66. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State1
1357. Athens 1845 to Dept.2 We assume comments desired are our views on feasibility of new approach to Cyprus problem in form of secret bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey with objective of agreement on union of Cyprus with Greece compensated by some mix of following elements: minor Greek territorial concession to Turkey, emigration of Greek minority from Turkey (with assisted voluntary emigration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey?), transfer of Patriarchate from Istanbul, and Turkish military base on Cyprus.
We not only concur that it would be useful explore this possibility but also believe satisfactory settlement can only be achieved along these lines.
At same time we wish point out that, while Turkish Cypriots have no alternative to accepting whatever deal Turkey may make, Greek Cypriots have greater independence from Greece. Despite their protestations about Panhellenism, it might take considerable persuasion to win Greek Cypriot acceptance of some elements of deal along lines suggested above.
While there has been marked intensification of enosis agitation in recent months, two very significant elements of Greek Cypriot community are at best lukewarm and at worst hostile toward it. Makarios and GOC officials obviously have vested interest of being large fish in small puddle. A strong and apparently growing Communist movement would obviously resist submersion and probable suppression in Greece. Coalition of these two elements would be quite likely insist in first instance on “full sovereignty”, “self determination”, “neutrality rather than NATO” as dodges for avoiding enosis. For this reason we believe that, if enosis is agreed on as basis for solution, every effort must be made bring it about as integral part of immediate settlement rather than agreeing on “full independence” or “self-determination” on understanding Cyprus state will wither away and enosis will inevitably occur.
We would not anticipate any serious Greek Cypriot opposition (though there would probably be a lot of noisy protest) about Greek territorial cessions elsewhere or about population movements. Greek Cypriot [Page 137] attitude is wholly self-centered. On other hand, we would expect strong resistance to Turkish base on island, in part as desecration of “holy soil” but even more out of fear it would be used as center for agitation among remaining Turkish community. Limited Turkish military presence might eventually be palatable if it were on NATO base within what is now British sovereign base area.
Another area in which Greek Cypriots might demonstrate independence of Greece, as recent history makes only too clear, is by reneging on agreement once made in order attempt eliminate any special concessions to Turkey or Turkish Cypriots on island. Fact Greek Cypriots cannot be trusted makes it all the more important enosis be part immediate settlement and not as goal to which settlement might eventually open way. Considering Cypriot temperament, strong Communist influences, resentments arising from current strife, and widespread holding of arms, we have every reason to expect Cyprus to be source of difficulties for years to come. It is certainly far preferable this be internal Greek problem rather than international problem of type now facing us.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Paris, USUN, OSD, CIA, JCS, and the White House.↩
- Telegram 1845, June 8, reported that Greece remained firm on its ultimate objective of enosis but recognized the need for some limited concessions to Turkey and counted on the United States to achieve a mediated settlement. (Ibid.)↩