Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 26, 1966, 1600Z.

1805. Dept pass White House. Ref: Embtel 1804² and Deptel 1340.³ Conversation with President Ayub re Indo-Pak relations.

1. In same March 24 conversation with President Ayub, I took up, pursuant to reftel, recent unsatisfactory development of Indo-Pak relations. I discussed forthcoming Washington visit Indira Gandhi, confirming that we would seek to promote acceptance by GOI of need for peaceful solution of all essential Indo-Pak issues as a necessary contribution to security of India as well as Pakistan. We were urging both parties to seek constructive atmosphere for continuation of bilateral ministerial talks, with recognition that each side would have to show some flexibility in every round if momentum was to be maintained. Urged Paks to seek progress on all fronts where essential interests of two countries touched, including trade, arms limitation, refugees, and territorial disputes, as well as Kashmir. I said that, in all candor, we felt disappointment that Paks apparently had shown needlessly rigid and negative attitude in recent first round of Ministerial talks at Rawalpindi, particularly citing apparent GOP unwillingness to negotiate restoration of various services and relationships interrupted by war.

2. President Ayub denied that Pakistan had been the cantankerous party in the talks. He said the Indian refusal to engage in even prelimi nary discussion of mechanism for later Kashmir negotiations had torpedoed the Ministerial talks, not any Pak intransigence. He condemned Indian self righteousness in pretending they were the wholly reasonable party and Pak stubbornness entirely responsible for lack of accomplishment. President said GOP would not refuse to consider restoration remaining usual operating connections between the two countries, but he felt that restoration was relatively small matter which could not provide any basic solutions and that routine questions should not be mixed at Ministerial level with the matters which did fundamentally matter, which he identified as settlement of basic dispute (Kashmir) and arrangement to live with each other in peace and security without threat posed by excessive military capability. President said Indians were as delinquent on issue of arms build-up as on Kashmir. Pakistan could have no feeling of confidence or security about the future in such circumstances and would have to condition its posture on that of India, which was unyielding as to Kashmir and threatening as to arms build-up. Ayub felt that we were over-estimating the importance of day to day relationships such as trade, bilateral air services, communications and travel between the two countries. He said that existence of these facilities had not prevented the outbreak of war in 1965 and restoration would not solve the current deep difficulties in Indo-Pak relations. He was not sure that a normalization of ordinary relationships would be timely or appropriate at this juncture. The tragic losses inflicted during the war were only a few months back and people could not and should not forget them and go about ordinary day to day business as though nothing had occurred.

3. I said we felt that it was right and proper to go about the healing process as rapidly as possible, beginning with modest measures if that was the best that could be done at the moment. We thought that restoration of any and all normal ties and reestablishment of the fullest possible intercourse between the two counties would accelerate the healing process, tending to lower the barriers of hate and misunderstanding, some of which grew out of ignorance and disruption of normal links.

4. I told President we thought it was possible that GOI might be prevailed upon in a later bilateral session to agree to discussion its national security requirements as to Kashmir, and to consider the Pak view of its national security requirements as affected by the Kashmir issue. I suggested that in a pre-election year, this might be about all the Indians could realistically be expected to do and it might be the forerunner of a broader joint exploration of other aspects of the Kashmir issue later on. I suggested that a joint Indo-Pak examination of defense requirements and ceilings might also be undertaken. I probed to see how receptive the President might be to this approach.

5. Ayub was less than lukewarm to this suggestion, indicating that while national security of Kashmir was of major importance, it could hardly be separated out from other aspects of the issue, all factors being closely inter-related. He was not willing to say that he saw promise in this approach but he indicated he would think about it. I told him that some such exchange could be construed by each side as the “visible effort” that needed to be made by each party. I told Ayub we were watching closely the performance of each side, and as Vice President Humphrey had intimated, the willingness of both India and Pakistan to make accommodations in the spirit of Tashkent would have a bearing on our ability to reestablish our economic and technical assistance programs on a fuller scale. Tactics by either side incompatible with their responsibility for maintenance of peace and negotiating progress would militate against our ability to restore our aid programs in the way that we would like to.

6. President Ayub expressed GOP willingness to do full part to contribute to peace and maintain progress along lines Tashkent declaration but asserted corresponding Indian willingness was so far missing. He cited alarming scale of Indian rearmament, including recent acquisition large number Communist tanks, not suitable for use in Himalayas, and certainly intended only for employment against Pakistan. He referred to swollen Indian military budget and large diversion of Indian resources to arms purchases, facilitated by foreign economic assistance. He said Indians were well aware of domestic political difficulties posed for him after Tashkent by their talk about Kashmir and their commitment to arms race. Nevertheless, he was willing to continue ministerial talks and expected to schedule another round some time after Washington talks.

7. Ayub said Indians were greatly encouraged to follow aggressive course by sympathetic and generous attitude they are encountering from aid-giving counties. He said Indians felt they were riding high and “Indian balloon needs to be pricked.” He said this could only be done by one of the major foreign powers, obviously referring to US and Soviet Union. He said Indians would come down to a realistic negotiating basis very quickly if only one of their great power friends would prick the balloon.

8. I told President we were fully aware that Indira Gandhi talks in Washington would have bearing on Pak interests as well as Indian, and we expected to have something to communicate about the outcome of the talks later on. President affirmed his particular interest.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, and London. Passed to the White House at 1:45 a.m.
2. In telegram 1804 from Karachi, March 26, McConaughy reported on that part of his conversation with Ayub on March 24 that dealt with an impending visit to Pakistan by a delegation of senior Chinese officials. McConaughy expressed regret at what he described as the unfortunate aspects of the visit, particularly in that it coincided with Prime Minister Gandhi’s visit to the United States. Ayub represented the visit as the logical outgrowth of his visit to China in 1965, and part of the process of normalizing Pakistan’s relationship with a potentially dangerous neighbor. He noted that the Chinese trip had been planned well in advance of the announcement of the Gandhi visit. (Ibid., POL 7 ChiCom)
3. Telegram 1340 to Karachi, March 10, expressed the Department’s concern about the outcome of the first round of Ministerial talks between Indian and Pakistani officials growing out of the Tashkent agreement. The talks took place in Rawalpindi March 1–2 and did not proceed beyond the Pakistani insistence on a full discussion of the Kashmir dispute. The Indians refused to discuss the substance of the issue and the talks broke off. The Department instructed the Embassy to make the point to the Government of Pakistan that if the Tashkent process was to lead to peace, each side must approach the bargaining table with some flexibility, and not allow its tactics to become a stumbling block that threatened the entire process. (Ibid., POL INDIA–PAK)