Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, October 28, 1963, 3:03 p.m.

509. Your 973 and 975.¹ Agree fully your proposed approach to Sukarno. You may tell him President still hopes make trip to Asia in first part 1964. He should be left under no illusion, however, that Presidential visit possible while Indonesia in state hostile confrontation against Malaysia and UK.

In addition, should be stressed that future prospects as well as current behavior must be taken into account in determining feasibility Presidential visit early 1964. Visit could not take place if there were any indications Sukarno temporarily refraining from belligerent acts and had engineered makeshift settlement with Malaysia simply to provide suitable climate, while intending resume confrontation afterwards. To contrary, there would have to be reasonable assurance that Sukarno would not cause embarrassment by engaging in provocative actions (either against Malaysia or in other field) within few weeks or months after visit.

This would require enough solid progress in resolving Indonesia-Malaysia dispute to demonstrate that Sukarno really committed so thoroughly to peaceful settlement that any reversal unlikely. Would also require achievement fairly clear understanding among Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines as to means they intend follow in reaching final settlement. In addition, there could be no signs any imminent Indonesian moves against Timor, foreign enterprises in Indonesia, etc.

We recognize that foregoing will not be easy to get across to Sukarno, but believe it essential that he be aware of these conditions both to dispel illusions and to derive maximum leverage from his strong desire for visit.

We have no objection text proposed press release (your 975). Dept does not plan issue statement re your return but will respond press inquiries by drawing on text your release. Please advise date and time its issuance.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL INDON–MALAYSIA. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ingraham, cleared in draft by Forrestal and Cuthell and by Sullivan, and approved by Rice.
1. In telegrams 973 and 975, October 28, Jones suggested that he be authorized to inform Sukarno that President Kennedy would only be able to visit Indonesia if tensions were eased with the United Kingdom and Malaysia, and if Indonesia began to assume constructive leadership in Southeast Asia as befitted its status as the largest and richest nation of the area. Otherwise, Jones proposed to tell Sukarno, the U.S. Congress and public would not understand the trip. Such an approach would exploit Sukarno’s intense desire for a Kennedy visit and put him on notice that continued confrontation would make the trip impossible. Jones also submitted a draft press release explaining his visit. (Ibid.)