Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

82. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 7, 1964.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting July 7, 1964 at 12 Noon on Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• See Attached List²

Secretary Ball led off the discussion of Cyprus by telling the President he thought it would be useful to report to the NSC on a situation which was like a time bomb that could blow up any time in the next six weeks. His report largely reflected the State Department memorandum submitted prior to the meeting.³

One of the principal problems, he said, is irrationality on both sides. The Greeks figure time is on their side. They think they can work out a plebiscite followed by enosis simply by sitting tight. The threat of Turk invasion has roused their stubbornness and Athens seems blind to its long-range interest in conceding enough to Ankara to provide a basis for improved relations after a Cyprus settlement. The Turks, on the other hand, see their position being eroded day by day. They resent our having restrained them when chances for a successful invasion were best, and they are bitter over Greek and Cypriot disregard of the London-Zurich treaties. They see a political solution as the only alternative to exercising their right of intervention.

Pressures are building up, Mr. Ball went on. The Greeks have sent 4000 troops to the island (CIA believes 5–7000), in addition to their regular garrison there. The Turks, who have to put their men ashore at night from small boats, have sent perhaps 1000 in addition to their garrison. The Turks see the Greek buildup outrunning theirs and their hope of successful intervention vanishing. Meanwhile, General Grivas—a fanatic, fortunately anti-Communist—has taken over the Greek Cypriot forces and hopes to build an army of some 35,000 men. The Turks have a lurking fear that Grivas may overthrow Makarios suddenly and simply announce annexation of Cyprus to Greece. So the pressure on the Turks to act soon is increasing. Moreover, the Turks know of the Greek plan, if the situation drags on through the summer, to throw the whole question to the UN General Assembly where the Greeks are confident they will get a blessing for self-determination leading to enosis. On top of this, incidents could trigger Turk Cypriot rebellion or island-wide fighting at any time.

We are staking our bets of necessity on the Geneva talks, Mr. Ball continued. Acheson has arrived. The arrangements made for him there are not good but are the best we have been able to work out. He had his first talk with the UN Mediator yesterday and reports an atmosphere of pessimism. However, we hope his further discussions before talks with the Greeks and Turks begin early the week of 13 July may improve the atmosphere. Meanwhile, we are doing extensive contingency planning to limit the scope of a Greek-Turk war if the Turks invade and to keep bloodshed on Cyprus to a minimum. We are also considering how we should handle ourselves in the UN Security Council and how we might develop safehavens for refugees on the island. On 9 July we are holding a meeting here with the British and Canadians to see what pressure they can bring to bear on the Greeks. We are also studying seriously the problem of evacuating officials and tourists should war break out.

At that point the President broke in to ask how many Americans are in the area. Mr. Ball replied that there are about 250 on Cyprus, mostly with our communications facilities there. Since we went through an evacuation exercise earlier this year, he contemplates little difficulty there.⁴ In Greece there are 5–6000 Americans and in Turkey 16–17,000. However, he felt that danger in the mainland countries of a severe anti-American reaction would not be great.

The President then asked whether Papandreou had replied to his letter (of 2 July).⁵ Mr. Ball said the reply had just come in and that it was simply a pro forma reiteration of the Greek position and really did not take us anywhere.⁶ The President said he wanted to see that letter as soon as possible.

There followed a detailed briefing by Gen. Burchinal on the military forces that would participate in any hostilities on Cyprus. The attached memorandum records the substance of this briefing.⁷ Mr. Ball, at the end of the briefing, highlighted the fact that the Turk goal is limited to establishing a beachhead for bargaining purposes; the Turks do not want the kind of war that complete conquest would require. Mr. Ball also estimated that perhaps 20–25,000 villagers might be slaughtered once an invasion started. General Burchinal suggested that Turk air mastery might prove some deterrent since Greek villages would be vulnerable. No one responded, but the feeling seemed to be that this would only increase the carnage.

The President summarized his understanding in these terms: The Turks have substantially greater forces than the Greeks in every respect; they could land and maintain a beachhead; and the Soviets would not intervene. General Burchinal confirmed the President’s understanding, estimating Turk army superiority at 3–1 and air force at 4–1. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary McNamara elaborated on the President’s last point, saying we didn’t think the Soviets would intervene militarily but they would unquestionably try to make political hay out of any disorder on Cyprus. General Wheeler added that a prime Soviet objective is the fragmentation of NATO and any Greek-Turk hostilities would further that end.

The President moved on to the question of what our next steps might be and asked whether there is anything further we can do to prevent Turkish invasion and to assure the success of the Geneva talks. He pointed out that the Greeks didn’t expect much to come of these talks and have shown a good deal of irritation at the way we treated them during Papandreou’s visit here.

Mr. Ball felt that the President had seriously shaken Papandreou with his statement that the US would not militarily restrain a Turkish invasion. He felt we had gained some ground with the Greeks during that visit. Mr. Bundy felt less optimistic, noting Greek peevishness over the President’s latest letter.

The President recalled that Papandreou had pressed for a US formula when he was here. Mr. Ball pointed out the pitfalls of providing one at the outset of discussions. He said that Mr. Acheson is well prepared to introduce the elements of such a formula in the course of the Geneva talks. However, if we presented a US solution in advance, he felt both parties would attack it and walk out. The President agreed.

Secretary McNamara brought up the desirability of using General Lemnitzer and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to bring home to the Greek and Turk military that a clash between them would be suicidal. Mr. Ball said General Lemnitzer was bearish on this idea because he did not feel the Greek military had much influence over its political leaders. His previous talks with them had netted little.⁸ However, the NAC will be meeting 8 July and we expect a strong Canadian challenge to the Greeks based on reports that Greek NATO units and materiel are now on Cyprus. Both Secretaries McNamara and Ball, however, favored instructing General Lemnitzer to go ahead and tell the Turk and Greek military again what we have told the political leaders. While Papandreou seems to have absorbed the President’s warning, the military leaders still apparently feel that we will stop a Turk invasion and that no move they make really risks a direct Greek-Turk confrontation.

The President asked General Wheeler whether we have taken into account the demands that a Turkish invasion would place on NATO. General Wheeler felt we had examined the consequences carefully. He was concerned particularly about how the Turks would receive a direct US rebuff. However, he did not feel Turkey would “fall into the Soviet Bloc.” He felt the strength of Greek Communists made Greece potentially very unstable. Ultimately he saw both Greece and Turkey lost to NATO if hostilities were permitted to go on very long.

The Attorney General suggested another approach. He asked about the possibility of organizing an effort to explain to influential elements other than the military and government in Greece and Turkey what the situation would be if either country took the steps it is contemplating. In other words, would the Turks like the situation that would exist after they secured a beachhead on Cyprus—carnage in the Turk Cypriot villages, world opinion against them, Greece less willing than ever to negotiate a settlement? Would the Greeks welcome a Turk foothold on Cyprus, the economic disruption of a Greek-Turk war, possibly defeat of Greek forces? Wouldn’t there be some deterrent effect in getting across to influential Greeks and Turks an objective analysis of the situation they will have to cope with if they don’t negotiate now?

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball whether we could not do this sort of thing through our embassies. He felt that embassy involvement might create a clearer view in Ankara and Athens of our concern. Mr. Ball felt that it would be very difficult to do anything of this kind publicly because of the irrational atmosphere in both capitals. Anything we do, he said, gives the appearance of our working for the other side. For instance, if we described the terrible consequences of a Greek-Turk war, the Greeks would simply ask why, then, we would refuse to stop a Turk invasion. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

When the President asked how much of the position we took in the Washington talks has “dribbled down to the Greek and Turk populace”, Mr. Ball said that the average Greek thinks we’re holding the gun of a Turk invasion at Greek heads to force a deal. The Turks feel that, because we restrained their invasion, we’re pro-Greek. So the people have very stereotyped views of our position. In the current hysterical atmosphere, it is very difficult to put across a reasonable explanation of our goals.

Secretary McNamara asked whether we couldn’t stimulate leading Greek citizens to brief their own press and make it more aware of the consequences of the present course of events. For instance, could we get Onassis and others of his importance to explain the economic consequences of provoking a Greek-Turk war?⁹ He did not feel we could do this directly but felt perhaps Mr. McCone might have some suggestions to offer.

The Attorney General said he did not see any objection to our being associated with such an effort. He felt that we would be talking simply about the facts of a potential situation, not about controversial positions. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Ball how painful it might be if such a campaign came out of Paris—from NAC members and NATO officers there. Mr. Ball agreed that the farther from Washington the better and pointed out that the UN Secretary General could also do some of this if he would.

Mr. Bundy wrapped up this part of the discussion by suggesting to the President that we draw up a program for mounting such a campaign just to see what it looks like. The President instructed him to do so with the help of the agencies involved.

Mr. Bundy then moved to the problem of how we get the Geneva talks going. He felt that the Greeks could get what they wanted if they would just sit down and talk and asked whether we shouldn’t use this argument with them. Secretary Ball said he had done just this during his luncheon with Papandreou. However, he pointed out that it is difficult to carry this argument much further than private conversations because the Turks could easily construe it as a US-Greek deal.

Mr. McCone asked whether the real problem wasn’t what the Turks would get out of these talks rather than how we could satisfy the Greeks. He said he hadn’t seen any evidence of a formula that would meet Turk needs. Mr. Ball said he felt we could put together a package which the Turks would think pretty good if we could once get the two parties together.

The President returned to the question of how we might bring pressure to bear on the two governments. He asked Mr. Wilson how seriously concerned the people of each country are about what is going on. Mr. Wilson responded that the people of Turkey particularly are frustrated by their government’s inability to act in the current situation and pointed out the danger that such frustration would lead to impulsive action. He did not feel, however, that the people had thought through the consequences of a Turkish invasion. He felt we could draw up a list of people in Paris, Athens, and Ankara who might be useful in creating a more realistic view of the consequences of invasion.

Mr. Talbot brought the discussion back to Geneva by pointing out that we can’t count on the Greeks to act in their own best interests. We can’t rely simply on a campaign to make people aware of the consequences of their action—especially when they are acting irrationally. Therefore, he felt our best hope was in pushing the negotiations in Geneva.

The President reacted by saying if we are to succeed there we will need more power than we have had to date. We did our best during the Washington talks to convince both Greeks and Turks to negotiate. Now we are going to make another approach to the Turk military in an effort to get them to throw their weight into the scales on the side of moderation. He saw no reason why we should not explore every way of getting a reasonable view of the situation across to important people in both countries.

In conclusion, the President outlined two courses of action: (a) our military in Paris would make clear to the Greek and Turk military what consequences they could anticipate if either nation moved militarily; (b) we should also draw up a plan for getting this understanding across to as many influential people in both countries as possible.¹⁰

With that the meeting adjourned.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 2. Top Secret. Drafted by Harold H. Saunders.
2. Not found.
3. A memorandum entitled “Talking Paper for the Under Secretary at NSC Meeting,” July 6, outlined the current situation in Cyprus and the options available to the United States. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Meeting July 7, 1964)
4. In January 1964, the United States evacuated the families of officials working in Cyprus.
5. See Document 80.
6. See footnote 4, Document 81.
7. Not found.
8. See Document 5.
9. Documentation relating to subsequent contacts with Aristotle Onassis are in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8, and ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Cyprus Miscellaneous and Cyprus: Proposed Solutions.
10. Efforts to make the consequences of military action clear were outlined in a July 8 memorandum from Talbot to Bundy. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 9)