70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1
8463. For Bruce. We see coming week as crucial in long-smoldering Cyprus crisis. If Inonu and Papandreou talks should fail to yield constructive results, critical new situation might confront us as early as next week. Even while Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers here, impact of Grivas’ presence on Cyprus or of communal clashes on island could add complications.2 Role played by British will have great significance during these days. We sense UKG would prefer avoid facing hard contingencies that may lie ahead, and we look to you to help strengthen their realism and readiness to take any difficult actions that may become necessary.
On June 20, Under Sec Ball called in British Ambassador to explain how we view upcoming talks with Inonu and Papandreou.3 Ball said our objective is to get Greeks and Turks into serious high-level discussions in [Page 144] presence distinguished American. Dean Acheson has agreed to undertake this task. We estimate Turks will agree, but Papandreou will be more difficult. We expect tell Papandreou close vote of confidence in Ankara4 ominous sign that Turks deeply frustrated. If no movement on Cyprus, Inonu could fall. We should be under no illusions that Turks might then move militarily, whatever we said to them. If Turks moved there would be no question of stopping them with Sixth Fleet or other military means, because we would not fight our allies.
Object in taking this line will be to demonstrate to Papandreou what dangers Greece, Turkey and Western world could face on very short notice unless Greece and Turkey able to compromise their positions. Assuming Inonu will by then have agreed to talks, Papandreou will be told flatly that he will be risking security of his country and of Alliance unless he also agrees to substantive talks.
Harlech agreed Greeks must face up to dangers. US should “make their flesh creep” by spelling out prospects and making them understand US would not stop Turkish intervention if it were started contrary to American advice.
Ball raised question of British plans for such contingency. He returned to discussions of last February when London had agreed to consider possible tripartite intervention should Turks move. Harlech drew back fast from that particular suggestion. He left impression British would want no part of fresh military intervention in Cyprus. He did not think HMG had ever agreed to intervention though there had been talk of trying to get Turks and Greeks to limit their advances should they land on island.
On June 21 Ball met with General Taylor and Sec McNamara to review contingencies on which State-Defense planning should focus in immediate future.5
Our contingency problem is what US and UK could do if Inonu and Papandreou talks should result in impasse and if Inonu’s moderation was then eclipsed by more activist Turkish forces, leading to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This could now occur without our getting much advance warning. In any case we not at all certain we could turn Turks off again even if we had notice.
This would obviously be war nobody could win. We do not see how Greeks could stop Turkish landing or put effective Greek forces on Cyprus. Nonetheless, Greek and Greek Cypriots could harass Turkish action, delay actual landing of total Turkish force and plunge island into bloodbath. If Greeks widened attack to mainland areas, consequences [Page 145] could be disastrous. Meanwhile UNSC activity would be intense. Western security interests could only be seriously jeopardized and none but Soviets could gain, whether or not they threatened to intervene militarily in Turkey or Cyprus.
Turks, if they moved, would hold they acting legally under Article IV of Treaty after failure of Guarantor Powers to take effective joint action to restore constitutional position. Greeks of course would take opposite stand. In this situation posture and actions of UK could have determining effect. We believe plan proposed by Ball in February still has merit, but will be glad to hear any alternatives British may wish to put forward. In any case, we hope British studying this contingency carefully, for if Turks move it is clear US and UK will need to set their courses fast and to lead their public attitudes appropriately. US and UK must obviously stay in close consultation.
We are also looking urgently at possible Soviet actions in event of military operations over Cyprus, and hope British are doing same. Role of UN also needs study.
More immediate question is impact of return of Grivas to island. We assume British will be extremely agitated; British EmbOff suggested today UK might even withdraw contingent from UNFICYP. We appreciate Grivas’ presence reopens old wounds and we know how sensitive British public is to his earlier role. However, relationships have changed and it is conceivable Grivas could impose more discipline on Greek Cypriot irregulars, correct slide toward Soviets, extend hand of friendship to Turks and protect them from Greek Cypriot extremists, and actually contribute to solution of British difficulties on island. However this may be, it is going to be hard enough—yet essential—to calm down Turkish fears of Grivas and to forestall any rash Turkish reaction. It is equally essential that British not let appearance of Grivas upset our careful preparations to bring Inonu and Papandreou to effective substantive talks. Do try to persuade them of this.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TUG. Drafted by Bracken, Jernegan, and Talbot; cleared by Ball; and approved by Talbot.↩
- Grivas returned to Cyprus on June 17. The Greek Government announced his return on June 21.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP.↩
- The Inonu government survived a vote of confidence on June 19 by a vote of 199 to 195.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩