80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

6. For Chargé. Please deliver soonest following letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister:

“Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want to tell you again how glad I am that we had an opportunity to visit together and to exchange views on the critical problem of Cyprus. I know that the course of the discussion was not altogether easy for either of us, but I am sure that it is of great importance for those of us who bear the responsibility for government within the Western Alliance to talk honestly together on such grave matters. It is out of just such hard work together that we can ensure a high degree of understanding.

Over this last weekend I have been thinking some more about our conversation and about the problem of Cyprus, and I think it may be helpful for me to continue our discussion by sending this message to you as you return to Athens.

First of all, let me say that the last week has only strengthened my deep conviction that the problem of Cyprus grows more urgent and dangerous with every day that goes by. Until we can get serious negotiations started, we must recognize that time will not work on the side of peace. Right now we are coming near to the last hour. That is why I hope our two Governments can agree in the view that in this very dangerous situation it is absolutely essential that serious and searching talks should be started promptly.

I promise you that my conviction that we are at the edge of a crisis is not lightly formed. It rests on two powerful facts: the first is that passion on Cyprus is now intense on both sides, and the second, that the build-up of armaments on the Island continues. This is a condition which is bound to become increasingly explosive; indeed, the build-up of armaments on the Island is already dangerously close to the flash point. And even without an immediate explosion the belief that danger is steadily increasing could at any time create pressures for intervention in Turkey which may prove irresistible. Having prevented such intervention by most strenuous personal efforts last month, I know very well that there is a limit to what any of us can do from now on, to prevent the Turks from exercising rights which are very real indeed to them.

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I see only one way in the world to turn the course of events away from this pathway toward disaster, and that is by a prompt and determined search by Greece and Turkey for a permanent political settlement. I recognize that such a joint effort will have some critics and opponents on all sides, and I recognize also the quite understandable belief of many in your country that all that is needed is that the majority of the people of Cyprus should be allowed to settle their own future. But let me urge with all the force I can, that it simply is not enough, in this most dangerous situation, to have a belief in the rightness of one’s own argument. The pressures on Turkey for action are extremely strong, and they too derive from a deep conviction that Turkish rights are at stake.

As I said in our discussions, the United States most earnestly desires to be helpful in the search for a solution, but the United States does not seek to impose any outside view, or to take sides with one of its friends against another. Our conviction is that any successful solution must derive from the agreement of the parties and cannot be dictated or imposed from outside. But we shall be just as helpful as we can to both our friends, once a serious discussion begins.

Moved by my sense of the increasing danger of this question, let me say once again, as solemnly as possible, how much I hope that the Government of Greece will be able to join in a prompt and determined effort to seek through negotiation a lasting answer to this perilous problem. It is in this spirit that I hope your representative will be empowered to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem with the mediator and the Turkish representative. I hope also that his instructions may be so framed that our American representative will also be able to help in bringing about a settlement. In such discussions, neither side must insist that there is only one acceptable basis for discussion; both sides—and all of us who hope to be helpful—must approach these negotiations with a resolute determination to work out a peaceful answer.

Let me say again in closing that I fully recognize your responsibility not only to join in preserving peace but to uphold the principles of your Government and the rights of your people in accordance with your duty as the leader of Greece. You can be sure that the United States, in urging negotiation and in offering help to the mediator, intends no disregard whatever of the rights of Greeks and of Turks in their homelands and on Cyprus. My conviction is simple: that the real interests of the peoples and the real responsibilities of their leaders can be met if there is real negotiation—and that if there is not such negotiation, none of us can prevent a disaster for which all of us will be held accountable.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Talbot, and approved by Ball. In a July 1 memorandum to the President, Bundy commented that Ball felt a letter to Papandreou was needed as a stern reminder of the dangers created by Papandreou’s resistance to real negotiations. Bundy further commented: “Papandreou will not like this letter, any more than Inonu liked your letter of June 5. But that is not the point now.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6)