Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

64. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 11, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The Cyprus Problem

My conversations in Athens and Ankara² have led me to reappraise the play of forces in the Cyprus problem and to modify my thinking as to where we should go from here.

Athens

The significant impressions I gained in Athens are the following:

1. For the first time the Greek Government is scared—scared at the reality of the danger of a Greek-Turkish war and at the progressive extension of Communist control in Cyprus.

2. The GOG is fed up with Makarios. Papandreou wants to deal him out of any settlement talks. (This is a marked change from a few months ago when the GOG was insisting that Cyprus could not be discussed without Makarios participating.)

3. The GOG is now pleading for a strong American intervention in the search for a settlement. (This again contrasts sharply with its earlier attitude when it supported Makarios’ efforts to exclude us from a serious role in the Cyprus situation.)

There were strong indications that Papandreou would like to have the USG force a settlement on the GOG that it could accept only with the excuse of outside pressure.

Ankara

On the Turkish side, Inonu is doing everything possible to maneuver us into taking responsibility for bringing about a settlement. The Turks are clearly frightened of the Cyprus situation. They are perplexed and sad. They also want us to force a settlement on them—provided adequate face-saving aspects can be devised.

Washington

Under these circumstances we are now in position for the first time to bring the Cyprus matter to a conclusion if we are prepared to invest time, energy and prestige. The alternatives are dismal.

The UN is totally unable to make even a beginning on a solution. Tuomioja has flopped around for three months and has achieved nothing whatever except to discredit himself with the Greek and Turkish Governments. This is not altogether his fault since the UN holds no cards in this game. Moreover, it is under the disability of having to genuflect to the Makarios Government. But Tuomioja quite clearly has operated on the wrong assumption—that the Cyprus problem was an affair between the two communities on the Island and not an argument between Greece and Turkey. His efforts to work out a solution from the vantage point of Nicosia were doomed to failure. It would have made quite as much sense for a mediator to try to solve the Kashmir problem by sitting for three months in Kashmir.

U Thant knows that the UN cannot succeed in settling this question. Tuomioja is sick of it and wants out. I think it altogether likely that we could get their tacit acquiescence to a vigorous USG initiative.

Quite obviously Papandreou needs a far greater shock than I was able to give him Wednesday night but I made a start. We need to lay on a crash effort to bring the GOG up short. But the GOG is a hard nut to crack and we are far from being home with this one.

Even so there are indications that Papandreou is ready to start low-level conversations with the GOT. Certainly the GOT is dying for a chance to start talking with the Greeks. But it won’t occur without us. Both Papandreou and Inonu indicated quite clearly to me that they envisaged a successful negotiation only under active USG tutelage. I am convinced that a meeting between representatives of the two Governments, without the active presence of the USG, would be likely to lead only to a deepening crystallization of positions. Certainly this was the result when Sandys tried it out in London last January.

Recommendation

I think therefore, that the central thrust of our effort should be directed at bringing representatives of the two Governments together with a strong USG representative as a catalyst—under quiet conditions. The pattern, in other words, would not be unlike that which we followed successfully in disposing of the West New Guinea problem.³

I doubt that the United States should try to put forward any plan for settlement. Certainly it should not do so at the outset of negotiations. The Greek and Turkish Governments are now latched on to enosis and double enosis respectively. There should be room for bargaining under these circumstances. In fact, Erkin made it clear that there was—so far as the GOT was concerned.

I would suggest, as one possibility, that we think of trying to arrange a meeting at some quiet, neutral spot such as the Villa Bellagio on Lake Como where representatives of the two Governments—perhaps at the Ambassadorial level—would be brought together with a respected but hard-boiled American, such as Dean Acheson, who knows the score and is not afraid to use American pressure.

Every effort should be made to keep this meeting secret, although we should quietly tell the British and perhaps U Thant what we were doing. Given the present state of Greek feelings, I think it possible that Papandreou could be persuaded to arrange this without letting the word pass to Makarios.

As a condition to our undertaking this, we should exact from the two Governments a firm commitment to try to hold still the two communities on the Island pending the outcome.

I think we must put this show on the road right away. Time is definitely not running on our side. We can get Turkish approval when Inonu comes to Washington. Meanwhile we should give thought to whether Papandreou might not be invited to pay us a visit.⁴

George W. Ball

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cyprus, Vol. 7. Secret.
2. Ball visited Athens and Ankara June 10–11. Documentation on the visits is in Department of State, Central File POL 23–8 CYP. Ball’s account of the trip is in The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 352–355.
3. Reference is to Ellsworth Bunker’s role in the 1962 Netherlands-Indonesian talks regarding West New Guinea.
4. In telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13, the Department of State instructed Labouisse to sound out Papandreou about a visit to Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GREECE) A letter of invitation was transmitted in telegram 1513 to Athens, June 13. (Ibid.) The letter was delivered on June 14.