138. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
445. From Acheson. Turks came to see me this morning to say they had reported proposal I put to them yesterday and already had “governmental decision” back from Ankara. Essence this answer was that [Page 277] Turkey had accepted initial proposals I made in Geneva but this was final, not bargaining position. What I had proposed yesterday was radical change involving abandonment of “principle” of sovereign area as well as basic principles of my plan for protection Turkish minority right. This Turkey could not accept.
I took strong exception to statement Turkey had accepted initial proposals. Told me they were acceptable “as basis for discussion”. In my view, this meant discussion of all aspects, not merely that Turkey would accept my offer and try to get more. Erim said there must have been misunderstanding; Turkey would have been willing to discuss certain details, such as exact boundary of sovereign base area, but it was quite unable discuss idea of lease instead of sovereign possession.
I urged that Turks refrain from giving me at this time final rejection of latest proposal. They should wait and see what Greece did. It appeared GOG did not like my ideas any better than GOT. At least, Turkey might allow Greece to take onus for breakdown of talks.
Erim insisted, however, on going ahead, saying I could “use it or not.” According to Ankara, he said, sovereign base area of adequate size would have been barely acceptable compensation to Turkey for enosis, but leased base could never be adequate counterpart. Turkey must be free on its base to do anything it wished in both civil and military fields. So far as minorities were concerned, my original proposal had been acceptable, but Greek counter proposal (which he implied I had adopted) was completely different. As he had already said, Turkish Government was not prepared to discuss basic changes. Since GOG had failed agree to my position, Turkey preferred no settlement at all.
He then began once again to talk about federalism, mentioning that USSR had never declared itself as opposed to this solution. Establishment of federal state on Cyprus would preserve Turkey’s freedom of action, which would be lost once enosis took place. He went on to emphasize that it was impossible for Inonu to sell enosis to Turkish Parliament and people without sovereign base as counterpart.
At this point I read him excerpts from latest Ankara press summary which showed newspapers were talking about enosis as possible solution and pointing out dangers of self-determination for Cyprus in light of Soviet Cypriot rapprochement. They were pointing with alarm to danger of Russia achieving a Mediterranean Cuba. Greek press, I said, was taking somewhat similar line. This seemed to indicate to me that both Turkish and Greek opinion had realized we had entered a new phase.
As to federalism, I emphatically said this was not presently feasible alternative. Makarios simply would not accept it and he would have Soviet support.
With all the energy I could muster I tried to impress upon Erim that our only chance to save situation is now. This offer gave Turkey a great [Page 278] deal, even though I admitted it was not what GOT would like. There really wasn’t all that difference between sovereignty and a lease. What had sovereignty meant in case of Britain and Cyprus? Possession between 1914 and 1960, less than the fifty years being offered Turkey. It would be incredible folly for GOT to turn down this last opportunity. Rejection would be disastrous for Turkey, for U.S., for Greece and for Cyprus. Turks should realize they can’t get what they want without fighting. And that would bring down whole house of cards. I strongly hoped Greece and Turkey would not lose sight of their real national interest. They must not allow themselves to be blinded by wretched island of Cyprus to real Slav danger which threatened them both.
I summed up by saying that I had done everything I could. I had no more ideas. If my latest proposal were not accepted, I would be finished. Only thing I could do, and what I planned to do, would be to ask Amb. Hare to make final approach in Ankara to urge GOT to reconsider. (I said, however, I would not ask him to do this unless I heard that Greeks had accepted.)
Erim and Sunalp listened to this calmly, injecting occasionally repetitious remarks about Turkish inability to give more ground than I had asked them at first. Their only substantive suggestion was that we go back to validity of existing treaties and that U.S. and Turkey make new joint statement that these treaties must be respected. I said we had made our position in support of treaties clear ever since Inonu visit to Washington. Restatement in present circumstances would be futile.
At one point, Erim remarked that if there should be settlement between Greece and Turkey GOT would prefer to have all aspects of agreement made public at same time. We did not follow this up, but I assume he was referring to my earlier suggestion that agreement not be published, at least in full, until after enosis had been accomplished.
We parted amicably, with Sunalp remarking he would probably not see us again because he had received orders to take command of 29th Division at Erzerum. Erim said nothing about leaving Geneva.
Comment: Seems apparent that sovereignty is key issue in Turkish mind. With it, they can pretend to their people that they have achieved form of partition; without it they think this impossible. I got no reaction at all to my repeated warning about dangers of Soviet domination of Cyprus. Erim observed very calmly that if this happens “you will have your Cuba and we will have our Cyprus, each ruled by a man with a beard.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 11:01 a.m. and repeated to Ankara and Athens. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.↩