Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, January 4, 1962, 6:22 p.m.

588. Embtel 937.¹ Fully understand difficult position you are in and necessity to follow through on line you have taken with Phoumi. However proposed invitation from Co-Chairmen creates new situation which makes it desirable for you to hold back on further sanctions at this time. We believe that if it becomes necessary to break with Phoumi/Boun Oum it preferable do so on issue of their unwillingness to go to Geneva and carry on negotiations rather than solely on issue of two specific cabinet posts. We agree that crux of problem is whether or not Phoumi/Boun Oum will accept any Souvanna government solution. We believe that Phoumi regards Interior and Defense as last important issue remaining before he would have to come to terms but still conceivable that solution could be negotiated out under additional pressures at Geneva if we can get Phoumi and Boun Oum to go there. In any event immediate question facing us is whether we can get Phoumi/Boun Oum to do so and negotiate.

We plan hold high level discussions in Washington and expect send you instructions Saturday afternoon.² By that time Boun Oum will also have received invitation from Co-Chairmen upon which you would base your new approach. Would appreciate your comments and advice on following ASAP for our discussions:³

a) In our view one way of achieving our objective would lie in making sanctions so painful to other Lao that Phoumi would lose his political and military support and Lao themselves would force him to resign or appeal to King to remove him.⁴ Can these objectives be achieved without going beyond suspension military supplies and finance?⁵ Would other Lao be available to take over from Phoumi and willing to negotiate for a Souvanna solution?⁶ How would Army loyalties go if it became apparent we would no longer support it with Phoumi in charge? How many forces might follow him if he went South? Would FAR command structure become totally disrupted by Phoumi’s departure or could this be forestalled?⁷ FYI In this connection we are considering possibility that we can obtain Soviet agreement to hold back PL if in the interests of producing peaceful negotiated settlement we are forced to take strong military sanctions against RLG.⁸ End FYI

b) If it becomes necessary break with Phoumi we would need come to some understanding with Souvanna in advance. Would appreciate your advice on type of commitments we should try to get from Souvanna. For example should we get Souvanna to mend fences with Phoui?⁹

c) Since we will wish to take prompt action you should feel free to include requests for further specific instructions in your answer.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–462. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Cross, cleared by Rice and Cleveland in draft, and approved and signed by Harriman. Repeated priority to Geneva for Fecon, London, Paris, and CINCPAC, and to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon.
1. Document 254.
2. January 6.
3. In telegram 945 from Vientiane, January 5, Brown reported that he had taken the following action: he had told the RLG Finance Minister that as of that day he was suspending U.S. cash grants and that the final decision on U.S. military aid would depend on the RLG’s response to the invitation to Boun Oum to go to Geneva. Hasey had urged Phoumi to accept; Brown would not do so unless Phoumi asked for his advice or a natural opportunity to tender it arose. Once Boun Oum was airborne for Geneva, Brown recommended that the United States give the RLG its January cash grant. Should Boun Oum remain obdurate at Geneva or refuse to go at all, then Brown recommended suspending U.S. military supplies. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/1–562)
4. The Country Team answered these questions in telegram 949 from Vientiane, January 6. It doubted that painful sanctions to other Lao would force Phoumi from office or make the King remove him. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–662)
5. The Country Team responded in telegram 949 that either suspension of military supplies or suspension of financial assistance over a long period of time would seriously damage FAR and the Lao economy and would bring Phoumi down. Removing U.S. military advisers would accelerate the process, but at obvious cost.
6. The Country Team stated in telegram 949 that the King was not a replacement for Phoumi and Phoui was a “very faint hope.” There were no other likely volunteers.
7. The bulk of the Army would remain loyal to Phoumi, the Country Team commented in telegram 949, even after the United States broke with him, and many of the southerners in it would go south with him. The Meo under Vang Pao would probably not follow Phoumi since the United States was supporting them and Phoumi could not do it alone. The FAR command would be totally disrupted.
8. The Country Team observed in telegram 949 that “holding back the Pathet Lao” would not be enough; the Soviets should be asked to suspend their military airlift as well.
9. The Country Team observed in telegram 949 that without a strong anti-Communist group headed by Phoumi in the Souvanna coalition, there was not much point in supporting Souvanna. However, the best possible candidates for conservatives in a Souvanna government were Leaum and Khamphan (it was improbable either would accept) or Phoui whom Souvanna would be very loathe to accept.