131. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
337. 1. My talks with Papandreou of Sunday (Embtel 314)2 and last night (Embtel 327)3 reveal state of dejection and hopelessness of the GOG. They seem to have lost whatever sureness of footing they had. Papandreou’s suggestion Sunday night of a Presidential declaration and his proposal last night for instant enosis with details to be worked out later had certainly not been thought through. He gave the impression casting about for some way out of his dilemma. He seems at the end of his tether (partly through his own fault) and he sees the US as his only hope. Although the Soviets had moved onto the scene when we met on Sunday, his main preoccupation then seemed to be his fear of another Turkish attack and the consequent involvement of Greece in a war with Turkey. Last night the Turkish threat seemed to preoccupy him less. He then had in mind Kyprianou’s instructions to go to Moscow.4 These instructions caused him to see Greece losing Cyprus to Soviet influence and the consequent failure of his own policies. He translated this failure into personal political defeat at the hands of the Communists who would be the only ones to gain by it.
2. Papandreou’s reaction to the events of the last ten days has shown, not surprisingly, considerable emotion and some inconsistency. For example, while he was allegedly threatening Kyprianou with a parting of the ways in the event of a Soviet alliance, and was also in effect asking US and the Turks to accept his pledge of good faith in giving the Turks a fair deal in the event of enosis, he was at same time withdrawing the Greek elements from Sixth ATAF and LANDSOUTHEAST and presiding over a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense which decided to disengage, as necessary, military, naval and air units of the Greek forces now assigned to NATO. (Greek statement on this makes clear this was direct reaction to GOT withdrawal air defense units.)5 We [Page 266] consider these Greek gestures unfortunate and untimely but not reversible until the general climate here improves.
Basic fact which recent events have driven home is that there can be no solution of the Cyprus problem which does not take into consideration will and emotions of Cypriot people. They cannot be by-passed or forced into line, and the Turkish air strikes are going to make it especially difficult to obtain agreement from the Cypriot people (regardless of Makarios) to any Turkish base on the island. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that we should make every effort to keep talks going in Geneva. Even though Mediator’s illness has greatly complicated situation, as of the moment it appears that Greeks are still willing to try to narrow the gap separating them and Turks.
4. However, it is unhappy fact of life that Papandreou government is fundamentally weak, poorly organized for effective action, and short on talent. Papandreou himself by nature is long on words and short on deeds. It may be, in the end, because of this weakness and because of difficulties faced in obtaining any kind of Cypriot acquiescence, the US will have to accept the unhappy burden of being the guarantor of an “instant enosis” solution that leaves GOT/GOG final agreement to be hammered out at a later time. This might turn out to be the only way to forestall a Soviet intrusion on the island. This unpalatable position for the US, leaving us the target of the ill will of all the parties, should be adopted only in extremis.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Paris for USRO, Geneva for Acheson, USUN, DOD, CIA, and the White House.↩
- Telegram 314 from Athens, August 16, reported the “mood of dark despair” of Papandreou. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 327 from Athens, August 18, reported Papandreou’s concern regarding the entry of the Soviet Union into the diplomatic maneuverings over Cyprus. (Ibid.) On August 15, the Soviet Government issued a statement offering aid to Cyprus against foreign intervention, after a request from President Makarios. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 586–587.↩
- Makarios’ decision to send Kyprianou was revealed to the Greek Government on August 17.↩
- The Turkish withdrawal took place on August 17.↩