Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

264. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, January 6, 1962, 9:30–10:10 a.m.

Meeting in the Cabinet Room on January 6, 1962, on the subject of Laos

PRESENT

• President
• Secretary of State
• Secretary of Defense
• Director of CIA
• Chairman JCS
• General Taylor
• Deputy Under Secretary Johnson
• Assistant Secretary Harriman
• Mr. William Bundy
• Mr. Robert Cleveland
• McGeorge Bundy

The Secretary of State opened the meeting by explaining the current situation, in which the most essential point was to get Boun Oum to go to Geneva. The Secretary indicated his hope that Mr. Harriman would also go to Geneva and would, among other things, talk frankly to Pushkin about the need for restraining the Pathet Lao during the period in which we were trying to put “heat on Phoumi.” The Secretary reported that while there was some opinion in Vientiane and at CINCPAC that Phoumi’s army was better and stronger than it had been before the truce, there was skepticism on this point in the intelligence community. Moreover, even the optimistic estimates contained a conditional clause, to the effect that the prospects of Phoumi’s army would be good only if the North Vietnamese stayed out of the contest.

Mr. Harriman indicated that he did not think it was yet necessary for him to go to Geneva, though he would be ready to go on short notice. He did agree that it would be important to get a message to Pushkin in the sense indicated by the Secretary.¹ He outlined the expectation that the U.S. aid check now being held up could be deposited as soon as Boun Oum was on his way. Meanwhile, the time was not ripe for any military sanctions.

There was discussion of Phoumi’s need for some personal satisfaction in any eventual agreement. The current Souvanna proposal leaves not very much for him. The President expressed sympathy with the notion of a private high-level offer of financial support to Phoumi for his own needs and those of his followers.

Director McCone reported that there was doubt in the CIA about the prospects of a Souvanna government in which the Ministries of Defense and Interior were held by Souvanna supporters. If Souvanna should behave as he has in the past, such a government would not be very strong.²

Mr. Harriman responded very firmly and clearly in defense of the “Souvanna solution.” He believed that this solution had been accepted as American policy last August and he thought that the current issue was quite simply whether Phoumi or the President of the United States was to run U.S. foreign policy. While he agreed that the problem of closing the border between Laos and Vietnam was important, he pointed out that the Russians had specifically agreed that this border should be closed. He believed that the Russians did not want fighting, and do want a reasonable agreement. The alternative, in his view, was what General Bradley had once called “the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.” We must not let “a strong man” dominate the policies of the United States Government.

The President made it clear that he did not want a resumption of fighting, and by clear inference he reaffirmed his support for the policy outlined by Governor Harriman. (At a brief meeting later in the week, on January 12, the President reaffirmed this view of Governor Harriman on the eve of the latter’s departure for Geneva to participate in the next round of discussions.)

In closing the meeting, the President summarized the current position as follows:

1. Every effort must be made to sustain a cease-fire, on our side, by maximum pressure on Phoumi to avoid any adventure.

2. An effort should be made with Pushkin to ensure that similar restraint is exercised on the other side.

3. The conversations about formation of a Souvanna government should continue, and we should hope that progress may gradually be made toward agreement.

4. Subject to agreement between the Department of State and the CIA, the President authorized a high-level “dicker” with Phoumi.

After the President left the meeting, there was agreement among those remaining in the meeting that there should be a new national intelligence estimate of the capabilities of the forces of the Royal Laotian government.³

McG. B.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 1/1/62–4/15/62. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on January 15. The time is taken from the President’s Appointment Book which does not indicate that U. Alexis Johnson, William Bundy, Robert Cleveland, and Secretary of Defense McNamara attended. (Ibid.)
1. See Document 266.
2. CIA Director McCone prepared a memorandum for the record of this meeting, January 6, in which his views were outlined more fully. McCone stated that the intelligence community believed if Souvanna held both Defense and Interior Ministries Laos would become “an open roadstead from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.” Secondly, McCone stated that sanctions on [text not declassified] Phoumi would cause grave unease from Sarit and among certain elements in South Vietnam and would force Sihanouk closer to the Sino-Soviet bloc. McCone stressed that support of Phoumi should be looked upon not as a bribe, but as money spent on worthwhile objectives. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-McCone Files, [text not declassified])
3. See Document 268.