260. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
McGB:
Theme for a pleasant cruise with Van Roijen—while recognizing how painful it is to concede to Indos, US cannot see why, having taken painful decision to concede the basic principle, the Dutch are playing with fire in procrastinating about renewed negotiations. When Rusk saw Van Roijen this morning1 latter repeated all the old arguments about taping down in advance those details about UN presence; etc. which we feel should be held for negotiation. He will submit formula to his government but said he was not optimistic. Rusk apparently did not take the strong line recommended to him, but State is now proposing another JFK letter to De Quay. It will be over tonight or tomorrow. Time has come for another push, and you can fire the opening gun.
Dutch are clearly trying to spin out this painful process as long as possible, because of sheer distaste at giving in to Sukarno and partly to [Page 582] salve their new-found consciences over Papuans. The trouble with the way Dutch are playing it is that, while the end result will be the same, if they keep throwing up so many road blocks they (and we) risk losing the capital with the Indos that the concession on basic principle will otherwise have earned. After a further long and painful process of negotiations, with several ups and downs, the Dutch will end up having let go of WNG under the worst possible circumstances, making it doubly difficult for them to recover a position of influence in Indonesia itself. We too would have lost the capital we expect to gain by a negotiated instead of a “Russian” solution to WNG dispute.
For example, one of the Dutch psywar tricks is to build up an ersatz Papuan independence movement. The proposed visit of five Papuans to UN is their latest trick. This sort of thing will merely arouse Indonesian fury, risk collapse of the negotiations, and eliminate any possibility of good Dutch relations with Indos—without any compensatory advantages. It is a silly way to play the game.
Dutch also keep feeding us “intelligence items” indicating that Sukarno is using US by playing on our fears of communist takeover. It might be well to chide Van Roijen about “naive Americans” theme; strength of PKI and massive Soviet military aid are facts with which we must contend. Dutch can hardly argue that their policies toward Indo in last fifteen years have done so much to help create obstacles to growth of communist influence. It is Dutch policy, not US, which seems a bit naive in perspective.
It might be well to suggest that we think we’re actually doing Dutch a service by providing a means for them to disengage with honor from what otherwise is becoming a violent dispute involving military action and counter-action of unpredictable dimension—and one they can’t win. What worries us and UK is that not only will Indos get WNG but if they get it with Bloc help, the result may be a crucial blow to the whole Western position in SEA. Instead the Dutch can blame us for having forced a settlement. A period of strained relations may ensue, but over time we think Dutch will recognize favor we did them.
Finally, why not remind Van of President’s personal interest in this problem, that he is kept fully abreast of it, that he fully endorses Bunker formula, and that he hopes Dutch will not pull a Portugal on us, painful as these problems of colonial disengagement may be.