265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

596. Embtel 945.1 Following are instructions promised Deptel 5882 which are based upon assumption Boun Oum likely accept Co-Chairmen’s invitation:

1.
You should follow up Co-Chairmen’s invitation for 3 Princes meeting in Geneva directly with Boun Oum and Phoumi.
2.
You should make every effort influence Phoumi to accompany Boun Oum, but if Phoumi unwilling, you should urge Boun Oum to [Page 574] bring along some other Lao who could play useful role. We strongly prefer Phoumi since decisions taken in his absence not likely be binding. However, we do not at this point contemplate making Phoumi’s non-attendance at Geneva cause further holding up January payment.
3.
If Boun Oum goes to Geneva, you should release January payment at appropriate moment. If useful, you may indicate in advance that resumption of payments would be contingent on Boum Oum attending 3 Princes meeting. If cash grant resumed, do you advise that we require resumption free convertibility of RLG?3
4.
If Boun Oum refuses go Geneva, you would continue withhold payments, then steps would be considered here in light your recommendation at that time.
5.
Phoumi-Boun Oum position on Defense and Interior remains crucial to settlement but consider that at this time you should direct your efforts to preventing Phoumi and Boun Oum from repeating adamant stand on this issue in advance of next meeting, e.g., avoid references to issue in reply to Co-Chairmen’s invitation.
6.
Would appreciate your views as to whether Phoui could perform useful role if he returned to Geneva in his capacity as head Lao political parties delegation to Conference? Could this for example facilitate rapprochement between Phoui and Souvanna?4

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–562. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Cleveland in draft and Peterson, and approved by Harriman. Repeated niact to Geneva Fecon and CINCPAC, priority to London and Paris, and to New Delhi, Saigon, Bangkok, and to Moscow by pouch.
  2. See footnote 4, Document 256.
  3. Document 256.
  4. In telegram 953 from Vientiane, January 7, Brown suggested that if, contrary to his expectations, things went well at the Geneva meetings of the three Princes, the United States could assure the RLG that financial aid would continue. At that time, the Embassy would insist on resumption of convertibility as a condition of continuation. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–762)
  5. Also in telegram 953, Brown agreed to suggest to Phoumi that Boun Oum should take Phoui to Geneva. Brown felt, however, it would not be wise or effective to use much pressure on this. (Ibid.)