with Souvanna’s blessing but at the price of assuring him protection by U.S. resources against the consequent Viet Minh reaction. This would engage considerable numbers of U.S. and probably Thai forces to protect the Mekong River Valley and associated areas of Laos. In short, we could not confine our Laotian military undertaking to the corridor alone.
5. I encountered no strong disposition, at any of my stops, to propose interdictory action at the political and military costs outlined above. I also found a general understanding that, in greater or less degree, these same considerations applied to all measures proposed against the corridor which entailed overt, conspicuous violation of Lao territory and the 1962 agreements. Thus, certain of the contingency plans discussed under agenda item 1 (c) of the most recent SEACOORD meeting,2 which would involve forces that could not, because of their nature and numbers, remain clandestine, have to be measured in this same general scale of military results versus political costs.
6. This brings us to harassment. It will be recognized that we already engage in some harassment against the corridor. This is in the form of RLAF air action, Steel Tiger, Bango/Whiplash, and finally the clandestine SGU operations on the ground. We are attempting to enhance all of these, and, given certain technical breakthroughs, ought to be able to be more effective, particularly with our air actions. We should not overlook the possibility of more effective exploitation of FAR’s potential in the southern corridor area, the provinces of Attopeu and Saravane. We have certain advantages here, including a competent commander, which should permit some modest advances along the fringes of the corridor, giving us better jumping-off bases for intelligence and harassment.
7. A special case in point is Shining Brass. I had useful talks both in Saigon and Honolulu on this subject. Colonel Blackburn, the new SOG Chief, has a very realistic approach to this enterprise and is quite willing to try a start under the ground rules now in effect. In comment on these ground rules, I should like to stress that these are intended to fix practical operating conditions which minimize the risk of a large political ruckus, but which will provide an experience factor against which we can explore modifications as time goes on.
Therefore, in Saigon, we agreed that SOG would begin its operations by overland penetration in the two authorized areas, using small teams accompanied by U.S. personnel. Although I have no reason, from Vientiane perspective, to insist on ten day limit for operations, Colonel Blackburn seemed to feel that was reasonable from viewpoint human endurance in this terrain. If he wishes extend that period, I would not object.
As for air support, I would naturally concur in emergency extraction by air if the team were in trouble. It seems to me that this would fall [Page 389] into category of SAR effort. On aerial resupply, this would seem to be one of the matters where experience factor should be examined, especially in determining whether teams wish to jeopardize the secrecy of their locations by conspicuous airlifts. With respect air strikes, these can be accomplished with Bango/Whiplash framework if strikes are really desired. It is important that we use this procedure in order to have effective double check against possibility striking other friendly clandestine units operating in corridor under Vientiane control.
Finally, on question aerial introduction of teams, I continue negative insofar as it concerns initial penetration. Nothing could be more reckless than to drop some boys (a la Leaping Lena) into an unknown area where they are almost certain to be caught. Whether we would ultimately wish rotate personnel by air is question on which I feel we should again reserve judgment, as in case aerial resupply, until experience factors can be measured.
In short, I feel the most fruitful course of action on Shining Brass is to begin modestly under rules currently approved and then examine the operations as they proceed to determine where and how they can be successfully improved.
8. This brings us to intelligence, and especially to the inherent conflict between harassment actions and intelligence efforts. It has been our experience that, whenever we convert some of our passive intelligence assets into positive harassment teams, we produce a reaction which eventually degrades our intelligence capabilities. For example, when a guerilla team, based on intelligence supplied by one of our road watch teams, conducts a harassment, the Viets invariably react by launching a sweep which clears all of our road watch teams off that section of the road.
This relationship is one which will have to be examined in the conduct of all our operations in the corridor. I discussed it with General Carroll, during his recent visit, and with Admiral Sharp at Honolulu. It will have particular pertinence to Shining Brass and will, in large measure, determine operational features of that program. Similarly, with our SGU teams, our Kha assets, and other in-country efforts, objectives have to be fixed in the light of this equation.
9. Finally, there is the question of the degree to which the RLG should be or would wish to be privy to all our activity. Much of what we are now doing in the corridor is known only in vague outline to Souvanna and I’m sure he prefers it that way. Some of our future operations may involve such political risk that it would be prudent to have fairly clear understandings with Souvanna. This is something else we’ll have to keep under constant examination.
10. In summary, there are vomiting considerations to all the actions which may be proposed in the corridor. We will have to weigh these in [Page 390] the balance each time. The essential consideration is that we must be sure, in each instance, that the objective we seek is worth the price we will have to pay.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.↩
- Apparent reference to the SEACOORD meeting of July 23–24 held at Bangkok. Item C discussed at this meeting was plans presented by COMUSMACTHAI for Thai/U.S. Special Forces operations in the Laos corridor. At the meeting it was agreed that the planning should go forward on a stand-by basis even if it proved unnecessary to use the forces. (Telegram 149 from Bangkok, July 24; ibid., DEF 1 ASIA SE)↩