234. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)0
Bundy said the President agrees to the play of the telegram1 but has a few language changes.2 He said instead of saying it is not politically [Page 528] realistic simply say “Dutch cannot be expected to promise”. He said fight them in quite the form of the paragraph that warns that this would not justify use of force—a sign that use of force would serve no one’s good. The President doesn’t want to go back and play the old record. Bundy said “While we think this would improve your position, of course you must understand that our whole object here is to avoid a resort to force”. He said this is just a more substantial matter that we will use our influence if negotiations begin—our influence with both sides in hope that a successful resolution can be achieved. He said in saying this we are, of course, aware of the positions of both sides.
Bundy asked if you bilateralize it does it take some of the sting out of seeming to promise things to him and Ball said no, he thinks that is perfect. Ball said he had no objection to it at all. He added that we had told him that was best. Bundy said of course if you sit down you can count on our good offices because we do not want a solution that is satisfactory and in saying this we are aware of the interests of both sides. He asked Ball if he would put something like that in and Ball said yes.
Bundy said the President thinks the reference to Cuba is a good thing. He said one other thing the President would add is to congratulate the Attorney General for his appeal on Pope but to add that if this does not produce a result the Attorney General should find a way of indicating at the end of his trip that in view of the fact that the matter has now been raised personally by both the President and the Attorney General the United States regards the matter as closed and is disappointed in this and does not propose to discuss it further.
Ball asked Bundy if he had seen 14503 and Bundy said yes. He said this just seeded into the President’s feelings. The President thinks that the Attorney General should point out that this was done as a personal thing, it is not a trading matter, and that he is now reemphasizing his brother’s personal concern and they still hope that this will produce a result, if it does not they don’t expect to raise the matter again. Ball agreed.
[Page 529]Bundy said “the President agrees that we ought to deal with the Dutch after, and he agrees I think, although he doesn’t, he’s not sure he sees the point, but I think he agrees, and anyway I certainly do and he doesn’t disagree, with the notion that this should not be done until Bobby is safely in the air, that we don’t want US pressing Dutch in the context of the Attorney General’s presence. The President does want to bring it home to the Dutch and he wants to bring home his own interest and his suggestion, which I have some diffidence about, because I don’t want to sour the wires, is that at a certain stage I ought to have a talk with van Roijen. I’m quite willing to do this but only on the basis of really getting the marching orders very clear with you and Averell and all concerned ahead of time.” Ball agreed.
Bundy said there may be some advantage in making it clear to them when Bobby gets up to The Hague by telling him this. Bundy told the President “I think George Ball will be against it not because you can’t tell Bobby, because he doesn’t want to tell Jones; doesn’t want Jones to have it in his head at this moment that we are in fact going to twist the Dutch arm because the temptation to say it in the environment out there is very heavy” and the President’s comment on that was “What do you think we can send to Bobby that doesn’t hit Jones?” Bundy told the President he didn’t know and that he wasn’t sure we wanted to do it that way. Bundy said he thinks the thing to do is to explain this point to Bobby when he is safely in the air. Bundy said he doesn’t think it is worth it. Ball said he thinks frankly that it puts Bobby under a kind of difficult strained situation and Bundy agreed.
Bundy said he thinks the Secretary’s cable should have a sentence or two about “After careful discussion with the President we think ...” so that Bobby will be very sure that the President himself has latched on to this problem. Ball agreed and said he thinks that would be very useful. Bundy asked Ball if he would, fix the first paragraph that way and Ball said yes. He asked Bundy if he wanted it right in the very beginning and Bundy said he didn’t see why not.
Bundy turned to the letter.4 He said they think it is a little softer in tone and a little less aware of the sort of urgencies of Sukarno than might be useful. Bundy said next to the last line—the question of New Guinea “which I know troubles you” to “which I know is of such high importance to you” or something like that. He said then they would strengthen the language about “I hope that you and the Dutch can soon arrange to sit down”. Bundy said we would urge him more “and it is for that reason that I am urging that you and the Dutch sit down together” or “that we are urging so strongly”. Ball said he liked that better. Bundy said the sentence [Page 530] before that seems a little longer than it needs to be but he said he didn’t think there is any point in flapping with it very much.
Bundy said it is a persuasive cable and the President thinks it really has to be. Bundy said we are moving along here and after we’ve sort of heard what happens next then we can talk further about exactly how to deal with van Roijen and give the Dutch its own worry.
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]
- Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ball’s office.↩
- Document 235.↩
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Ball and Bundy had an earlier telephone conversation at 8:50 a.m. that day. A transcript prepared in Ball’s office reads as follows:
“Bundy telephoned regarding the telegram done last night. He said he had talked to the President last night and he was fretting as to whether we could say anything. It is flat. We can’t tell them we are going to use influence.
“Ball said we were in a position where we have to be flat or the excitement and pressures, which are considerable, and the atmosphere as it is, which was implicit in their telegram, if we give even a kind of suggestion of something, it is likely to get bigger on the way through translation. We were flat, but he wanted him to get the idea that this was no hero. Bundy said he noticed it was a reminder of Sukarno’s character and endorsement of voting. He is a persuasive fellow, of course.
“Bundy said when he tries this on the boss he may want to call Ball.” (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia)
↩ - Document 233.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 232.↩