Office of the Historian

140. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1

Ankara, August 22, 1964, 3 p.m.

363. For Under Secretary Ball. Have just had two and half hours very difficult conversation with Inonu and Erkin in which I initially based presentation on summer negots to date in order establish extraordinary effort at highest level made by USG in this matter, following this by giving substance Ball telecon of last night2 and delivering Acheson letter.3

To make long story short Inonu was obviously well primed and steadfastly insisted no agreement possible which did not provide for larger base area and full sovereignty, with especial emphasis on latter. He agreed however that this should not be considered as final decision but rather as exchange of views which he would report to Erim and I to [Page 281] Washington in order obtain reactions of USG. If our proposal unchanged he would submit to government for final decision but he made clear he would not support; to do so would end his political career. Limit to which he could go was original Acheson proposal.

It will probably take me several hours to try to patch this rather strange conversation together;4 strange in sense that arguments advanced by Inonu, although having degree of cogency, did not give impression of indicating what he really had in mind.

As contrasted with Inonu’s calm, Erkin’s pressure seemed be running rather high. Said Turks always being asked make concessions; base proposal worthless; as Turk citizen support of proposal would constitute betrayal of his people; better let things go on as they are or even have enosis with no arrangement. Then and possibly with some significance he observed that in any event there now seemed be “light of hope for federation” and, when I asked him genesis of this idea, his first reaction was to say not result of consultation with Russians, which I had not suggested. Mention of same thing by Erim to Acheson (Geneva’s 445 to Dept)5 only yesterday may or may not be coincidental.

In sum, my talk was longer version of that between Acheson and Erim yesterday, with sovereignty and area of base given as striking point, but I am not at all sure that this was not used as excuse to get out from under whole thing, which in curious contrast with what appeared be inspired press build-up for something like what we finally proposed.

I of course used every gun at my disposal but Inonu had obviously entrenched himself well in advance and would give no ground beyond agreeing keep open for another round.

Hare
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Received at 9:01 a.m. and repeated to Athens and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.↩
  2. Following receipt of telegram 445 from Geneva (Document 138), Ball initiated a teleconference with Hare at 5:15 p.m. on August 21. Ball instructed Hare to press the Turks to settle on the basis of the Acheson proposals. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation) Hare reported that he requested a personal meeting with ailing Prime Minister Inonu in telegram 359 from Ankara, August 21. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)↩
  3. Transmitted in telegram 112 to Ankara, August 22. In his letter, Acheson stressed the need for an immediate agreement on the basis of the proposal he had offered. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram 364 from Ankara, August 22, received at 12:56 p.m., Hare outlined in greater detail Inonu’s objections to the Acheson proposals. (Ibid.)↩
  5. Document 138.↩