5. Telegram From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1
ALO 17. 1. I arrived in Athens at 1145 local, 29 January, where I was met by General Pipilis, Chief of the Defense General Staff, and the various service chiefs. After a short press conference at the airport with a large number of press, I departed for a conference with Prime Minister Paraskevopoulos with the understanding that General Pipilis was to accompany me. When we arrived in the Prime Minister’s office, Pipilis was summarily dismissed, and the conference, which lasted about an hour, consisted only of the Prime Minister with an interpreter and myself and my executive officer. As a result of his dismissal from my conference with the Prime Minister, General Pipilis later expressed the fear that the Prime Minister might be pursuing a different line than the Defense Ministry and my executive officer was specifically queried by him regarding content of the Prime Minister’s remarks.
2. After lunch with Defense Minister Papanikolopoulos and the Chiefs of Staff, I had a two-hour discussion with them at the Defense Ministry, followed by a one-hour conference with the Crown Prince substituting for his father, who was ill. All parties concerned voiced views which were substantially the same.
3. In opening all my conferences, I explained the purpose of my visit along the same lines as I had the day before with the Turks,2 highlighting, of course, the disastrous consequences of a military clash over Cyprus between two NATO allies.
4. The common thread which the Greeks pursued in all of our conversations was that the Turks were determined to abrogate the 1955 treaty3 and that they would settle for nothing less than full self-determination for Turkish Cypriots and partition of the island of Cyprus. Furthermore, the Greeks maintained that the Turks were pushing things to an explosive state by their large concentration of forces at Iskenderun and by their continuing inflammatory remarks in the state-controlled press and radio. As a consequence, Greek public opinion has been [Page 10] greatly aroused and has now reached the fever pitch of 1940 when neither the King, nor the government, nor anyone else, could hold the Greek people in check.
5. To reduce these tensions and to resolve the current crisis, the Defense Minister listed the following requirements:
- a.
- Dispersion of the heavy concentration of forces in southern Turkey, or, failing that,
- b.
- Introduction of an allied force to Cyprus of sufficient size to maintain peace and security.
- c.
- Stationing of the Sixth Fleet around Cyprus to police the waters and prevent a Turkish invasion.
6. Of these requirements, the dispersal of Turkish forces at Iskenderun is regarded by the Greeks as the most imperative and the most immediate since they look upon this concentration as a Sword of Damocles which could prevent any productive steps. If however, none of the requirements is met, then the Greeks would be compelled to take prompt counter-action. The precise nature of this counter-action was not disclosed.
7. With regard to the allied force, Greece is quite willing to withdraw its forces from Cyprus if the Turks will do likewise. In response to my specific question as to whether they would object to leaving both Turkish and Greek forces there if an allied force went in, the Defense Minister responded that he would have no objection to this if it were necessary. As to command of the allied force, the Defense Minister stated that the question had not been thoroughly studied but that they would prefer to see an American commander.
8. I informed the Greeks that I had been notified through appropriate NATO Commanders of Turkish movement of forces and that I was convinced that I would continue to be kept informed. I stated that even though naval units of both Greece and Turkey were not under NATO command, I had received notification of the movement of Turkish naval units from the Black Sea to Iskenderun. With regard to the build-up of ground forces, I stated that there was not any repositioning of additional combat units in the Iskenderun area, but that any increase in combat strength there related only to the build-up to 100 percent strength of the 39th Division which was normally based at Iskenderun. I stressed the importance of Greece following the NATO procedures for reporting and consultation and was assured that such procedures would be followed and that, in no case, would Greece take any unilateral action without prior consultation.
9. In general, I did not find Greek officials as calm as the Turks. Emotion is running high, aggravated by a sense of frustration stemming from the all-too-obvious military advantages of the Turks in the Cyprus area and the feeling among the military that they cannot look to their [Page 11] caretaker government for decisive leadership. On the other hand, they gave every indication that they sincerely hope to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem. The disadvantages under which they labor are likely to militate against any precipitate, unilateral moves by Greece.
10. I departed Athens at 1830 local and arrived in Paris at 0100 30 Jan. En route I stopped at Naples for a conference with Admiral Russell to give him more detailed information regarding my visits.4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to USDOCOSouth for Admiral Russell, Athens, and Ankara and passed to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy. The Chairman of the JCS had requested that Lemnitzer visit Athens and Ankara to “calm the situation” in telegram 4559, January 27. (Ibid.)↩
- Lemnitzer reported on his talks with Turkish officials in an unnumbered telegram to Secretary of Defense McNamara, January 29. (Ibid.)↩
- Apparently a reference to the 1959 agreements establishing an independent Cyprus; for texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 765–775.↩
- The Embassy in Athens reported in telegram 1122, January 30, that Lemnitzer had succeeded in “lowering temperature” in Athens. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 2)↩