Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 11, 1964.

SUBJECT

• President’s Meeting with Greek Ambassador Matsas

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• His Excellency Alexander Matsas, Ambassador of Greece
• Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Robert W. Komer, The White House

After the President greeted Ambassador Matsas cordially, the Ambassador said he understood that the President had already taken action on the letter now being formally delivered. However, Matsas had no report as yet on the Ball conversation in Athens.² The President then carefully read Prime Minister Papandreou’s letter.³

The President made clear our position on the Cyprus crisis. Outside powers could not solve it. The Greeks and Turks must settle it themselves. He believed the Prime Minister of Greece should get together with Prime Minister Inonu, or have some representative talk with the Turks. We had told Turkey that there could not be war but we didn’t know how long this would stick. Moreover, we were “disappointed” that the Greek Government had not taken the initiative to meet and talk with the Turks. It was much more dangerous not to get together than to get together. As we saw it, there were two requirements for a solution: (a) whatever was done must be permanent; (b) the solution could not be humiliating to either side. It was much more dangerous not to have a solution. War could help nobody. Therefore, the President continued, he had told Ball to urge Papandreou to take the initiative in getting together somehow with the Turks. The US people were becoming quite worried over the Cyprus problem; they couldn’t understand why “two of our close allies were growling at each other.” As for Makarios, he didn’t seem to care. He thought he had the Greeks supporting him. Meanwhile, the Soviets were meddling and fully expected to win in the end. So we thought the Greeks must show some statesmanship and get moving toward agreement.

The President returned to the theme of American public attitudes. Some Americans were already wondering if they should go to Europe and to the Eastern Mediterranean now. There was no reason why Turkey and Greece couldn’t agree to talk about their problem. It would be dangerous if they did not. To repeat, this solution should be permanent and not humiliating to either side. We had gone to the aid of Greece and Turkey in the Truman Doctrine. We had helped through the years, and wanted to help now. But Greece and Turkey must grasp the problem. We had stopped the Turks from moving, but we couldn’t drop the matter there. We wanted to see them at the conference table. Greece should take the initiative.

The Ambassador asked what response his government had given to Ball. The President replied that they seemed to be considering our démarche. But he urged a Greek initiative. Action was what was needed.

Matsas explained that the chief need as his government saw it was to stop the constant threats of invasion. The President interrupted him, saying we had stopped it already but couldn’t stop it always. We had acted vigorously when trouble was imminent, but we might not be able to stop the Turks again.

Ambassador Matsas agreed there were still dangers ahead. His government had disturbing reports in the last day or so, including reported overflights of Rhodes. The President replied, “If I can’t get you to talk, I can’t keep the Turks from moving.”

Matsas again sought to explain the Greek position. He reported that the whole trouble lay in the continuing Turkish threat to invade Cyprus. The President interjected: “Or in your support of what Makarios is doing—or in arms imports.” The Ambassador replied that otherwise Makarios would have felt isolated. There were two dangers: The Greek-Turkish tensions and the risk of Makarios drifting to “the other side.” Both are the consequence of the Turkish threats. If only the US could secure Turkish agreement not to invade, then tensions would be reduced and there would be no need for arms imports to Cyprus, etc. etc. The President emphasized that we could not get the threat called off until the Greeks had agreed to talk. This called for statesmanship. Papandreou was a statesman. Matsas should tell his Prime Minister to call Inonu today and arrange a meeting. We had done everything we could. Our troubles around the world these days were not our own; our troubles turned out to be mostly disputes between our allies. Certainly Greece and Turkey would not be justified in destroying NATO over this issue.

Matsas asked if the President thought it impossible to get the Turks not to invade. The President said: “Nothing is impossible if people will act.” But Papandreou must act in this case if we were to have peace and not war. Matsas tried to point out again that Turkish agreement not to invade was the key to the situation. The President said bluntly that we could not get the Turks to turn off until there was some basis on which to argue with them. He noted that the Greek Government was apparently willing to have secret talks (this surprised Matsas who was obviously unaware of this. So Mr. Komer confirmed that the Foreign Minister had said secret talks were possible). Matsas then asked whether any US proposals had been mentioned by Ball. The President said that we were not going to make proposals ourselves at this point. Any US proposals would be seized upon by one side or the other and used to blame us. We want the Greeks and Turks to start making proposals to each other. This should be a matter between the two of them. Matsas added: “And the Cypriots.” Matsas said that “talks are difficult under the threat of invasion.” The President immediately came back: “Of course they’re difficult. But it’s more difficult to talk after an invasion. Get together and work something out. If not, all NATO will become involved.”

The Ambassador contended that the Greeks from the beginning had sought to keep the dispute damped down and avoid actions which increased the threat of hostilities. He gave examples of proposals advanced to the British, cooperating with the UN, etc. In contrast, he said, the Turks have done everything to spread the dispute, as by their treatment of the Greeks in Istanbul. The President said he thought Papandreou should appoint someone and talk with Inonu immediately. Talk was far better than the way of the jungle. Matsas attempted to return to the theme of calling the Turks off. The President interrupted him again saying: “I have only a temporary hold-off. What we want is for your Prime Minister to sit down with the Turkish Prime Minister and work out an agreement. Our people are getting terribly worried.” Matsas said that temporary cessation of the invasion threat won’t solve the problem: it won’t keep Makarios from building up arms supplies. The President responded that nothing would. The President said: “The Turks are the only ones I have gotten to do anything till now. All I want is for the Greek Prime Minister to sit down and talk. This is not so difficult.” He pointed out that by just this means he had gotten the railroad strike settled in ten days. But Greece always wants Turkey to do something to ease tensions and Turkey always wants Greece to do something. What was the Greek program for settling the crisis?

Matsas described the desire for a fully independent state with self-determination and guarantees of minority rights. He noted this was a “compromise” position (i.e. not enosis). He asked what the President thought of this approach. The President said that we couldn’t negotiate for the Turks. All we wanted was for Greece to get together with them. It wasn’t up to us to say what agreement should be reached. “We stopped an invasion the other night. Now we want a conference. Let’s start discussing this thing.” He again mentioned the problem of American tourists going to the threatened area. It was easier to talk than to fight. The President told the Ambassador: “You will only be admired for saying ‘let’s talk’.” It was a matter of the Biblical injunction, “Come let us reason together.” Matsas said he would so report to his government.

The President then changed tactics and pointed out the strong American affection for Greece. The President himself would like to travel there again soon with his family. But there could not be a war. We had turned off the Turks. Now we want talks. As Speaker Rayburn had said, “It’s always better to talk than fight.” Matsas tried once more to press the theme that the US or the UN Security Council should get the Turks to call off their invasion threats. The President said, “Let’s see what you can do for us and we will see what we can do for you.” Matsas sought to inquire whether this meant the President would get Turkey to agree permanently not to invade. The President carefully avoided any such commitment. He said: “I made a positive request of the Turks and they said that even though they didn’t agree they would comply. I now make a positive request to you to talk. If you comply, we will then make some suggestions to the Turks. That’s better than fighting.” The President did not tell him what these suggestions would be, but promised that if Papandreou would try to bring Greece and Turkey together, we would help all we could to move things along to an agreement. Otherwise we’d have a disaster.

The President asked Matsas to tell his Prime Minister of the President’s deep sense of friendship for him and for Greece. The President was counting heavily on Papandreou. We did not want the US people to get the idea that Makarios was “using” the Greeks. “Greece must avoid at all costs humiliating its ally Turkey. Even in the Cuban missile crisis, we always left the enemy a way out. With an ally it was even more important to leave a way out.”

The President observed that negotiating with Makarios was impossible. Makarios wasn’t interested in the security of the West. But Greece, Turkey, and the US were. Matsas interjected that Greece could not negotiate without Makarios. The President indicated understanding that the Cypriots would have to be consulted at some point but the important thing was Greek-Turkish agreement. Greece talked about its responsibil-ities to the Greek Cypriots. Didn’t the Greeks see that the fate of 100,000 Turkish Cypriots was a matter of honor for Inonu too?

Ambassador Matsas assured the President that he would promptly inform his Government.

1. Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Memcons Other Than Visits. Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Talbot and Komer and approved in the White House on June 15.
2. See Document 64.
3. Document 60.