Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 13, 1965, 1040Z.

161. Shining Brass. Refs A. Deptel [106].² B. Vientiane’s 142.³ C. MACV MACSOG 9621.⁴

1. My political reservations about certain features of Shining Brass have always been associated with prospect that U.S. military personnel would be captured during these operations and would be paraded as flagrant violators of 1962 Geneva Accords. Our experience with GVN personnel captured during Leaping Lena indicates that Vietnamese elements of these teams will readily reveal all features of operations during interrogation. We could therefore expect details of these operations to be thoroughly exposed.

2. An exposure in this form would not only prove highly embarrassing to U.S., but also to Lao Government. Since it is currently contemplated that Shining Brass should proceed without knowledge of RLG, this embarrassment might produce strong reaction from Souvanna, and jeopardize most of our other operations in this country.

3. It has always seemed to me that U.S. and GVN personnel who are introduced into Laos by ground infiltration can claim either that (A) they were captured on Vietnam side of border, or (B) they did not know where border was. Hence, any chances of violating Laos territory could be anticipated and neutralized by a claim that U.S. personnel had been captured by Viet units in Vietnam and dragged across border into Laos.

4. On other hand, units introduced by air, with virtual certainty that operational details would be disclosed to enemy (para 1) if captured, would leave us with much egg on face. Therefore, I decidedly feel that we should reserve any authorization for use of air reinforcement or resupply until experience factor in Shining Brass gives us grounds on which to make a political judgment. It may be that Shining Brass operators themselves will decide, for military reasons, that they do not wish aerial resupply and reinforcement because such conspicuous activity would compromise their locations. However, if, for military reasons, they wish (after gaining experience factor) to recommend aerial resupply or reinforcement, then, at that stage, we will have to get a political judgment at fairly high levels. One element in that judgment will be decision whether we will wish to clear entire operation with Souvanna.

5. As previously stated (Ref B) I would have no objection to emergency aerial extraction, since I would regard this as an SAR action, similar to those we conduct regularly for downed airmen. Aerial extraction as a routine operation measure would, however, fall into same general caveats stipulated in para 4 above.

6. I note that no mention is made in Ref A concerning proposal in Ref C that certain selected teams be launched into corridor from Laos. I assume therefore, that this feature is not authorized. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. Reference A was not completed, but it is to telegram 106 to Vientiane, August 12, in which the Department of State informed the Embassy that the Department of Defense contemplated approving in principle cross-border operations into Laos. South Vietnamese teams accompanied by U.S. advisers would be infiltrated by ground, resupplied, reinforced, and evacuated by air. They could receive air support while in Laos and their stay would no longer be limited to 10 days. The Department asked if the Embassy had any objection to air resupply, reinforcement, or evacuation by air from South Vietnam. (Ibid.)
3. Document 194.
4. Not found.