244. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea Problem
PARTICIPANTS
- For the Netherlands:
- Foreign Minister Luns
- Ambassador van Roijen
- For the United States:
- The President
- William R. Tyler, Acting Assistant
- Secretary, European Affairs Ambassador John S. Rice
- Robert M. Beaudry, Western European Affairs
The Foreign Minister began by expressing his appreciation for the efforts of the Attorney General in trying to arrange talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia designed to achieve a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea problem. Mr. Luns added that on the basis of these soundings, if the Indonesians are sincere, the Dutch are prepared to sit down for preliminary talks leading ultimately to negotiations for a settlement. In response to a question from the President, the Dutch indicated that they prefer New York for the site of the conversations, since they desire to have some link to the UN even if U Thant himself does not act as a third party.
The Foreign Minister told the President that the Dutch have evidence that the Indonesians are prepared to attack West New Guinea toward the first of April and that the Dutch Government feels obliged to provide at least minimum protection for the 18,000 Dutch nationals, including women and children, in the territory. Mr. Luns said that the Cabinet had decided to send two fleet destroyers and two submarines presently in the Caribbean to West New Guinea. The President expressed concern that movement of ships at this time should not give the Indonesians an excuse to refuse to start talks on the grounds that the Dutch are reinforcing West New Guinea. The President emphasized the necessity to start the talks and give them a chance to succeed. He indicated the belief that if the United States were involved in these talks in any way, the Indonesians would be reluctant to break them off. The President [Page 550] emphasized that in his opinion, publishing the Cabinet decision to send naval vessels to West New Guinea would be most unfortunate.
In response to a question from the President, Mr. Luns said the ships would go through the Panama Canal and that they could arrive in West New Guinea waters by March 25. The President stated that he would have to discuss the matter with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to find out whether these vessels could move through the Canal without coming to public notice.
Mr. Luns agreed with the President’s analysis of the possible adverse effect on getting the Indonesians to start talks if reinforcements are sent through the Canal. However, Mr. Luns said, his Government had the responsibility to protect the Dutch citizens in West New Guinea and that if a massacre occurred, the Dutch Government would be unable to answer public criticism if it had not taken all reasonable measures to protect these people.
The President asked when the Dutch intended to send these ships, and Mr. Luns replied that the time is getting short since the vessels are due to return to the Netherlands. He emphasized the necessity for making a public statement since the crewmen would be writing home, and the Government would be asked questions in Parliament; therefore, the matter could not be kept secret. The President said he saw no sense in making a formal announcement at this time. The Foreign Minister pointed out that he had convinced the Cabinet not to send the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman to West New Guinea, since this would be an extremely dramatic gesture and might have a bad influence on the Indonesians. Ambassador van Roijen noted that the Dutch must keep their defenses up in order not to tempt Sukarno to make an attack. The President indicated that he understood the Dutch Government’s problem but noted that if the talks get underway it would be extremely difficult for Sukarno to make an attack. The President said he would be in touch with the Foreign Minister or the Ambassador later after checking with the Secretary of State. (After talking with the President later on the evening of March 2, the Secretary spoke to Mr. Luns and obtained his agreement to hold up the naval reinforcement pending the outcome of present efforts to get the talks started, Mr. Luns said he would send a telegram in this sense to the Dutch Cabinet prior to its meeting at 10 a.m. March 3.)
The President urged the Foreign Minister to take a broad view of the free world’s position in Asia in attempting to reach a peaceful solution of the West New Guinea dispute. The President said we are not indifferent to the difficulties the Dutch face but that in our opinion the problem is not a basic cold war issue. The President noted the extensive effort the United States is making in Viet Nam to prevent the Communists from taking over and that, while we have no confidence in Sukarno, if Indonesia goes to war the chances of a Communist take over in that country are [Page 551] greatly improved. This would be a disaster for the free-world position in Asia and would force us out of Viet Nam. The President said that the Attorney General believes that the Communists in Indonesia are making a substantial issue out of the West New Guinea question.
The Foreign Minister remarked that there is no difference in principle between maintaining self-determination for the population of West Berlin or West New Guinea, and the Dutch have a moral obligation to make certain that the people of West New Guinea have the chance to exercise self-expression on their political future. The President observed that the most important moral obligation we have is to keep Communists from making any further gains, adding that this task weighs heavily on all free-world countries. When Ambassador van Roijen suggested that the Dutch could not sacrifice the Papuan people and maintain its national honor anymore than the United States could run out on West Berlin, the President pointed out that in addition to the moral obligations involved, West Berlin is considered essential to the defense of Europe and the United States.
After a long description by Foreign Minister Luns of the evolution of the Papuan people and the need to take their desires into account, the President wondered whether there was any chance of an agreement coming out of the talks with the Indonesians. Although the Foreign Minister expressed pessimism, Ambassador van Roijen pointed out that there are aspects of the problem on which an agreement is possible and that some interim arrangement concerning the transfer of administration would be necessary. The President remarked that the Attorney General had reported considerable sympathy for the Netherlands in Indonesia and suggested that the Netherlands could play a most useful role in the Pacific if it could establish a good working relationship with Indonesia, but this could only be done if the West New Guinea matter is settled.
The President emphasized that by concentrating too much on the future of the Papuan population we may be forgetting our other obligations in Asia and free Europe. He urged that these matters be kept in perspective. The President noted that we have all the potential wars we need at the moment, and we do not consider it useful to become involved in this dispute. From the strategic viewpoint, we believe that West New Guinea as such is of little consequence, since if the Communists have Indonesia the additional territory does not alter the strategic situation. The President emphasized that we are not indifferent to the problems facing the Dutch in this matter, but we must balance it against our commitments elsewhere. We do not intend to become directly involved.
Ambassador van Roijen commented that the most important thing to do is to get the talks started. Mr. Tyler pointed out that we are instructing Ambassador Jones to inform the Indonesians of the Dutch willingness [Page 552] to hold secret preliminary talks in the presence of a third party, not necessarily U Thant.1 The Indonesians will be informed that during these talks both sides must avoid any measures political or military designed to exert pressure on the other.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–262. Secret. Drafted by Beau-dry and approved by the White House on March 10. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House and lasted until 5:50 p.m., is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)↩
- In telegram 987 to Djakarta, March 2, 8:34 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/3–262)↩