306. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson1
Final Notes on Gandhi Visit. This is my valedictory as your Mid-East hand, but fittingly so because I don’t think there’s been a more important substantive meeting since Kennedy met Khrushchev in Vienna. The flow of people and memos citing this as a historic opportunity to settle on a new course with 500 million Asians suggests that this is more than a Chet Bowles promotion.
Moreover, I think that we finally have the Indians where you’ve wanted them ever since last April—with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us asking for a new relationship on the terms we want. Circumstances helped (famine and the Pak/Indian war), but seldom has a visit been more carefully prepared, nor the Indians forced more skillfully to come to us (note how little press backlash about US pressure tactics—when it’s been just that for almost a full year).
The proof is that India is now talking positively about buying all the World Bank reforms; its line is now that it wants to go boldly in this direction, but can only do so if the consortium will help pay the inevitable cost. This is precisely where we wanted to maneuver the Indians—into saying they’ll help themselves if we’ll respond in turn.
The Nature of the Economic Bargain. This is aptly described in Dean Rusk’s memo2 at Tab A. I’d only add two points. First, I’d break away from the old pledge figure (435) and talk privately in terms of around a half billion dollars from all US sources—it sounds more generous while the arithmetic is the same—plus at least half a billion in food. This is over $1 billion—a generous response in anyone’s league.
Second, I’d stress that this can be a self-enforcing bargain—in two critical respects. Most of our dollar loan aid plus debt rollover (and the consortium’s as well) can be tied directly to import liberalization, as we did with the Paks. If India doesn’t liberalize to our taste, it just doesn’t get the dough. Similarly, you have already proved how our holding back on PL–480 can force India into revolutionizing its agriculture. Once the famine is licked, I’m for continuing to ride PL–480 with a short rein—it will be painful but productive. If these points don’t add up to requiring self-help, I’ll eat them.
[Page 594]That tough-minded George Woods and the World Bank are with us is reassuring. You’ve read the VP’s report on his talk with Woods,3 and at Tab B is Gaud’s memo4 on his views. Woods talks about “double or nothing” being the only sensible course on India aid, and it’s true that on any per capita basis our aid to India is very low (less than a dollar per person ex-food), while India’s own self-help contribution to its development is higher than that of almost any other LDC (twice that of Pakistan).
But as I explained the other day I think we can get real results in the next two years without going to Congress for a lot more money. Debt rollover is the backdoor financing key, and it’s the same as aid. If India takes off as a result of our strategy, then we’ll have a solid case to take to the Hill.
Political Conditions. We’re not going to get as much from Indira on the political side, especially on Vietnam and Pakistan. She’s new at being PM, scared of the coming elections, and lacking as yet in the confidence in her own position which would let her talk big. But we have a strong ally moving India toward us on these matters—Mao Tse-tung. Just as he forced the Soviets in our direction, he’s done the same with India. So the Indians are increasingly serious about China, and all we need do is nudge this trend along.
On Pakistan, the one thing that really gravels Indians—Dinesh Singh and B. K. Nehru are prime examples—is that we “equate” 500 million Indians with 100 million Paks. If you would just tell Mrs. Gandhi that we can count, it would reassure her enough about our basic intentions, that she’d stop any carping about our aid to the Paks.
If she raises military aid, I’d short circuit this by saying that it’s far less important than economic issues and we plan no decisions for a while, beyond perhaps allowing sales. Nor do we intend to re-arm Pakistan to where it can threaten India. In fact, we favor both countries putting a ceiling on military outlays; we don’t intend to finance an arms race indirectly via US economic aid. But India too must realize that forcing the Pak military to depend on Peking for arms would be folly from India’s own viewpoint.
She’s also ready to say in spades that India has no intention of taking over Pakistan. Get her to say so, and you can use it as powerful reassurance to Ayub. It’s the best you can get him, because she simply [Page 595] can’t give anything now on Kashmir (and it only creates useless trouble for us to try).
Emergency food is the trickiest problem. What’s needed is both to give her reasonable confidence that Uncle Sam will help generously and to keep enough pressure on her to seek other help and push on with reforms. The best bet is to say you’ll put it up to the Congress. But you should know that all your Executive Branch advisers are deeply worried lest Hill debate get out of hand, and create a sour aftermath to a successful visit. Even the sober Ellsworth Bunker reminded me of the 1951 experience when Mr. Truman went up for a $190 million food loan to India; Bunker said the violent criticisms voiced in the debate set back our political relations far more than the food helped fill bellies. Ellender talking about sacred cows certainly won’t help. You might ask Bunker about this.
You’re the judge on Congress. I’d only urge that we design the message to create the least flap and give you the most room to maneuver. This means avoiding tight formulas which box us in, since the worst of the famine is yet to come. Also, what happens if you ask for only 3.5 million tons of wheat/milo, and then want to authorize another tranche around September when Congress is out of session?
Visit tactics. All those who know her urge you see her alone first, put her at her ease, and then trigger her spiel by asking where she sees India going.
If she says the right things, you have a whole range of responses. I’d be generous but general, telling her that if she does what she says we’ll respond in kind. We’ll abide by what India works out with the World Bank (up to around a half billion—including debt rollover and EXIM).
The experts say there’s a strong case for moving quickly in May/June, before India gets caught up in its election campaign and Indira loses room to maneuver. So you might urge that she send her economics ministers pronto to talk with the World Bank.
I’m also sending up State’s briefing books, which have all the facts and background. You might want to reread the Strategy and Talking papers. I’ll have an agenda for tomorrow’s 10 a.m. pre-briefing session, at which we can clear up any last-minute points.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, PM Gandhi Visit Papers, 3/27–30/66. Confidential.↩
- Document 304.↩
- Not found.↩
- In a March 25 memorandum to the President, Gaud summarized World Bank views on India. He noted that if the Indian Government agreed to liberalize import controls, proceed vigorously with the new agricultural program, and keep up the momentum on population control, the World Bank would lend full support. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, PM Gandhi Visit Papers, 3/27–30/66)↩