69. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1

1377. Deptel 951.2 Regret Deptel 9423 not received (although serviced) when I called on Makarios this afternoon. Came in while at palace. With regard SC proceedings,4 he said Kyprianou will go along with resolution merely extending term of UNFICYP. Said he realizes both sides want changes in terms of reference and would like see resolution continuing some condemnation, either direct of indirect, of other side, but it highly unlikely be possible obtain such res and therefore GOC will not attempt it. I said this would assist in avoiding probable acrimonious debate if other procedure followed. Said my govt would be pleased to hear that this was GOC plan. Makarios went on to say, however, that GOC presentation would have to refer to Turkish invasion threats and to most recent events in Mansoura-Kokkina area where for to him inexplicable [Page 142] reasons Turks have picked this time to create new and dangerous situation. I urged him to try keep Kyprianou speech in as low key as possible.

While Deptel 942 not available and hence I unable act on specific suggestions, most of them covered indirectly. Items covered were Inonu visit; my frequent consultations his Ministers and himself; support for UN effort; gave credit several recent moves including offer Green Line pull-back; urged him make some unilateral gesture even in face Turkish actions in Mansoura area in effort improve Greek Cypriot image abroad and this particularly in his interest at this moment of SC meeting.

With regard Mansoura and events of last two days,5 Makarios in most apparent show of anger I have yet seen said he would not permit Turks to take over small Greek villages in area. Said he had reports that UN had urged villagers at Mosphili to evacuate, but when they had inquired whether they should do so, he had refused allow them. Said he will move to protect Greeks if UN cannot do so and if Turks did nothing.

In this regard, he expressed oft-repeated Greek Cypriot position that UN not forceful enough in preventing such incidents and in particular in this northwest area they apparently unable control smuggling of arms and people by Turks. He said if present situation continues much longer or if today’s incident becomes more serious, he will move to isolate area from rest of island. In this connection said he had told Plaza (Embtel 1356)6 that he could not wait “long” for UN to open Kyrenia and Xeropolis Roads. When he said he would close all roads to Turks if these two roads not opened, I said I was sure he had estimated far better than I what probable reaction of Turks might be to such action. Said he had and (contrary to what he told Plaza) he expected they would react violently, but he was prepared to take consequences since present situation intolerable.

When he went on to say he was more pessimistic now than he had been in some months, I said this distressed me since he was usually optimistic. I asked him what he thought probable GOT reaction might be to any such action on his part, particularly in view of present delicate situation in which GOT leadership found itself. At this point he asked me whether USG really thought that Turks had intended invade two weeks ago. I said that this was matter of conjecture for some, but that we were satisfied they had intended do so and it was only with greatest possible pressure that we had dissuaded them. Expressed hope that we would not have to try again.

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I said might be useful for me see Kutchuk and urge him use restraint to avoid new crisis. Archbishop told me feel free give “Vice President” full account his statements to me. Am seeing Gyani and Plaza tonight and will concert with them before seeing Kutchuk.7

We ended conversation by agreeing that at his usual Thursday evening press conference, he would say that I had called on him to inquire about GOC plans with regard to resolution and to express USG’s support for three-month extension of UNFICYP and our willingness to provide another $2 million for expenses.

Belcher
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
  2. Telegram 951, June 17, outlined U.S. strategy for the U.N. Security Council meeting on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 942, June 14, outlined U.S. strategy for establishing the proper atmosphere for talks in Washington with Inonu and Papandreou. (Ibid., POL 7 TUR)
  4. Reference is to the upcoming Security Council debate on the extension of UNFICYP for a further 3 months.
  5. On June 16, the heaviest fighting since April broke out in Nicosia and Tyllonia. At the same time Turkish Cypriot spokesmen began charging that the United Nations and its representatives were not conducting themselves in an impartial manner.
  6. Telegram 1356, June 12, reported on Galo Plaza’s discussions with Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)
  7. Belcher reported on these talks in telegrams 1381, June 19, and 1395, June 23. (Ibid.)