131. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State0
473. CINCPAC for POLAD. Once we made known to Sihanouk our ability and willingness take steps locate Khmer Serei transmitters, our involvement in this matter entered new phase and we no longer in position simply say we would like be helpful but have no knowledge their location. Our ability locate transmitters if RKG stopped jamming conveyed by Forrestal to Sihanouk and elder statesmen Penn Nouth and Nhiek Tioulong.1 Our reservations this matter have been based on possibility, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] one or perhaps all Khmer Serei radios located Thailand and not uncertainty whether Thais would be as cooperative as SVN Generals in stopping broadcasts if we so requested. Question also in our mind has been what reply we would make to Sihanouk, if radios silenced, in event he should ask where we found them.
If radios located only SVN and if GVN agreed stop Khmer Serei broadcasts and halt Khmer Serei activities, these actions would contribute importantly to improvement relations between GVN and RKG and give hope of restoration diplomatic relations between two countries with obvious benefit our overall position SEA. This benefit would accrue also to SVN and Thailand.
In any event we have now revealed to Sihanouk that we have ability locate radios if he stops jamming. This he may do at any minute now or he may have already done it, even in absence direct request from us for cessation jamming on specified dates. If Khmer Serei broadcasts then continue, we should not be surprised if he airs entire story, including Forrestal’s approach to him on matter. Such publicity could make even more [Page 280] difficult improvement in relations between GVN & RKG. Should Sihanouk state publicly that US has failed to take promised action stop Khmer Serei broadcast after he had cooperated by suspending jamming, GVN might gain impression we are not entirely sincere in our assurances to them that we wished broadcasts to stop.
In view foregoing I consider all more urgent every effort be made halt broadcasts through direct approach to Thai Government, together with whatever actions at Saigon would be most effective without any further approach here to Sihanouk seeking cessation jamming.
If Khmer Serei broadcasts continue and if we do not agree participate in conference on Cambodian neutrality at a time when our aid programs are being terminated in manner neither expected nor desired by Sihanouk (this despite fact that he took initiative to bring this about), this combination of developments could easily lead Sihanouk to point of breaking relations with US with all consequences that might flow therefrom including increased commitment to Communist bloc. We do not find convincing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] view that SVN, which has not found elimination of Viet Cong from SVN an easy task, could take on added job of eliminating “Viet Cong from Cambodia”, which would inevitably lead to added task of eliminating Cambodian military forces.
Thais are also equating dissident Cambodian radio broadcasts aimed at overthrow Cambodian Government with radio broadcast war of words between national radios Bangkok and Phnom Penh, which are hardly the same thing. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] we can not imagine what objective they have in mind which would warrant bringing situation in this area to such a dangerous stage, with serious consequences for them as for us. If their purpose is the overthrow of Sihanouk, we firmly believe Thai methods will, in present circumstances, have opposite effect. It seems to us patently in our own national interest to convince RTG of this.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–S.VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.↩
- See Document 124.↩