68. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1
1898. I saw Papandreou this morning accompanied by Brewster. After preliminaries, I handed over President’s letter.2 Papandreou read it carefully and said he would be glad to accept, and that June 24 and 25 would be satisfactory provided Inonu had then left. He stressed that it would be most embarrassing if they were both there at same time and made this point a flat condition. He feels it would be most awkward if both were there at same time and they did not see one another, and he does not consider it politically feasible to have a meeting with Inonu at this time.
I believe that Papandreou is sincere in his belief that an over-lapping with Inonu would cause real difficulties, and I strongly recommend that the President set the date for Papandreou’s arrival and meeting with him so as to avoid possible over-lapping.
Papandreou then went on to say that, as practical politicians, President Johnson and he would not want to have a meeting which failed. He said that he had tried to make the Greek position clear to me in previous conversations and to Mr. Ball last week. He hoped the President would understand that the Greek position had been formulated “objectively” and on the basis of principles of justice. I responded that it was not my understanding that President Johnson had in mind reaching a definite solution of the Cyprus problem during the proposed discussions. He was not attempting to short-circuit the UN. The purpose of the talks was to exchange views on ways to move toward a solution. He replied that he was not posing this as a condition to a meeting but he thought the President would want to know his views. He said he would put these in a letter which he would deliver to me this evening.
The PriMin then proceeded to outline his position, very much in the same way he has done on previous occasions and with Mr. Ball. There was nothing new in his presentation, except for his emphasis on fact that entry of Soviets in picture had made Cyprus issue a great deal more far-reaching than simply a Greek-Turkish problem. From the “security” point of view, the only hope was “Natofication,” including a NATO base which could have Turkish NATO personnel. From “moral” viewpoint there should be self-determination. The present limited independence [Page 140] should be lifted and self-determination exercised in the form of a plebiscite (resulting in union with Greece) to take place before the UN forces leave the island; i.e., within three months. He stressed that an independent Cyprus would mean a Cuba and a partitioned Cyprus would lead inevitably to conflict between the 400,000 Greeks and the 100,000 Turks which would only continue the crisis situation.
He asked what I thought about this. Reverting to his security argument, I suggested that Turks might well think double enosis would best serve purpose. He replied that even if he should order partition the population of the island would not accept it and civil war and chaos would ensue. In both cases the Communists would be the winners. Only by a close link with the West could this be averted.
I observed that even though his arguments might sound “objective” to many, there was still an important psychological factor and political realities which Inonu had to face. I suggested that if Menderes had been able to negotiate a deal which disallowed enosis, it would be expecting a lot for Inonu to accept it. I repeated the question I had often posed to him—what could be done to meet Inonu half way? He came to his “security” argument, repeating that the new factor since 1959 was that Sov Union was on scene and would be muddying waters. He felt that the US should stress heavily to Inonu that Natofication would achieve the security of the island within the NATO framework and Turkey would not have a Cuba off its southern shore. This solution could also get Makarios out of the way which should be helpful to the Turkish Govt with its problem of face. Also, compensation could be provided for the Turk Cypriots who wanted to move to the mainland, and further economic aid from the West might be promised. He underlined (more for US benefit, I think, than for the Turks) that this solution would be a lasting one and arrived at within framework of democratic principles.
I pressed him on score as to whether compensation he was offering would be adequate to meet the Turkish political and psychological problem facing Inonu. He had nothing to add to above. When I touched briefly on question of possible territorial exchanges based on news reports he took standard Greek line that giving up islands such as Chios, Mytilini or Samos would be inconceivable. It would lead to revolution in Greece.
Our talk, which was highly informal (no other Greeks present) and friendly throughout, did not touch on displacement of Istanbul population and Patriarchate.3
[Page 141]As to publicity concerning the visit, he stated that until he had sent a formal reply of acceptance and had received further word from us, he would not make any statement. He would parry questions with formula “I have received no formal invitation.” Publicity from US side should be held up also, pending consideration of content of formal letter, which will be cabled as soon as received. Meanwhile, I shall appreciate comments re date of meeting in light paras 1 and 2 above.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to London, USUN, Nicosia, and Ankara and passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, and CIA.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 64.↩
- In telegram 1899 from Athens, June 14, Labouisse reported that he had also told Papandreou that sending Grivas to Cyprus at this point could have deleterious effects. Papandreou had agreed with this analysis. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩
- In telegram 1516 to Athens, June 15, the Department of State informed the Embassy that June 24–25 was satisfactory for a Papandreou visit and that it would arrange for Inonu’s departure prior to Papandreou’s arrival. (Ibid., POL 7 GREECE)↩