Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

474. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report⁰

[document number not declassified]

Washington, March 25, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Security Situation in Thailand (Situation Appraisal as of 23 March 1963)

APPRAISAL

• Commentary

1. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement of this agency or any component. It represents the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. Prepared for internal use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to other agencies in assessing the situation for their own purposes.

2. There is increasing evidence to suggest that Thailand is in the classic phase one of insurgency development. Aided and abetted by Pathet Lao and other hostile elements in Laos—the privileged sanctuary—there continues to be a discernible increase in subversive activities within Thailand. This activity has been manifest in terms of increased organizational, indoctrination and training activities, including the training of persons in guerrilla warfare tactics.

3. Within recent months there has been a definite increase in Communist activity in the Malayan border area. Communist activity in the southern border area is directed to both the Communist terrorists organization as well as the Moslem irredentist movement in the four Moslem southern provinces. Both the Moslem irredentist movement and the Chinese terrorists are apparently receiving both financial as well as arms support from the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI) [2 lines of source text not declassified] The Chinese Communists may have recently augmented the Chinese terrorists organization with an infusion of new cadres. Vietnamese Communist control over the approximately 40,000 member Vietnamese communities continues unchallenged and constitutes a latent threat of considerable significance. Communist propagandists have been active among certain of the northern Thai hill tribes, the Akha and Lahu, and have apparently provided training in guerrilla warfare tactics to some Meo tribal leaders. Besides training in basic insurgency tactics in Thailand, the Communists have definitely been training Thais in Mahaxay in southern Laos, Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly. There is some reason to believe they may also be training Thai Meo cadres in North Vietnam.

4. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] the Chinese Communists consider Thailand the key to Southeast Asia. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], other than the Chinese there are three principal movements in Laos targeted against Thailand: the Pathet Lao, the Vietnamese and the Thai Exiles Association (TEA), the latter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a weak puppet-type organization. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] present plans call for a continuation of organizational activities but no hostilities during 1963. While Thailand is divided into five areas for purposes of Communist organizational activities and control, the north and northeast have (portion garbled—being serviced) equal priority. Influential persons among the farmers, youth, teachers and governmental authorities are to be recruited and trained during this organizational period. From 600 to 1,000 Thais will be trained in Phong Saly in Laos and Dong Hoi in North Vietnam for a period of six months in political indoctrination and guerrilla warfare prior to being returned to Thailand as cadres.

5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mit Sattanon, the head of the TEA, has been active in Nam Province for the past 18 months and has succeeded in developing an organization of from two to three hundred Meo, at least eight of whom have completed a six months guerrilla warfare training program in Phong Saly. Other information reports that certain Meo leaders have received extensive off-shore Communist training and have been returned to north Thailand. Communist training of Thai cadres has been underway for several years in Mahaxay and apparently at Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly as well. [22 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (10-l/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

7. All conditions for rapid development of a subversive mechanism are present in the northeast. Democracy is meaningless to these people as they have not in the past and are not now being effectively reached by the government. Disaffection has permeated the area. The government officials lack the means and the facilities to effectively reach them with government services. The people are being exploited and manipulated by clever propagandists and dishonest government officials. The people are hungry, thirsty and sick. Unless the Thai Government is able to develop boldly conceived and effectively implemented socio-economic programs of a nature adequate to satisfy the people’s demands, complemented by effective psychological warfare programs encompassing all media, this situation will continue to deteriorate further to the point of insurgency. For the Thai Government to succeed in a security sense, they must rapidly implement extensive positive programs which have effective impact at the basic level. Time is now of the essence. Without such programs becoming effective by possibly one year, we can anticipate that within from one to two years the situation may deteriorate to the point of active insurgency. It is believed that Prime Minister Sarit is well aware of the seriousness of the situation in the northeast and is endeavoring to take remedial action. The Mobile Development Units (MDU) may represent the mechanism by which the Thai Government could begin to counter otherwise significant trends in the northeast.

8. This situation must be viewed in context of a continuing deterioration in the security situation in Laos and Burma as well as extensive graft and corruption throughout the highest levels of the Thai Government. This corruption is well known and weakens the moral fiber of the government and inadvertently further exposes the governmental apparatus to Communist propaganda and agitation. The effect of the current Pork Federation scandal is very serious and could well result in major changes in the ruling hierarchy, including ministerial-level changes. Sarit has publicly announced his intention to clean up the corruption in the Pork Federation, but it is problematical as to whether he will have the courage to take significant remedial action.

9. [1 line of source text not declassified]¹

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Thailand, Vol. V, 1/63–4/63. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Routine.
1. In a March 28 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, Koren and Masters commented on this CIA assessment. They believed it was “credible” in its description of the security situation and the need for preventive action, but it fell short in “occasionally overdrawing conditions in the Northeast” and “failing adequately to take account of programs underway” As examples, they noted that a local commitment to Thai nationhood was what was important in the northeast. While people were dissatisfied and vulnerable, Koren and Masters did not believe disaffection had “permeated” the area. They stated that new programs were not the answer; what was required was a Thai sense of urgency in implementing the already adequate programs. (Department of State, EA/Thai Files: Lot 66 D 500, 13.1 Internal Stability, Jan.-June 1963)