Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, July 8, 1961, 5:25 p.m.

46. A)Brussels 5, rptd Léopoldville 3, Paris 3, USUN 3, Elisabethville 2, London 2.²

B) Paris Polto 10, Brussels Polto 1, Léopoldville Polto 1, USUN Polto 1, pouched London.³

C) Deptel action Léopoldville 29, info Brussels 47.⁴

Appears clear from Spaak reaction outlined urtel 5 that suggestion on rapid removal Belgian officers from Katanga as means applying pressure on Tshombe not easy for Spaak accept. Dept nevertheless seriously concerned that Belgium working at cross purposes with US in present difficult and delicate Congo situation and considers it crucial secure Belgian cooperation this matter (reftel C). Accordingly request you make new effort with Spaak, utilizing following major points as well as any others you consider might be effective.

1) Dept believes participation Katanga parliamentarians important to reduce risks Gizengists obtaining undesirable positions in new Govt. For this reason points two through seven should be made. Regarding possibility Gizenga domination parliament, you should draw on reftel C, pointing out we would certainly share Belgian concern at prospect government headed by Gizenga, but doubt this a real possibility. Inclusion Gizenga element in GOC however is price GOC will be obliged pay to reduce threat posed to Western position Central Africa by continuation separate Gizenga regime Orientale. This connection, you should suggest Spaak that Belgians Léopoldville like Longerstaey and Denis (advisor Kasavubu) might well be able play more useful role by facilitating resolution differences moderates and by persuading other Belgians desist encouraging indefinite postponement parliament and supporting plots similar that concocted by Mobutu.

2) Belgians and we should be clear on probable consequences of failure parliament meet promptly. This point also described reftel C. If Congo remains divided into three hostile segments, Gizenga will remain his Stanleyville redoubt where he very likely improve his domestic and international position. In absence of rapid, legal parliamentary solution, stature of Kasavubu will be diminished, there will be renewed pressure on Sudan and other moderate Africans and Asians support Gizenga, and Soviets and radical Africans may well push for new series of SC meetings. Belgians should be under no illusions as to our ability call tune in UN if Western-backed leaders can reasonably be blamed for failure take road of legality under parliament; it took considerable diplomatic pressure throughout world to secure seating of Kasavubu and adoption moderate resolutions, and there is no assurance we would be successful again.

3) As long as UN remains in Congo, there is no way of eliminating Gizenga and reintegrating Orientale by military operation, even if Mobutu and Tshombe should combine forces. UN troops would merely interpose themselves between hostile groups as required by existing mandate. Even if UN were not present, we have no faith in ability of Congolese mount operation of this sort.

4) Recent, relatively favorable course of events in Congo should not obscure fact world attention remains focussed on problem and that Western relations with majority of countries of world will be affected adversely if we appear to be standing in the way of national reconciliation in the Congo. The US, for its part, considers that it has a heavy stake in the success of the UN effort to bring the contending factions together.

5) It is against this background that we have suggested that the primary avenue open to us to influence Tshombe to cooperate would be to deprive him of independent military capability by withdrawing Belgian cadres. While we realize risks involved, we still think it might force Tshombe reconsider his pretensions to independence. There is no doubt in our mind that UN has will and capability ensure order in Katanga, and believe most serious risk would be possibility of clashes between Gurkhas and Katanga armed forces. It should be stressed to Spaak that we would not expect him to implement our suggestion without clear prior assurance from SYG of UN’s readiness prevent disruption law and order. Re Spaak’s apparent fear that step would further alienate Tshombe from Léopoldville, you might suggest Tshombe already appears have crossed this bridge. Moreover, Tshombe clearly becoming more and more liability for West unless brought back into Congo fold.

6) We would welcome any additional thoughts Spaak might have on reaching common objectives of bringing about Tshombe’s cooperation with Léopoldville. In this connection, we recognize rapid Belgian withdrawal might not have immediate effect bringing Tshombe around, although believe this withdrawal would diminish considerably his independent military capability, one of his major sources of power. However, believe we should also explore other possibilities, e.g., are there any methods of pressure on Union Miniere that Belgian Government might utilize or threaten to utilize to ensure cooperation, including making clear to UMHK that cooperation must show itself concretely, such as paying taxes to Léopoldville instead of Katanga. Are there any means of pressure that Spaak thinks we should be utilizing?

7) In any event, should be made clear to Spaak that Belgium not moving fast enough on withdrawals and that, in present difficult political situation, unless Belgians make dramatic step to demonstrate their cooperation with UN and their willingness undermine Tshombe’s position, they inevitably will bear large share of blame among UN members for failure present efforts toward national Congolese reconciliation. In context in which matter likely be raised in UN should present reconciliation efforts fail, US would find it difficult defend Belgium’s role for reasons spelled out above. It should be made clear to Spaak that we believe that fact present political picture confused offers no valid excuse for postponing large and dramatic withdrawals Belgian officers.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–261. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Tron and Woodruff; cleared by Blue, Vance, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs J. Wayne Fredericks, and in draft by Sisco; and approved by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, London, USUN, and Elisabethville.
2. Telegram 5 from Brussels, July 2, reported that MacArthur had suggested immediate withdrawal of most Belgian officers from Katanga to reduce Tshombe’s independent military capability and assure his cooperation with Léopoldville. Spaak said that reports he was receiving indicated the situation in the Congo was entirely unpredictable. Sudden Belgian withdrawal might lead to a final rupture between Léopoldville and Elisabethville and would risk chaos in Katanga and possible conflict between Katangan and U.N. forces. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–261) Telegram 2567 to Brussels, June 30, had instructed MacArthur to make this suggestion. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–3061)
3. Polto 10 from Paris, July 3, reported on a meeting of the NATO Ad Hoc Committee on Africa. Although the committee had generally agreed on the desirability of encouraging reconciliation between the Léopoldville government and Tshombe and delaying a meeting of the Congolese Parliament until the balance of forces was against a Gizenga victory, Rothschild had privately expressed doubt that Tshombe would agree to participate in the government or that Gizenga would participate unless he were given an important and sensitive post. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–361)
4. Telegram 29 to Léopoldville, July 8, stated the Department’s view that the risk of an indefinite postponement of Parliament, if blame fell on the Léopoldville moderates, outweighed the risk of negotiations for establishment of a new government and a meeting of Parliament without the Conakats. It argued that even without the Conakats, a moderate government with Gizengists in non-sensitive ministries would be possible. If the Gizengists returned to Stanleyville, the onus for failure to achieve a parliamentary government would fall on them. It instructed the Embassy to continue to press for the earliest possible meeting of Parliament and to urge the Léopoldville group to unite on a cabinet slate under a strong Prime Minister, presumably Adoula. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–161)