67. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
1891. Embassy notes with interest Istanbul’s 722 quoting Turk Press Attaché Athens Karaoglou to effect that Turkish invasion Cyprus would result in “immediate fall” Papandreou government and his substitution by military junta. If this belief also held by important GOT officials, Embassy believes it important clear up what appears to us to be misreading of situation. Our reading is that in event Turkish invasion Cyprus and subsequent Papandreou military response, government would have full backing of Greek nation. In our judgment only if government were to fail to take some action satisfactory to injured Greek pride would there be [Page 138] threat to Papandreou’s continuance in office. It should be noted that there is no important element in Greek political life calling for more “moderate” approach to Cyprus problem; on contrary, Papandreou being attacked by both right and extreme left for not pushing Greek and Greek Cypriot cause more vigorously. Opposition (ERE) press, for example, accuses Papandreou of “retreating” in face of US pressure to seek quick solution Cyprus question.
In any case, it important that senior GOT officials not labor under mistaken belief that Papandreou ahead of press and public in following “hard” line vis-à-vis Cyprus question. On contrary, in view inflamed public opinion here, great test for PriMin will come if and when he agrees to compromise settlement on Cyprus which falls short Greek demands. It conceivable that if he agreed to what public opinion considered “sell-out” on Cyprus, his many enemies within and without party might combine to bring him down. In that event, successor would almost certainly be figure with more intransigent view Cyprus settlement. In sense, Papandreou now paying for fact that during last two electoral campaigns he tried win votes by riding Cypriot tiger and attacking Caramanlis administration for “sell-out” of London and Zurich Agreements. Although he avoided stating exactly what final solution he expected to achieve, public led to believe that Papandreou victory would result in Cypriot independence and enosis, if not immediately at least eventually. Thus, when and if Papandreou sits down to serious negotiations public opinion will expect him to deliver on at least part of his promises, explicit or implied.
To reiterate: in our view Papandreou would have full support of nation in military response to Turkish invasion. (Although once heat of battle passed there might be second thoughts about how Greece was maneuvered into such position.) Only if he failed to take some dramatic action would his position be jeopardized. In such case his successor would undoubtedly be advocate of harder line. However, in view Papandreou’s character—as well as his stated commitments to respond to Turk “attack”—it highly unlikely that he would follow passive course under such circumstances.