Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

480. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, September 19, 1963, 6 p.m.

420. Saigon for Gen Harkins. Deptel 408.¹

1. DepUnder Secretary Johnson agreed use occasion his call on PMSarit Sept 19 to explore question of redeployment US/allied ground and air units to Thailand as contingency measure in event of grave Communist military threat Laos.

2. Sec Johnson began presentation with brief review salient points of current Lao situation, noting that some political gains had been made over past year. Sarit asked whether US favored return of PL Ministers to active participation in government national union. Sec Johnson replied it always our position PL should carry out Geneva Agreements. Sarit expressed doubt PL would ever do this faithfully but instead would use positions in government merely promote Communist objectives. Sec Johnson pointed to Souvanna Phouma’s encouraging firmness in rejecting unreasonable conditions PL attempting set on their return, and noted that it better for PL return to work in govt than resume military aggression.

3. Sec Johnson stressed non-Communists now generally in more favorable political position cope with PL machinations, noted allied govts about to agree on help to Lao stabilization program to check economic deterioration and then proceeded to review military situation. He mentioned that while things quiet during rainy season attempts made raise military capabilities of FAR and neutralists. Sarit remarked that PL military capabilities suffering from termination Soviet supplies and airlift and from interruption PL supply lines. Sec Johnson noted supply line interruption not an accident. With regard USSR role, he noted Soviets very reluctant talk about Laos and appeared no longer have much influence on situation. In response to question, Sarit said he believes Lao would benefit from training they receiving in Thailand and again underlined need for careful advance screening of Lao trainees, particularly those from Kong Le forces.

4. Noting approach dry season and need be prepared for serious Communist military moves in Laos, Sec Johnson said we wished consult Thais on possible contingency actions. Stressing we not pressing for firm decision at this time, he said we again considering possible desirability deploying US troops and air units to Thailand. Sec Johnson noted this could not be done too often, but that we believed it had been of value last year and might again be called for. Sarit did not make direct reply but also did not raise any objection. FonMin Thanat, who also present as was Phya Srivisan, said he personally felt deployment to Thailand of no value unless it clear that troops prepared move into Laos if necessary. Sec Johnson said decision for such further action could be made only in light of circumstances at time, but that deployment to Thailand would put us in better position meet contingencies rapidly and Communists would know this. Thanat then agreed firm decisions on further moves could not be made in advance. Phya Srivisan asked whether troops would be sent in under SEATO. Thanat thought they should be in SEATO framework but specifically on basis bilateral US-Thai understanding. Sec Johnson agreed, adding he hoped some other SEATO partners would join us as before and that consultation with other allies would be undertaken to this end.

5. Sec Johnson remarked that Emb Bangkok had prepared paper for his use in discussion this subject and as he had mentioned only more important points, he would leave it for Thais to read at leisure. (Paper drafted with this purpose in mind. Copy by pouch.)² He stressed paper did not represent formal communication to RTG.

6. Comment: While Sarit did not give specific endorsement of idea of troop deployment, and deliberately was not pressed to do so, he did not reject it. We believe Thais undoubtedly recognized conversation as genuine advance consultation and that it served prepare ground for further discussion and probable agreement if and when need for deployment arises.

Puhan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 408 to Bangkok, September 14, the Department instructed Puhan to approach Sarit about the possibility of reintroducing U.S. and allied troops into Thailand should the situation in Laos deteriorate. (Ibid.) In telegram 412 from Bangkok, September 17, Puhan suggested that the presentation to Sarit would be more effective if done by U. Alexis Johnson during his visit to Bangkok. (Ibid.)
2. Not found.