Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

139. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, August 21, 1964, 5 p.m.

357. Dept and other addressees already well aware views this post regarding impossibility any lasting peaceful solution involving Turkish base on island. From fragmentary info gleaned from various telegrams would appear we have now presented GOG fully approved USG plan which includes sizeable base on Karpas if not most of peninsula. At same time we are suddenly presented by GOG with “instant enosis” as only way Greeks can see out of present virtually impossible situation. At risk of being considered out of step feel I must observe that we are moving into almost hopeless dilemma and we cannot continue even for short period to ride both Geneva and (reluctantly but perhaps with no choice) “instant enosis” horses. Our reasoning is along following lines:

1. “Instant enosis” depends upon availability of reliable Greek troops for use in bringing it about and good discipline on part of Greek Cypriot armed elements.

2. Sovereign Turkish base not sellable here. Why should Greek Cypriots accept less than they think they will get at UNGA? And especially now that GOC has or thinks it has full Soviet backing? Greek army can hardly be expected to force base upon Cypriots who likely actively fight against it (Athens 353 to Dept).² Even leased base would be categorically refused by majority of Cypriots and certainly by their leadership including Georkadjis/Grivas. Therefore both crucial elements for imposed solution are lacking.

3. Turks believe we think Turkish base rather than NATO base can be imposed here if GOG agrees in Geneva. Therefore, it would seem that in Turkish eyes USG would be responsible if “instant enosis” did not result in establishment Turkish base.

4. Mood here is such that it not inconceivable Grivas et al. might go ahead with enosis anyway without our support and of course without any Turkish base. This will surely be terrible fait accompli for Turks to swallow after having held their hand on assumption that US would obtain them sizeable Karpas base.

Realize the foregoing obviously presents us with harsh choice. We feel here that possible solution could lie along lines our 345³ but if decision made for higher policy reasons to give Turks territorial concession, we must be prepared for real bloodshed, rapid increase in Communist strength, to say nothing of possible Soviet intervention in more active form and at best, festering sore which will continue to torture our major alliance.⁴

Belcher

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 11:59 a.m. and repeated to Ankara, Athens, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN.
2. Telegram 353 from Athens, August 20, reported a discussion with the Greeks regarding Turkish base demands and indicated that the Greek Government had not yet taken a decision on the issue. (Ibid.)
3. See footnote 2, Document 133.
4. In telegram 359 from Nicosia, August 21, Belcher advised the Department of State that “instant enosis” was impossible on terms that included a Turkish base. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP) In telegram 206 to Nicosia, August 21, the Department of State instructed Belcher to avoid any statement to Greek or Cypriot officials that might suggest official doubts about the “instant enosis” with a Turkish base deal. (Ibid.)