Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

245. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, March 3, 1962.

McGB

Next Steps on WNG

As I gather you know, after painful JFK/Luns session last night¹ Secretary and others corralled Luns and told him forcefully that any announcement of actual or pending Dutch naval movement would make talks impossible and put us on the spot. Secretary told Luns that JFK was highly disturbed at this unexpected development. Luns agreed to recommend that Dutch cabinet postpone any ship movements or announcements that they pending.

If Dutch buy (as is likely), our next job is to find some kind of formula which Dutch and Indos can buy. Bill Tyler’s view, which I think a shrewd one, is that Dutch are perfectly prepared to see WNG go eventually to Indonesia but are most unwilling to have a straight transfer of administration pronto. There must, in Dutch view, be some form of interim stage between Dutch withdrawal and Indoadmin which would save Dutch face by not appearing as flat surrender.

Sukarno’s asking price, on other hand, is clearly a prompt takeover of admin. All he seems willing at present to grant is any kind of assurances of later self-determination Dutch want.

Thus crux of matter is to find some form of interim arrangement which will be less than straight handover to Indos yet provide iron-clad assurance that admin will shortly become totally Indo, plus some Indo voice in interim admin.

Ideal solution would be Dutch-Indo condominium for first two to three years, phasing into total Indoadmin for remaining period until plebiscite. Bonus effect of this solution would be to bring Dutch and Indos close together again and help re-establish Western influence (via Dutch) in Indo. But it would require high order of statesmanship for Dutch and Indos to get along this well.

Alternative might be three-power trusteeship—Dutch/Indo/Malaya or Philippines for initial period.

At any rate Luns talks have revealed to us how tough and pinheaded Dutch position really is. To me, this clearly validates my feeling that we have to get very tough with Dutch. Best way is for us and UK to make unmistakably plain that Dutch cannot count on our support in any way if a clash occurs. If they let things go to this point they can reap their own folly. All we would do would be to evacuate non-combatants upon request.

Action. Let’s treat this like crisis situation it has become, and request President to direct setting up Task Force, with Ball or McGhee as chairman (this has become too big and dangerous an issue for business as usual any more). Moreover, we need some way to overcome splits within State (FE vs EUR vs IO) and get a clear policy line. TF to gin up pronto an action program with teeth.²

Bob K

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 3/62. Secret.
1. See Document 244.
2. Komer attached a draft NSAM creating a task force; it is not printed. He also handwrote a note as follows: “and I can push more effectively to this end.”