Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

143. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 22, 1964, 9 p.m.

378. Embtel 375.²

1. I told PriMin that statement that GOG did not consider itself in position carry out enosis on basis Acheson proposal came as shocking news on top of yesterday’s confirmation that he was prepared to accept the Acheson proposals in principle and was drafting a letter along those lines. I said new situation confronted us with possible disaster.

2. PriMin acknowledged above, but appeared greatly distraught and genuinely disturbed over report on Grivas’ position and atmos-phere in Cyprus. PriMin added that although it was folly to risk war over question of the size of a base, he was not master over Greek Cypriot community as Inonu is over Turk Cypriots. He said he had been most sincere in his statements to me yesterday and day before and that he had and is acting in good faith; that Acheson proposal is acceptable to gov as way to avoid war and resolve Cyprus question, but that he is helpless because he could not impose this solution on the island. This was brought forcefully to light by Defense Minister’s discussions in Cyprus. He finds himself in a serious impasse and does not know where to turn.

3. He and Costopoulos asked several times for US guidance. Would it be desirable for government to state publicly that it accepted concept of Acheson plan but that Makarios turned it down? As result of such statement, Greece would, of course, have to withdraw its forces from Cyprus and leave the island to its fate. Both Papandreou and Costopoulos questioned that this would be desirable course of action, as it would play more into Makarios’ hands and drive him even closer to Moscow and Nasser. “But what can be done?”

4. Papandreou said only way out that he could see was proposal he had made to me on Monday (Embtel 327),³ which would bring about instant enosis with no prior commitments, get rid of Makarios, cut out Soviets, and leave it to GOG to promise full safeguards (presumably along general lines Acheson proposal, with few relatively minor modifications).

Comment: As indicated, we believe GOG was sincerely attracted Thursday night to Acheson plan as being solution basically in over-all Greek interest (Embtel 362)⁴ but frankly stated their reservations regarding their capacity to make concessions regarding Turkish base. Yesterday morning Papandreou under intense US pressure took policy decision to accept US proposal in principle (Embtel 366)⁵ although he continued express misgivings as to his ability to execute program. Today following Garoufalias’ return from Cyprus, Papandreou’s illusion GOG might have capability to execute program evaporated.

It was always the case that the prospective settlement with Cyprus had to be of a nature such that the Greeks could impose it, overcoming whatever resistance exists among the Greek Cypriots to the settlement. As events moved along, under our pressure the Greeks gave more and more ground, hoping that what they were conceding was not beyond their capability to deliver. In their anxiety to obtain settlement based on enosis, they got beyond their capability to deliver.

Labouisse

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Received at 4:36 p.m. and repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, and Geneva. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
2. Telegram 375 from Athens, August 22, reported that because of Cypriot resistance to a Turkish base area the Greek Government was in “total disarray” and unable to accept the Acheson proposal. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 3, Document 131.
4. Document 136.
5. See footnote 3, Document 137.