Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

475. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State⁰

Bangkok, March 29, 1963, 7 p.m.

1477. Policy. Part I. Assessment.

Communist subversive efforts in Thailand are accelerating and we must quicken our pace to meet growing threat. This is our updated estimate based on review developments since our evaluation of last Sept (Embtel 586).¹ Fol represents Country Team consensus:

Recent developments in area including deterioration in Burma and Laos point up urgency and seriousness of threat of insurgency facing Thailand on which internal security plan based. Communists now appear be vigorously engaged in organization, indoctrination and recruitment of cadres for future activities in Thailand, particularly stepping up propaganda, agitation and subversive training efforts in remote areas of northeast while concurrently increasing efforts in south and north.

Disturbing signs of progress Communist subversive operations reported by varied sources:

Statements to RTG authorities by Sawang Trachu, defector from Thai Communist refugee organization in Laos, highlight importance Thailand in ChiCom planning and organizational activities (FTB 7235).² Sawang and other CAS sources point up organizational efforts among Meo in North Thailand, Commie training of Thai cadre in Laos and recruitment of villagers for subversive activity. Thai police estimate members subversive organization Sakhon Nakhon (where 79 persons arrested last June) at 500–600 and number Thais from northeast who received subversive training in Laos during past two years at up to 3,000 (of whom, 20 cases documented as having returned to Thailand and 200 suspected, while most apparently remained with Pathet Lao).

CAS also notes increase Communist activity along Thai-Malay border probably supported by Indonesian Communist Party, activity Communist propagandists among northern hill tribes, and apparent guerrilla training given some tribal leaders (FTB 7235).

PriMin’s party encountered outright indifference and hostility in Sakhon Nakhon Province during visit to northeast last Jan (Emb A-485).³

Observations US officials on recent trips to remote areas northeast confirm that Peiping, Hanoi and clandestine Thai radio broadcasts have generally strongest signal and wide listening audience there.

Mobile information teams and others travelling in remote areas northeast encountering teams itinerant peddlers medicine and cloth who show marked unfriendliness to Thai officials and evidently peddling Commie propaganda; MIT met with uncustomary cool reception in village earlier visited by peddlers. (Emb A-691)⁴

The Hanoi-controlled Vietnamese refugees in the northeast have been organized into tightly-knit groups which constitute a substantial subversive potential in Thailand’s most vulnerable regions. (Emb A-669)⁵

We are only too aware Thai shortcomings in mobilizing to meet threat, though they seeking to redress them. Critical aspect of our task is to impress our sense of urgency on Thais since it is they in final analysis who must exert principal effort to defend their own country. We believe that in past year they have come long way in developing heightened sense of awareness of danger and of what must be done to meet it. Prime Minister is not unlike LaGuardia, as Newsweek writes, in alerting countryside and galvanizing govt. Thai work on joint internal security plan is encouraging. But action still not sufficiently responsive to need.

However, we must put our own house as much in order as we can before blaming our allies here. Thais are confused and discouraged about US. Unofficial statements emanating from Washington suggesting “reassessment” of our security interests in SEA and desirability reducing our aid commitments here; notification to RTG of our intent eliminate consumables from military aid program; pressures for general reduction our grant and loan programs here, delays in approvals, deliveries or contracts; all these dishearten Thais at very time when they feel encircled by danger and confusion and confronted with growing subversion within.

Thailand could become another Vietnam. We hope public pressures at home will not force penny-wise and pound-foolish reductions in our aid effort here while Communists make continuing headway in spreading their influence in the countryside.

In candidness, all this in Thailand in 1962/63 is beginning remind me uncomfortably of US cutbacks and delays in Vietnam in 1959/60 just before Viet Cong sprang terror and insurgency on peaceful recovering countryside.

Part II. Conclusions

Foregoing assessment leads us to fol conclusions:

1. Time factor is critical. Strengthening Thai capability to counter subversion, infiltration and possible insurgency must be largely accomplished within next year and a half; this confirms estimate made in Embtel 586 of last Sept that Thailand had to attain capability within fol two years of withstanding possible Communist insurgency compounded by intense Communist diplomatic pressure.

2. Extraordinary efforts must be made to cut drastically time schedules for review, approval and deliveries under all types of programs for Thailand. Programs must be administered on an urgent basis.

3. Special provision must be made for Thailand in application of our world-wide policies on curtailment of aid programs. Unless this is done and programs are administered on an urgent basis, we will have much reduced chance of leading Thais into changes, reforms and measures essential to end growing subversive threat to Thailand.

4. We must also give more attention to psychological impact on Thai of US actions and statements. Outbursts FonMin Thanat, while exaggerated, reflect growing concern by Thais at critical dependence on great power who to some responsible Thai officials appears to begrudge its help and belittle Thai contributions to common cause. Their anxiety deepened by feeling that Thailand’s strong open commitment to Western bloc impairs its standing in Asia and exposes it to stronger Communist pressures. Though American press and legislators free express critical views on Thailand, Thais hold US executive branch responsible for keeping public informed of Thai contributions. More statements by Washington officials favorable to Thailand and effective publicity exploitation of such statements and of favorable press accounts are needed to bolster Thai confidence in our support for them as suggested in Embtel 1298 of March 4.⁶

5. We have rare opportunity not only to prevent Thailand from becoming another Vietnam but also to break new ground in political, social, economic and security development in Asia. While eliminating elements of our aid programs with marginal impact on US objectives, we are at same time redoubling efforts to stimulate Thais bring villagers close to central govt by maximizing and integrating priority programs in agriculture, community development, mobile development unit operations, village health, feeder roads, police and local leader training.

We must emphasize concrete felt needs: roads, water, medical care, schools, cash crops and more income. Effective long-range development programs are also necessary, though increased emphasis at this time must be on short term impact security programs.⁷

We undertaking review USOM programs with security implication to see if additional assistance inputs can be effectively absorbed and whether such increases would in fact accelerate contribution which programs can make to achievement our objectives. Our recommendations may involve reconsideration present trend of reduced dollar grants and reduced USOM staff in some fields.

Young

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, CSM 9–6 THAI. Secret; Prioriy. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. See footnote 1, Document 469.
2. Not further identified.
3. Not found.
4. Dated March 18. (Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI)
5. Dated March 8. (Ibid., REF THAI)
6. Not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 US/Mansfield)
7. Commenting on this telegram in a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, Koren (Masters was the drafter) accepted the Embassy’s assessment as factually correct, but, like the CIA assessment (Document 474), it failed to consider Thailand’s strengths and the U.S. and Thai programs already underway. The Embassy’s assessment was therefore in Koren’s and Masters’ view overly dramatic. Thailand would not become another Vietnam because Thailand had strengths Vietnam never had. Nevertheless, the Office of the Southeast Asian Affairs agreed that subversion had increased and more urgency was needed in accelerating progress on existing programs, but it was not as pessimistic as the Embassy (Department of State, EA/Thai Files: Lot 66 D 500, Thailand, Jan.-June)