Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

358. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, December 13, 1962.

1. Attached are some background papers for tomorrow morning’s Congo meeting. George Ball will have an official Department proposal for the meeting but this will not be ready until tomorrow morning. If you have time to look at any of the attached you may find it useful.

2. At Tab 1 is a good clear statement by Roger Hilsman on the alternatives.² It argues that, as a preferred alternative, we should choose to move with greater force in the Congo in order to achieve integration. The only other alternative is withdrawal. This would have large costs in terms of our general position in Africa vis-a-vis the Soviets and in the prestige and future usefulness in the UN. At Tab 2 are (a) a recent cable from Moscow, and (b) another Hilsman paper on the possibilities of Soviet military assistance or direct interference in the Congo.³ Both come to essentially negative conclusions, at least for the near future.

3. Hilsman’s first paper makes a good argument. I think there are two comments to be made on it. First, it overstates the Soviet threat. Accordingly, the immediate costs of the continuance of our present policy of attempting reconciliation through persuasion are likely to be less spectacular. Probably the Adoula government will fall, to be succeeded by a more radical government. Perhaps the more radical government will attempt military action against Katanga. However, without our support, neither the central Congo government nor the UN can take significant military action. Accordingly, the situation may just continue to deteriorate, perhaps at an accelerated pace and with increasing sporadic violence. The more radical government may well denounce the UN operation and ask for its withdrawal. This would be a significant defeat for U.S. policy. Our position in the UN and the UN’s future usefulness in peace-keeping and our position in Africa would all be damaged seriously by this course of events. However, this is different from Soviet intervention in Africa or a spectacular outbreak of civil war.

My second comment is that, while Hilsman properly emphasizes that our plan of action must be such as to give Tshombe room to back down, he does not emphasize enough the importance of limiting the objectives of forcible action. What we want is to achieve that degree of disarmament of Tshombe and explicit admission by him that Katanga must integrate which will make integration stick, provided that Adoula is willing to come to terms with the realities of Tshombe’s economic and political power. In the past Adoula, the UN people, and, I fear, our Embassy in Léopoldville have all stood, perhaps unconsciously, for unconditional surrender. It is obvious that Tshombe might as well go down in flames as surrender unconditionally, and if pressed to the end, he will do so. This proposition, in turn, underlines the importance of dismissing Parliament and strengthening Adoula’s rule in the first place, and then making it clear to him that he must use his strength to deal with Tshombe, after we have achieved the limited objectives of partially disarming him and ending formal Katanga secession.

CK

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Congo Security, 1962. Secret.
2. Tab 1 was a memorandum from Hilsman to Ball, dated December 11, on “The Congo: An Appraisal of Alternatives.” It is summarized and the circumstances of its drafting are described in Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, pp. 263–266.
3. Tab 2 was telegram 1478 from Moscow, December 12, and a memorandum from Hilsman to Rusk, dated December 7, on “Possible Soviet Military Assistance to the Congo.” The memoranda in Tabs 1 and 2 were part of a package that Ball sent to Bundy on December 13. The package included copies of a December 12 memorandum from Chester Bowles to the President, a December 10 memorandum and a December 12 draft from Williams, memoranda of December 12 and November 29 from Hilsman, and Bundy’s December 11 letter (Document 353). Ball’s covering memorandum noted that the attachments “all move in the direction of a hard line on the Congo.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Congo) The Bowles memorandum is printed in part in Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969, pp. 497–498. Telegram 1478 from Moscow is in Department of State, Central Files, 661.70G/12–1262)