454. Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Heinz) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)0
Mr. Gilpatric called me this noon and desired I pass along the following to you in regard to Thailand:
The President decided this morning that he wants to take some portion of our combat elements out of Thailand.1 This would be a token [Page 949] affair, amounting to 1,000 of the 3,000 Marines. The Marines would be moved to Okinawa, but would be ready to move back in on very short notice.
In regard to Sarit, we would tell him that it is not desirable to have so many combat personnel sitting in Thailand during the rainy season with little to do. It would be much more desirable to have part of them training in Okinawa, and in a position to move back in very quickly should they be needed. In addition, we desire to move in some logistic personnel to accomplish our build-up (pipe line, air field construction, storage depot).2
To the Russians we would say that this move is made to make it easier for them to carry out their part of the bargain in regard to the Laos settlement.
To the public we would say that this is a more or less routine shift of personnel, that we are constantly making shifts in answer to varying situations.
Another factor influencing this decision is that we do not want to get committed on a definite number of U.S. troops in Thailand, and do not want to be frozen as to the numbers that we have there, either with Sarit or with anyone else. No definite ceiling was established for U.S. troops in Thailand. We will introduce logistic forces as necessary to do the job.
Mike Forrestal is drafting necessary cables on this to be cleared with State and Defense.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Thailand, 334–384, 1962. Also sent to William Bundy and Frank K. Sloan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs (ISA). The source text is Bundy’s copy with a note on it indicating that he saw it.↩
-
In a telephone conversation on June 25 at 5:20 p.m., Ball and McNamara discussed the President’s desire to withdraw troops from Thailand. Ball stated that there were a series of reasons why the troops should not be withdrawn, noting that the effect on the Thais would be disastrous and it would make the Chinese Communists believe that they had scared the United States out. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Thailand)
Ball then called Forrestal at 5:30 p.m. and explained the background of the President’s concern. For some time, according to Forrestal, the President had wanted to remove some troops and envisioned a gradual withdrawal that could be explained to Sarit as nothing more than a gesture. Sarit could be assured that the troops could come back in a day’s notice. (Ibid.)
↩ - When informed by Harkins and Young of the plan, Sarit concurred with the redeployment with the comment, “we have no choice. We have jumped into pool with you and we now swimming together.” Sarit also approved of the improved logistical program for Thailand. (Telegram 2113 from Bangkok, June 29; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/6–2962)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩