Office of the Historian

481. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk0

Washington, December 9, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • The Succession Problem in Thailand

Prime Minister Sarit died on December 8, 1963. Our estimate of what follows is that:

1.

General Thanom Kittikachon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, will be the immediate successor.

(He is now Acting Prime Minister, and, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it had been agreed among key military leaders before Sarit’s death that Thanom would succeed. If for some reason Thanom does not serve, another well-known figure who, like Thanom, is respected but not personally powerful, will be chosen.)

2.

Since Thanom will be a relatively weak Prime Minister, the influence of key Army officers will be great and there will be a more or less prolonged period of maneuvering for power among them.

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(The most important competitors, all of whom look support, are:

a.
General Praphat Charusathien, Minister of Interior and Assistant Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
b.
General Chitti Nawisathien, Deputy Commander of the Army.
c.
Lt. General Krit Sriwara, Commander of the First Army Area (Bangkok).

3.
The present political structure, i.e., a working relationship among the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the monarchy and its supporters, with the Army predominating, will continue.
4.
Thai foreign policy, largely dictated by the threat of Communist China and the need for United States support to meet that threat, will undergo no major changes as a result of the succession. However, Thai sensitivity to indications of United States support for Cambodian demands, including the demand for a conference on Cambodian neutrality, will be heightened rather than the reverse.

  1. Source: Department of State, EA/Thai Files: Lot 67 D 320, POL 15 Government, 1963—Nov.-Dec. Secret. Drafted by Pickering. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk saw it. Originally Pickering drafted a longer memorandum for Koren, which Koren passed on to Hilsman and Rice. (Ibid.) Hilsman instructed Koren to “Have this redone—shorter, punchier, and in much, much less detail—as a memo to S.”↩