Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, March 24, 1962, 12:28 p.m.

1073. Vientiane for Harriman. For Ambassador Jones from McGhee. I am glad you have been able to return Djakarta as I believe your presence and your unique relationship with Sukarno will be invaluable in helping us through tight situation.

As you know talks got off to good start in extremely harmonious atmosphere. However it very early became clear that Indo delegation had no authority engage in discussions which would probe into substance of differences between them and the Dutch. On first day Malikproposed two-point agenda which they said if agreed by Dutch would form adequate basis for subsequent formal negotiations in which all other questions and details could be discussed. Van Roijen protested that he could not agree to Indo agenda which he described as “blank check”. Instead he suggested that the negotiators should probe into substantive issues such as nature interim administration, in sufficient detail at least to provide some outline of direction problem would move. However Indos continued insist that their mandate did not permit such discussions.

It seemed evident to Bunker and we agree that it is unrealistic to expect agreement on agenda to emerge from such limited discussion as appeared available to Malik and for this reason Bunker suggested to Malik that he seek broader authority. You will know from previous messages the basis of Malik’s decision return Djakarta.¹ You also have been informed of subsequent Zain and Nugroho discussions with Attorney General and in Department.²

In these circumstances I think it is essential for you to see Sukarno to give him our assessment and to urge him to provide Malik with greater authority as well as to make every effort possible to bring talks off successfully. I think you can best decide timing for approach to Sukarno which should be designed to back up in most effective way possible what we believe will be constructive Malik report to President as basis for requesting better negotiating authority.

Believe démarche to Sukarno should be constructed around following major points:

(1) Talks have gotten off to excellent start in friendly and cooperative atmosphere. It clear to us that both sides have made major efforts to achieve situation free from tension and suspicion. We believe both sides making sincere effort. FYI only. Van Roijen told Bunker that Dutch not opposed to Indo participation in interim administration. He also made clear that Dutch would not wish participate. End FYI. Ambassador Bunker is pleased by cooperative attitudes displayed and wishes this conveyed to Sukarno.

(2) Substantial areas of basic agreement already have emerged. The Dutch have made clear their desire to leave the territory and the Indonesian delegation recognized the need for special provisions with respect to Dutch promises to the inhabitants of the territory. Both sides have indicated they could agree that some sort of interim administration or authority would be advantageous in facilitating the withdrawal of the Dutch. The Dutch have stated their willingness to continue financial support during a transition period. In final session van Roijen said that if things go in WNG as Indos expect (meaning that Papuans will opt for Indo if GOI had adequate opportunity present case), Indo will have gained objective and Dutch would not object. Added he did not think this assessment too optimistic. In private talk with Bunkervan Roijen went even farther and said he believe WNG would eventually go to Indo because “there is no other place for it to go.” Finally both sides have expressed a desire to normalization of relations between their countries.

(3) With these broad areas of general agreement already established it is essential that every effort be made to find a suitable formula for resolving the differences that remain. Any other course would be incomprehensible. It is not realistic to even consider that war could be waged over an issue in which substantial agreement already exists and in which talks have begun satisfactorily on the remaining problems.

(4) We think that the next most useful step is to provide Ambassador Malik with authority to discuss these remaining differences in greater detail and we are convinced that problems can be worked out in such circumstances.

FYI. We believe it would be useful for you to weave in some discussion of the purpose of diplomacy, i.e., that the object of such activity is to achieve objectives, not necessarily to focus exclusively on immediate symbols. End FYI. Remind Sukarno of Subandrio’s statement to you that the GOI does not wish to humiliate the Dutch and explain to him that substantive agenda talks seem essential to finding a formula that will be face-saving and satisfactory to both sides. The Dutch are interested in achieving face-saving formula. Such a device should and can be found in arrangements for interim administration. We believe it extremely unlikely that Dutch can agree to transfer until such device agreed on. Therefore it essential that Indos be prepared to discuss the substance of this fundamental problem.

(5) Finally, you should again stress to him the importance of avoiding statements or actions which might be considered provocative and therefore prejudicial to successful negotiations. As you know this point was also made in Bunker’s final talk with Malik.

(6) Ambassador Bunker has seen this message and you may associate him with above assessment.

FYI only. While we consider it extremely important that Malik be successful in obtaining greater powers we consider it absolutely essential that in any event he return Washington to resume discussions. Circumstances preceding and surrounding his departure were such that Dutch as well as Department considers that he is making sincere effort to negotiate solution. Failure return would be serious breach of faith and would have very unfortunate effect on future prospects for diplomatic settlement. You should not make this argument to Sukarno unless and until it unmistakably clear that Malik will not be given broader instructions but in such event you should use this as last resort argument. End FYI.³

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–2462. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lindquist; cleared by Bell, Sisco, Rice, Tyler, and Bunker; and approved by McGhee. Repeated priority to The Hague, to USUN, niact to Geneva for Rusk, and niact to Vientiane.
1. Telegrams 1058, 1059, and 1066 to Djakarta, all March 22. (All ibid., 656.9813/3–2262)
2. Telegram 1067 to Djakarta, March 23, reported that Indonesian Ambassador Zain told Robert Kennedy on March 22, immediately after the recess of the talks, that Indonesia was disappointed with the results so far. Indonesian Minister Nugroho was called to the Department to clarify those remarks since the Department had concluded that the talks were proceeding well. Nugroho stated that the Dutch did not seem to realize that Indonesia’s primary concern was liquidation of the Dutch colonial empire and the fulfillment of Indonesian independence. (Ibid., 656.9813/3–2362)
3. Jones saw Subandrio on March 26 and made these points. Subandrio was prepared to admit that the atmosphere of the talks had been harmonious and the Dutch showed understanding. The situation was not “hopeless,” but Subandrio could not quite admit it was “hopeful.” Subandrio stated Malik would return to Washington to resume the talks in a few days if a formula could be found to resolve the deadlock. (Telegram 1717 from Djakarta, March 26; ibid., 656.9813/3–2662) Jones saw Sukarno on March 30; see Document 255.