The essence of the preferred solution involves a trusteeship to be undertaken
by Malaya with material assistance from a consortium of nations organized by
the United States but working to the extent possible through the United
Nations. The trusteeship arrangement would not contain predetermined
conditions governing the ultimate status of West New Guinea. It would
therefore be without prejudice to the sort of self-determination which the
Netherlands insists upon as well as without prejudice to the ultimate
transfer of the territory to Indonesia which the latter insists upon. This
open endedness would be accomplished by stipulating that a United Nations
mission visit West New Guinea and report back to the Seventeenth General
Assembly which, acting upon the report and recommendations of the mission,
would, within the terms of Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter,2 consider the future status of the
territory.
It is my belief that, with appropriate pressure from the United States upon
both the Netherlands and Indonesia, it should be possible to reach this sort
of understanding prior to the opening of the Sixteenth General Assembly next
fall. If this is correct, it would be my recommendation that we be prepared
in that Assembly to take the lead in achieving this sort of solution. To
this end, I am suggesting below a series of steps which I recommend that you
approve in order that we can begin implementing this
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proposal.3
Some of these steps may, of course, require modification in the light of the
results achieved in the preceding steps.
Tab A4
Washington,
May 23,
1961.
Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk
to President Kennedy
SUBJECT
- Policy with Respect to West New Guinea (Irian)
There are four broad lines of policy open to us on this question:
- I.
- Continue our policy of “neutrality” on the issue, which
includes, on the one hand, the urging of negotiations between
the Dutch and the Indonesians and, on the other hand, urging
Indonesia not to attempt to use force to settle the
issue.
- II.
- Work towards a “Melanesian Federation” which would involve
placing all of the Australian and Dutch territory in New Guinea
(as well as possibly some of the islands in the area) under a
United Nations trusteeship (possibly with Australia and two
Asian states as trustees), pending attainment of a sufficient
degree of development to permit independence.
- III.
- Place only West New Guinea (Netherlands New Guinea) under a
UNGA short-term (two or three years) trusteeship agreement, with
the Netherlands as trustee, under which the Netherlands would
phase out most of its personnel, replacing them with non-Dutch
personnel and providing that the General Assembly would decide
the future status of the territory before the end of the
trusteeship.
- IV.
- Place West New Guinea under trusteeship with Malaya acting as
the trustee and being provided with resources and personnel
supplied by a consortium of states organized by the United
States which would utilize United Nations facilities to the
maximum extent and which would result in the rapid but orderly
replacement of Netherlands administrators. Dispatch a United
Nations mission to West New Guinea to make findings and give
advice to the United Nations General Assembly which would then,
acting on the advice of the mission and under the authority of
Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, recommend what the
future status of West New Guinea shall be and what means shall
be used to accomplish that status.
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I.
The first course of action seems to be running out, with both the
Netherlands and Indonesia adamantly refusing to enter into any
meaningful negotiations and with an apparent growing danger of Indonesia
mounting a para-military operation against West New Guinea. The
Communist espousal of the Indonesian claim is greatly facilitating
Communist infiltration into Indonesia and is promoting Indonesia’s
alignment with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The issue also distracts Sukarno from his pressing internal
problems, weakens the influence of moderate Indonesian elements, and is
threatening to undermine the heretofore anti-Communist position of the
Army.
On the other hand, Australian interests are considerably affected, and
the Australian position has in general been that Indonesia may well fall
under Communist control even if the West New Guinea issue is resolved to
Indonesian satisfaction, and a Communist-controlled West New Guinea
considerably complicates Australia’s defense problem. Thus, Australia
would desire to do all possible to maintain the status quo.
II.
The second solution has many attractions as a long-range policy. It would
be consistent with the principle of self-determination. It would, at
least for the time being, better serve Australian defense interests. It
would be difficult for the newly-independent and neutral countries to
oppose, and to this extent would reduce support for Indonesia’s claim to
West New Guinea.
On the other hand, it would probably take several generations to give the
bare minimal preparation of the population for any meaningful
independence or self-determination; it would not satisfy Indonesia,
which would feel frustrated and balked; and even to get the proposal to
the stage of presentation to the United Nations would require a long
period of negotiation and public opinion preparation in Australia as
well as in the Netherlands.
III.
It should be recognized that the third alternative is primarily designed
as a “face-saving” device to transfer West New Guinea from the
Netherlands to Indonesia. There have been many indications that
important opinion in the Netherlands is increasingly seeking such a
device. It would largely remove most of the disadvantages of the present
situation vis-á-vis Indonesia and thus “draw the fuse” on this
potentially explosive situation. It could be pointed out to Australia
that, to the degree such a solution arrests the drift of Indonesia
towards Communism, it promotes Australian security interests, and that a
Communist
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Indonesia holding
West New Guinea does not represent a materially greater threat to
Australia’s security interests than a Communist Indonesia not holding
New Guinea.
Even though there is increased receptivity in the Netherlands to some
“face-saving”, it is unlikely that the Dutch Government could be
persuaded to sign such a trusteeship agreement, and the pressing on the
Netherlands of this solution would undoubtedly strain our relations with
the Netherlands to a considerable degree. Such a solution also runs
counter to the principle of self-determination, theoretical though this
may be at the present stage of development of the peoples of New Guinea,
and might be said to remove a primitive people from Dutch colonialism
only to turn them over to Indonesian colonialism.
IV.
The fourth alternative is a modification of the third and designed
primarily to bridge the gap between Dutch and Indonesian positions
concerning trusteeship for West New Guinea. The Dutch have stated they
would accept the idea of a trusteeship only if self-determination for
the inhabitants of West New Guinea were guaranteed by terms of the
trusteeship. The Indonesians have stated that they would accept
trusteeship for West New Guinea only if it were designed as an interim
arrangement to provide for the orderly replacement of Dutch
administration prior to turning the territory over to Indonesia.
This proposed alternative would leave an “open end” with respect to both
these stipulations. By making clear that the Malayan responsibility is
an interim one pending further determinations on the question by the
General Assembly, it does not preclude the prospect that the territory
might go to Indonesia. By stipulating that the General Assembly should
act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII it provides the
Dutch with an opportunity to turn over administration of West New Guinea
without abandoning the principle of self-determination for the
inhabitants and transfers the problem of implementing these assurances
to the United Nations membership, leaving the Dutch without direct moral
responsibility for the outcome. We must recognize, however, the distinct
possibility that Indonesia will oppose such trusteeship and will
introduce a counter resolution predetermining the turnover of the
territory. We can best dissuade Indonesia from such a course of action
if we have taken soundings and believe that two-thirds of the UN membership is prepared to support such a
trusteeship solution.
Australian interests in this matter are regarded ultimately in the same
light as discussed under the third alternative. The Australians are
publicly committed to the proposition that anything acceptable to both
the Netherlands and Indonesia would be acceptable to them. Therefore,
while they might not favor, and may even resist, the solution envisaged
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under the fourth
alternative, they would in the last analysis accept such a solution if
we could, by applying pressure on both the Indonesians and the Dutch,
get these two principals in this dispute to agree on such a course of
action.
The Prime Minister of Malaya, who has taken an active role in attempting
to settle this dispute, has been informally approached and has expressed
his willingness to serve as a trustee for West New Guinea provided the
United States would undertake to organize a consortium of nations which
would supply him and his government with finances and personnel which
would enable him to discharge his responsibility effectively and
provided Indonesia can be brought to accept it. Despite the fact that
both the Dutch and the Indonesians have some reservations concerning the
Prime Minister of Malaya’s potential role in this matter, it is
considered that he is the least objectionable to both participants of
any single candidate that could be designated for this post.
Recommendation
None of these proposed policies is ideal. Each has certain drawbacks in
terms of its acceptability to the nations primarily concerned with this
problem. However, the fourth solution is specifically designed to
minimize each of these drawbacks and to maximize the opportunity to
enhance United States national interests in the solution of this
problem. Therefore, on balance, I am inclined to favor the fourth
alternative and recommend that you authorize the Department of State to
undertake preliminary consultations with Malaya, the Netherlands and
Indonesia, Australia and Secretary General Hammarskjold concerning the
establishment of an interim trusteeship. It is further recommended that
you authorize the Department of State to consult with those friendly
nations which it considers willing and able to contribute finances and
personnel to assist in the administration of such a trusteeship. Among
the states envisaged for such consultations are the United Kingdom,
Australia, Canada, Japan and others with an interest in the Pacific
region. It would be anticipated that action for the establishment of the
trusteeship and for the dispatch of the United Nations mission to West
New Guinea would be undertaken in the Sixteenth General Assembly. It
would be anticipated that the report and recommendations of the visiting
mission be considered by the Seventeenth General Assembly which will
convene in the fall of 1962.
