Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, March 21, 1962, 8:23 p.m.

1052. Bangkok for Harriman. Secret preliminary talks have gotten off to amiable start in atmosphere remarkably free from tension.

Initial meetings Ambassador Bunker has held with Malik and Van Roijen privately, jointly, and with full staffs have produced initial state ment in which both sides have briefly reviewed background of dispute and stated present positions.¹

In early session Indo delegation proposed two points formula for agenda which could form basis subsequent formal talks under aegis U Thant:

1. Transfer WNG administration to Indonesia, including task protecting welfare Papuans.

2. Normalization Dutch-Indo relations.

Indos insist that agreement on this formula will enable initiation early formal negotiations—possibly next week. They hold that proposed agenda states essence of problem and they display unwillingness discuss issues in greater substance. Malik says he is authorized only to discuss agenda items in broad form such as that above, that he has no authority delve into substance such matters as, for example, nature of interim administration. However, it clear Dutch envision need for some sort interim administration and Indos have not excluded this.

Van Roijen has stated GON unwillingness transfer administration to Indos (implication is direct transfer). As reason he cited Dutch “promises” to Papuans, said Papuans oppose such transfer and stated chaos would result. He opened discussions by suggesting exploration of nature intermediate administration might assume. He has protested that his govt cannot be expected to sign “blank check,” by agreeing agenda formula proposed by Malik, while at same time Malik not prepared discuss even informally modalities of interim administration.

As of second day, it appears that Indos have come to talks with above proposed agenda formula and have no authority delve further into issues. It also clear Van Roijen not prepared or not authorized concur in Indo formula without substantial exploration and agreement details.

In circumstances, Ambassador Bunker has approached Malik with suggestion and counsel that he seek broader authority from Djakarta. Malik has agreed and says he will cable Djakarta tonight. Hopefully he would be enabled explore nature interim administration and also enter into some substantive discussion of the differences separating parties and means reaching agreement on them.

Chargé should seek immediate appointment with Subandrio for approach to GOI paralleling Bunker’s to Malik.² You should express our pleasure that talks have started in harmonious atmosphere out of public gaze. You should make point that what appears to be Malik’s limited authority has seemed so far to preclude discussions of even that degree of substance which seems essential to agenda formulation process in this case. Subandrio should be assured that items discussed in secret preliminary talks would not be precluded from subsequent formal negotiations. Subandrio told you (Deptel [Embtel] 1694)³ that preliminary talks were to save Dutch face but not to deal with substantive dispute. Fact is we see no way to save Dutch face without discussion at this stage of substantive matters especially as they pertain to nature of interim arrangement and protection Papuan interests, leading to their inclusion in agenda. You should reiterate that present secret talks present unique opportunity for peaceful resolution of thorny problem, that eyes of world focused on these talks and that it our desire and hope that agreement can be reached through unrestricted discussion.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–2162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lindquist; cleared by Rice, in draft by Tyler and Wallner, shown in draft to Bunker, and McGhee was informed of the substance; and approved by Bell. Repeated to The Hague, USUN, Bangkok, and Geneva for Rusk.
1. The initial meetings were covered in detail in memoranda of conversation of the full group meetings on March 20 and 21 and one-on-one meetings between Bunker and Malik and Bunker and van Roijen, March 21. (Ibid., 656.9813/3–2062 and 656.9813/3–2162)
2. In telegram 1702 from Djakarta, March 22, the Chargé reported that he had made the approach, “but without much detectable effect.” Subandrio had agreed to spell out in more detail instructions to Malik, but was not prepared to allow Malik to discuss substantive questions such as interim administration. That type of issue would be negotiated by Subandrio himself, the Foreign Minister stated. (Ibid., 656.9813/3–2261)
3. Dated March 21. (Ibid.)