Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, August 22, 1964, 3:25 p.m.

347. For Ambassadors from Ball. Your 375.² We cannot accept the Greek Government’s vacillation and you should make this point quite clear to them. The President has been advised that the GOG has accepted our proposal and we intend to proceed on that basis. We are using every possible means to bring about a Turkish agreement and we cannot accept any Greek second thoughts at this point.

I suggest, therefore, that in your next meeting with Papandreou you convey to him the deep sense of surprise felt in Washington by his apparent backsliding. You must continue to keep the pressure at the maximum until we get this whole business nailed down. So far as the United States Government is concerned this is a last major effort and we do not intend to see it fail. If it should break because of the lack of courage or determination on the part of the GOG we would have to make clear to the world where the responsibility lay.

We have been considering how to respond to the Greek request for guidance in handling the situation in Cyprus. You should alter or amend the following suggestion as you see fit.

With the approval of Papandreou and hopefully of Canellopoulos also, the King would send word to General Grivas that he wished to see him. He would then make the following points to General Grivas preferably speaking in the presence of Papandreou and Canellopoulos.

1. The Government has fully considered the USG proposal and believes that it should be carried out.

2. A quick solution through the American proposal is the only door still open of preventing the Communization of Cyprus without the practical certainty of a Turk attack.

3. The Americans have been making a substantial effort to help find a solution. They have assured the GOG that if enosis is immediately effected through a peaceful bargain with the Turks on the basis of the American proposal they would promptly provide substantial assistance for the rebuilding of Cyprus and the development of its resources.

In connection with this last point you may indicate that we would be prepared to undertake an aid program that could result in the reclaiming of more land for Cyprus than would be included in the proposed Turkish base. How you should formulate that is for you to decide. We are reviewing the situation with the experts this afternoon and will forward you promptly some harder data as to the possibilities of desalination and soil reclamation.

What must be gotten across to General Grivas is that what the American proposal offers is an opportunity for him to fulfill his Dighenis role and thus reclaim Cyprus for Hellenism and save it from Communism to which Makarios is leading it. He would also secure for the people of Cyprus the chance to make their Island blossom like a rose.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
2. Telegram 375 from Athens, August 22, reported that as a result of Garoufalias’ visit to Cyprus, the Greek Government was convinced that Makarios would reject any settlement involving cession of territory in the Karpas Peninsula to Turkey. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 379 from Athens, August 23, Labouisse endorsed the proposal for support of Greece made by Acheson as the best means of checking Soviet influence. (Ibid.)