Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, April 19, 1962, 8:56 p.m.

1192. Deptel 1189.¹FYI. We have carefully studied Dutch letters delivered earlier in week. These letters and the various follow-up conversations which Department officers and Bunker have had with Dutch clearly reveal new Dutch position which, while not including full acceptance Bunker formula, is major departure from previous line.

Of central importance is Dutch willingness relinquish administrative authority to Indonesia via an interim UN phase prior to exercise self-determination by the Papuans.

While agreeing this transfer, Dutch, as you aware, protest that para 4 of formula contains insufficient assurance that genuine Papuan expression, including right of contracting out, will be carried out or enforced. They insist that very strong self-determination clause is necessary to sell transfer to Papuans and to rest Dutch conscience. By latter they probably mean that GON needs such provision to fend off domestic political criticism of transfer prior self-determination exercise. Further, they are deeply suspicious of Indo intention carry out true self-determination.

Dutch would have formula provide for continuing UN responsibility for preparation and execution self-determination after interim period when Indos would have assumed otherwise full administrative control. They specifically dissatisfied with present wording para 4 according which Indos, by agreeing arrange for Papuan free choice, have prime responsibility with UN role limited to advice and assistance.

Also bearing heavily on our thinking is our expectation that an appropriate and completely valid exercise of Papuan free choice will be accomplished and that the outcome will be honored by Indonesia. Indonesia should understand that we have taken Indo assurances to us on this score at full value and that the US Government, in helping find a solution, expects nothing less if our relations are to continue be based on mutual confidence and respect. End FYI.

In these circumstances and on basis your assessment Embtel 1882,² you should put to Indos immediately supplementary understanding set forth para 3 Deptel 1189. Should Sukarno or Subandrio ask you whether Ambassador Bunker making this suggestion at Dutch request, you should say that language is Ambassador Bunker’s but tell Indos it is designed to meet point raised by Dutch.

We leave choice of persuasive argumentation to your discretion but suggest emphasis be given Dutch preparedness see Indo obtain administrative control prior self-determination if Indos, in return, willing strengthen para 4. Best way for GOI demonstrate sincerity would be to agree that, after interim period, UN shall retain basic responsibility for preparation, execution and implementation Papuan free choice and that GOI will cooperate fully with UN measures to carry out this responsibility. We believe Dutch can be expected interpret “adequate guarantees” in these terms and you may wish suggest this likelihood to Indos. Indos repeatedly have said Dutch willingness transfer admin would be greeted warmly and responsively by GOI. Ambassador Bunker as impartial third party believes he should have GOI assurances on above point before he can get Dutch back to conference table. USG fully supports Bunker’s analysis of situation and necessity for obtaining supplementary understanding.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/4–1962. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lindquist; cleared by Bell, Cleveland, and Bunker, and in draft by Tyler; and approved by Harriman. Repeated priority to The Hague and to USUN.
1. Telegram 1189 to Djakarta, April 18, contained a new version of the Bunker formula that included supplemental language for paragraph 4 that reads as follows: “Indonesia would agree to make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations and United Nations personnel, to give the people of the territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice not later than _____ years after Indonesia has assumed full administrative responsibility for West New Guinea. The Government of the Netherlands would agree to transfer administration in accordance with this proposal on condition that the Government of the Netherlands receives, as a result of formal negotiations, adequate guarantees for safeguarding the interests, including the right of self-determination, of the Papuans.” (Ibid., 656.9813/4–1862)
2. In telegram 1882, April 19, Jones noted that he believed the supplemental language suggested by van Roijen would be acceptable to the Indonesians who thought this was what they had already agreed upon. (Ibid., 656.9813/4–1962) When Jones submitted this language, Subandrio accepted it without argument. (Telegram 1894 from Djakarta, April 23; ibid., 656.9813/4–2362)