Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, October 24, 1963, 4:32 p.m.

503. Eyes only for Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. We are all very conscious of the tremendous burden you have carried since you became Ambassador to Indonesia and especially over the past few critical months. As there now appears to be a momentary lull in Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, it would seem a good opportunity for you to get a well-deserved rest. I want you to know of my personal appreciation of the tremendous job you are doing under very difficult circumstances. We all were greatly impressed with resourcefulness and judgment that you used on your own initiative at the time of the lamentable events of mid-September.

I am sure you share our confidence that Frank Galbraith could carry on for a few weeks. Would you prefer to take a month in Baguio or to come to U.S.? In any event you should take Marylou with you at Government expense. If you decide to come here, I know we would all benefit from a direct report from you on your view of the future of Indonesia and the Maphilindo area. We would limit your consultations to a short period and insist that you take a rest to refresh yourself for the difficult task you will face when you return to Djakarta.

It has occurred to us that because of your special relationship with Sukarno your recall for consultations might be a useful way to bring home some truths to him. If you decide to come here, an approach to him along following lines might be useful. Tell him you are being called home for consultations; that you know only that I want to confer with you at this moment on Indonesia-U.S. relations. You might speculate that you will be asked to advise on problems with which U.S. Government is faced, i.e. our desire to maintain cordial relations with Indonesia and to help create a strong viable state working for stability in the area and the dilemma which we face because of his current policies. In short, that you will be faced with task of explaining what Indonesia wants and where it is heading. You should say that you are sure you will be asked to explain why, if Indonesia really follows an active independent policy, it is deliberately creating instability in the Maphilindo area. You might ask Sukarno what he would say if he had the opportunity personally to explain (and justify) present Indonesian policy to the highest officials in the U.S. Government. You might mention that the “neo-colonialism” argument is not convincing here and that we do not believe 100 million Indonesians are being “surrounded” by ten million Malaysians. We know that Indonesia can be a forceful influence for the principles of “Pantjasila”, with which we agree. Can Sukarno reconcile his current policy and actions with the principles of “Pantjasila”?

If you believe a different approach to Sukarno would be more effective, please let me know.¹

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL INDON–MALAYSIA. Secret. Drafted by Bell; cleared by Harriman, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett, and in draft by Hilsman; and approved by Ball.
1. In telegram 965 from Djakarta, October 26, Jones agreed that his recall could prove productive by allowing him to have a serious talk with Sukarno in long-range terms before leaving. Jones suggested a departure of November 5, with a stop-over at Manila and Honolulu for consultations. He would arrive in Washington on November 9–10. (Ibid.)