Office of the Historian

193. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

Washington, August 7, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Cross-border Operations (U)
1.
(TS) JCSM–475–65, dated 18 June 1965, subject as above, submitted recommendations pertaining to cross-border operations into the Laos Panhandle.2
2.
(TS) Subsequent to submission of JCSM–475–65, the US Ambassador to Laos, on 23 July 1965,3 in conference with representatives of the [Page 385] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and the Joint Staff, indicated concurrence with the concept for cross-border operations and initiation of Phase I, subject to the following modifications:
a.
Initial introduction of teams accompanied by US advisors into Laos to be by ground infiltration.
b.
Subsequent resupply, reinforcement, or evacuation by air from South Vietnam to be permitted.
c.
Air strikes on possible targets developed to be flown as approved and conducted through the Bango system only, not to include strike aircraft from South Vietnam.
d.
Elimination of the ten-day restriction on the length of stay.
3.
(TS) With regard to subparagraph 2 c, above, air strikes on targets developed by cross-border teams would be conducted through the Bango alert system, which employs strip alert US aircraft based in Thailand. This system requires that air strike requests be passed to the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), Udorn, and thence to the Air Attache (AIRA), Vientiane, for approval. Upon approval, attack aircraft are scrambled from Ubon and a T–28 air coordinator from Udorn. If the aircraft in Ubon are unavailable, the Bango system draws on Whiplash aircraft at Korat and Takli, which are up to 380 nautical miles from the target area. The original concept envisioned that all strike requests would be passed immediately to an ASOC in the RVN. The ASOC would launch A–1 aircraft on ground alert at RVN bases less than 90 miles from the target area. An air coordinator would not be required and US team members trained as Forward Air Controllers would control air strikes. COMUSMACV has pointed out problem areas involved in using the Bango system for this particular operation. However, in the interest of obtaining early approval to initiate operations, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC recommend acceptance of the Bango system with necessary adjustments to be made if the responsiveness of the system is not satisfactory.
4.
(TS) CINCPAC, on 27 July 1965, recommended acceptance of the other modifications listed in paragraph 2, above, for initiation of Phase I operations.
5.
(TS) Costs incident to FY 1966 cross-border funding requirements have been refined by COMUSMACV as follows:
a.
Dollar funding requirement—$191,000.
(1)
Individual equipment for approximately 80 personnel— $20,000.
(2)
Organizational equipment including communications— $100,000.
(3)
Personnel and organizational equipment replacement and additional communication requirements—$25,000.
(4)
TDY funds to support US augmentation personnel—$46,000.
b.
Piastre funding requirements totaling $125,000 will be made available through GVN approved budget.
c.
If special paramilitary forces are required for subsequent operations visualized for Phases II and III, additional funds will be required.
6.
(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view that FY 1966 costs for specialized equipments and support of indigenous personnel which cannot be allocated through normal timely mechanisms be provided from DOD contingency funds. In this connection, responsibility for planning and conducting cross-border operations has been assigned by COMUSMACV to the Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group which currently is responsible for OPLAN 34A operations against the NVN. Therefore, the funding mechanism developed for cross-border forces should be additive or compatible to that utilized for OPLAN 34A, in order to avoid layering two methods of accountability on the field agency responsible for operations. Further, with regard to the COMUSMACV estimate for TDY funds to support US augmentation personnel ($46,000—item 5a(4), above), it is considered that such costs should be borne by the Services involved as a normal obligation as in the case of other TDY personnel ordered to forward stations. Therefore, the dollar funding requirement summarized in paragraph 5, above, for FY 1966 DOD contingency funds should be $145,000.
7.
(TS) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend, in lieu of paragraph 8 of JCSM–475–65, that:
a.
The cross-border concept contained in JCSM–475–65, as modified by paragraph 2, above, be approved.
b.
Phase I, as modified by paragraph 2, above, be approved for execution.
c.
FY 1966 costs incident to cross-border operations in the amount of $145,000 be funded from DOD contingency funds in a manner similar to that employed for OPLAN 34A funding.
8.
(U) Upon receipt of your approval, the draft message in the Appendix4 will be dispatched.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, DOD/OSD Admin Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Viet 381. Top Secret.↩
  2. The recommendations were that cross-border concept be approved, in principal, for further planning, training, and discussion with the RVNAF; that approval be given to the first phase, operating in only the two southernmost areas of Laos (Dak Prou and Dak Tou), operate up to a limit of 20 kilometers from the border and for no longer than 10 days; that the costs be paid from Defense contingency funds; and that air infiltration, exfiltration, and supply be allowed and that uniformed U.S. advisers participate in the operations. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Sullivan summarized his discussion on this issue in general in Document 194.↩
  4. Not found.↩