174. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea
I talked with you the other day about the West New Guinea problem.1 The mounting evidence suggests that we are presently in a period which may present a unique but transient opportunity for action which might solve the problem. Both sides seem more interested in a settlement than they have been for some time.2 One of the latest bits of evidence on this score is the view of Prince Bernhard which this office recently received and sent on to Assistant Secretary of State McConaughy.3 At the [Page 392] same time, if the opportunity for action is not seized, and the Indonesians resort to military action, we shall be faced by most difficult policy dilemmas. Quite possibly the dangers of such military action will increase as a result of Sukarno’s visit to Moscow which begins on June 5.
In the light of these circumstances, I believe we need to get this question to the Secretary and to the President for consideration at an early date. There are various ways in which it might be presented to him. I would like to suggest that State develop for Presidential consideration an issues paper which would discuss the pros and cons of alternative solutions.
State should use its discretion in developing the alternatives to be considered. However, I think it ought to give consideration to possible variations on its last trusteeship proposal. The major sticking points at present seem to be the question of the terminal date of a trusteeship and the question of self-determination. Perhaps, therefore, we ought to give serious consideration to an approach along lines which, I believe, may have been discussed in the past, under which it would be agreed through the UN: (a) that the Dutch administration of West New Guinea would be phased out over a period of two to four years and a temporary administration by the UN or a group of neutral states substituted; and (b) that the ultimate disposition of the territory would be settled by the UN itself at the end of this phase-out period. Such an approach would temporarily bypass the self-determination issue without, however, turning the territory over directly to Indonesia.
Any such paper should consider major questions of tactics, including the U.S. role in efforts to obtain a solution. Thus, the existing division in the Dutch Government and the views of Prince Bernhard suggest that there might be real value in our putting considerable pressure on the Dutch to consider a proposal that would resolve this division in the government in a direction favorable to a solution. There is also the question of whether we need to convey to the Indonesian Government during the period prior to Sukarno’s visit to Moscow some kind of general reassurance that the U.S. is continuing its efforts to find a solution.
I would be inclined to defer to your judgment in this matter, but I do feel confident that State should promptly formulate a view for presidential decision before the Paris visit.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–1261. Secret. Copies were sent to McGhee, McConaughy, and Battle.↩
- No record of this conversation has been found.↩
- After visiting the Netherlands, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Henry Owen of the NSC Staff that his visit “convinced him that public opinion there is much more receptive to the idea of giving up New Guinea than the Dutch Government would lead you to believe.” (Memorandum from Owens to Rostow, May 5; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, Vol. I, 5/61)↩
- Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana, had no official position in the Netherlands Government. His views came to Robert Johnson of the NSC via Henry G. Walter of the law firm of Fulton, Walter and Halley. On May 3 and 8, Johnson wrote and then revised a memorandum to Rostow explaining Bernhard’s proposals: The Netherlands would announce its readiness to turn over West New Guinea to a multinational trusteeship (balanced between East and West but not including the Netherlands or Indonesia); in a plebiscite to follow trusteeship, return of West New Guinea to the Netherlands would not be an option; and Dutch civil servants would remain at the pleasure of the trusteeship organization. (Ibid.) On May 9, McConaughy sent Rostow his comments on Bernhard’s proposal, which he believed represented evidence of shifting Dutch opinion, but he raised questions about the practicality of the scheme. (Ibid.)↩
- Kennedy visited Paris for discussions with President de Gaulle May 31-June 3.↩