453. Editorial Note
Director of Central Intelligence John McCone visited the Republic of Vietnam, Thailand, and the Republic of China June 2–14, 1962. On June 11, McCone met with the Country Team in Bangkok to discuss the status of U.S. support to the Thai Border Patrol Police and the counterinsurgency [Page 947] effort. McCone was assured that training of the Border Patrol Police was proceeding well and that equipment was reaching Thailand with one problem: Transceiver radios for village-to-village communication were going to South Vietnam as a first priority rather than to Thailand. McCone promised to recommend in Washington that delivery of these radios to Thailand be expedited.
Finally, McCone and the Country Team discussed the requirement for short takeoff and landing and other aircraft in northeast Thailand. (Memorandum from the CIA to the Special Group (CI), June 14; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files).
McCone prepared notes of his impressions of Thailand. They read as follows:
- “a. SEATO—Despite the establishment of a token allied force, Thailand will continue to be skeptical of the organization’s worth (particularly the membership of France and the UK) and will look primarily to the US for its protection.
- “b. Neutralism—Beneath the currently strong Western orientation is an historical propensity to adjust to prevailing trends in the areas. A deterioration of the Laotian and South Vietnamese situations would bring Thailand to a re-examination of its stance. If the political orientation of Laos and Burma moves to the left, the Thais will probably tend toward neutralism and disengagement from the West in order to accommodate to the evolving situation. In doing so they will blame the US.
- “c. The succession problem—While Sarit exercises the power of a military dictator and has every intention of doing so during his lifetime, he is not well (reports have given him one to two years). There is no assurance that, should he die, there would be an orderly succession, and hence a difficult situation might result.
- “d. Subversion in the northeast—It is probably only a question of time before an anti-government movement in northeastern Thailand manifests itself, inspired and abetted by North Vietnam through Laos. Thai efforts thus far to counter what probably is now only a rudimentary subversive apparatus in the northeast have been largely negligible. The Thai government is aware of the threat and is requesting assistance from the US in meeting it.
- “e. Communist terrorists in the south—The remnants of terrorists from Malaya in the southern border area, while small and relatively quiescent, will continue to be a problem.” (Ibid.)
On June 18, after his return to Washington, McCone met with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric at 11:30 a.m. to discuss his Far Eastern trip. Richard Helms accompanied McCone. McCone stated, that U.S. military forces in Thailand should have training as their basic mission and expressed concern that the prospective Laos agreement might eventually force [Page 948] their withdrawal. McCone also stated that he feared Thailand would move toward neutralism and seek accommodation with the Communist bloc should the U.S. position in Southeast Asia show additional signs of weakness. McCone concluded with the observation that U.S. programs in Southeast Asia were “essentially holding actions which would buy time,” but would not succeed over the long run. As McCone put it, “we were merely chipping away at the toe of the glacier from the North.” (Ibid., DCI/McCone Memos for Record)
Later that day, McCone and Helms met with Secretary of State Rusk at 3:05 p.m. and had a similar discussion. McCone made the same point about the need for U.S. training of Border Police and Thai military, and he noted that Prime Minister Sarit had agreed to an increase in the Police Aerial Reconnaissance Unit. McCone also discussed security in the Embassy and the problem of procuring equipment for northeast Thailand. (Ibid.)