Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

63. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 11, 1964, 8 p.m.

4455. SC—Cyprus. Cypriot FonMin Kyprianou called with PermRep Rossides on Stevenson June 11. Fol are highlights:

1. Kyprianou stressed that principal reason he decided for time being not call urgent SC mtg was his awareness Pres Johnson’s efforts with GOT which he did not wish upset as he hopeful it would produce something. Stevenson emphasized seriousness present situation stressing GOT concern with Cypriot arms imports, conscription, disappearance hostages, ties with SovBloc. Situation deteriorating and there need work actively for solution agreeable to all parties before situation deteriorates further. Said he hoped GOC had given thought to this as obvious that in any solution no party will get everything it wants.

2. Kyprianou responding to Stevenson mention of GOC moves cited provocative GOT acts (including use UK soldiers for smuggling) leading to GOC arms and conscription decisions and defended these as right and duty of GOC. Stevenson said situation difficult to control. Was worse than in March and GOC had not exercised restraint he had hoped, or avoided provocations as he hoped. Kyprianou stressed GOC had avoided number of moves and Rossides provided chapter and verse on Turk contingent, “rebels” at Hilarion, obstruction on Kyrenia Road.

3. Yost stressed need create feeling of confidence among Turk Cypriots. Kyprianou replied “If GOT wants them have confidence they’ll have it. Their unease ordered by Ankara. Everything calm where GOT not stirring them up.” Turk Cypriot discontent is manufactured as result longstanding GOT partition plan of which GOC amassing more and more evidence. Denied arms imports and conscription designed have any effect on Turk Cypriots stating they reaction to: (1) invasion threats; (2) need to discipline Greek Cypriot forces. In response Stevenson question, Kyprianou said regular GOC army would disarm irregular Greek Cypriots.

4. Stevenson again stressed seriousness of situation mentioning GOT fear of new “Cuba.” Kyprianou said this new idea but Rossides emphasized Greek Cypriot Communists few and without arms and nationalists in control. Nationalists got main outside support from SovBloc as result Western lack of sympathy.

5. Stevenson asked Kyprianou state of negots with Sovs and Czechs on arms. Kyprianou, hesitating somewhat, denied there were such negots. Rossides noted GOC would abandon arms acquisition if SC guaranteed territorial integrity. Kyprianou defended acquisition of arms “from US or anywhere,” not necessarily from Sovs and Czechs.

6. In reply Stevenson query on SC, Kyprianou said 1) not abandon idea urgent mtg; 2) planned in regular mtg raise question Turk threat, exit of Turk contingent along with Greek.

7. Yost stressed GOT feeling that they have been pushed back steadily from Zurich agreements and cannot tolerate this, particularly in view of method by which this done. Kyprianou noted initial method was negots.

8. Stevenson emphasized US effectiveness in restraining GOT diminishing because of GOC moves, urged Kyprianou “bend over backwards avoid provocations”, saying would be wise not take any actions which would exacerbate Turk feelings and plan quiet SC mtg instead to extend UNFICYP on basis SYG report and then might be possible move forward toward solution. Kyprianou countered asking how fact recent GOT preparations can be hidden and mentioned expanding SC mandate to include UN guarantee against attack. Stevenson remarked this unlikely.

9. Referring ideas in press for population exchange, Kyprianou stressed Turk Cypriots wanted return to villages but cannot because of Turk Cypriot terrorists’ threats. With choice, only 20 per cent would leave Cyprus, he said. Yost suggested offering reassurances in SC to Turk Cypriots to improve atmosphere but Kyprianou responded that this would be admitting GOT threats justified.

10. Referring again GOT threats, Kyprianou said “We not importing planes and tanks to fight Turk Cypriots.” Went on describe Mansoura as center smuggling of Turk arms and men which GOC cannot and UN does not stop, implying this would be exposed in SC and would have been publicly described previously except for bearing it has on trial UK airman.

11. Rossides called for “bold move”—dismantling all fortifications by both sides leaving security to UNFICYP.

12. On problem hostages, Kyprianou said there had been regrettable incidents but not as many as charged. Claimed many on Turk list solely in Ankara or hidden in villages. Claimed Kutchuk had not deplored hostage taking as Makarios had and had no accounting for 39 Greek hostages.

13. Stevenson suggested further talk prior SC mtg. Again stressed US efforts with GOT. Urged avoiding clamorous SC mtg in order move on to next step.

Comment: Fol mtg, MisOff encountered Asiroglu (Turkey), informed him that Kyprianou testing idea of calling for withdrawal Turk contingent, SC guarantee for Cyprus but that Stevenson had argued strongly against it. Expressed hope Kyprianou would find similar discouragement elsewhere. Asiroglu stated he confident in Norway, UK, perhaps France. MisOff suggested he talk to others particularly Bernardes, prior his departure for consultation. MisOff stressed Stevenson urging non-polemic mtg. Asiroglu had earlier told MisOff GOT not now planning bring Turk Cypriot leaders to New York but would do so if solution warranted it.

Barring new developments, present expectation SC finish apartheid June 17 and take up Cyprus June 17 or 18 on basis SYG report. SYG had not yet called for mtg on financial contributions presumably because Comptroller still having difficulties figuring up estimates for present and future periods as UK and Swedish bills coming in and being argued.²

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, London, Athens, Ankara, and Paris for USRO.
2. In telegram 4470 from USUN, June 12, the Mission added that Kyprianou also argued that enosis would provide Turkey with the best guarantee about future Cypriot political orientation to the West. (Ibid.)