353. Letter From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)1

Dear George: We have become increasingly concerned by reports indicating that the situation in the Republic of the Congo is deteriorating rapidly. While the capability of the Congolese Central Government to control the situation is being undercut by opposition factions, there are reports that the Soviet Government has indicated its willingness to offer military aircraft and other military supplies to assist the Congolese Government in ending the Katanga secession. The possibility of Soviet military intervention manifestly adds a new critical factor to the Congo crisis and compounds the difficulties already confronting the UN and the Congolese Government. These developments pose a threat to the Congolese Central Government and to the UN position which, in turn, threatens achievement of the US objective in the Congo.

While I am aware of the UN, US and Belgian political and economic measures which may be undertaken shortly in a further effort to end Katanga secession, I am concerned that these complex measures may not eventuate in sufficient time to favorably influence the situation. Unless positive action is taken on an immediate basis, the UN effort may collapse and the Congo revert to the chaos of July 1960.

[Page 718]

Prior to his departure for the current series of NATO meetings, Paul Nitze requested the opinion and recommendations of the JCS on the following two questions:

1.
Should the US make a positive offer of military support to the UN and the Congolese Government to counter the possibility of Soviet intervention?
2.
If such an offer is considered warranted, what should be the nature and dimension of the US military support offered to the UN and the Congolese Government?

The JCS views are contained in the attached memorandum. I concur with their expression of urgency and their proposals for US action. I recommend that these views be brought to the attention of Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Gullion and that we take the necessary action to implement these proposals as soon as possible. I believe it imperative that, at the earliest possible date, the UN Secretary General be informed of our determination to undertake such action to preclude collapse of the US and UN efforts to bring about a solution in the Congo.

Sincerely,

Bill

Enclosure

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCSM–983–62

SUBJECT

  • Congo Developments (U)
1.
Reference is made to the memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 7 December 1962, regarding recent Congo developments.2
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the central issue of the Congolese problem is to keep a pro-Western regime in power. Any such regime [Page 719] will be in political jeopardy as long as the Katanga problem remains unresolved. The persistence of the problem stems from the inability of either the Congolese Government or the United Nations to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the Tshombe regime and its supporters.
3.
In August of 1962 the United States approved a military assistance program for the Congolese National Forces which will be implemented when approved by the Congolese Government. An impact shipment of about $150,000 has been made. Further implementation of the over-all program, coupled with a public announcement of United States Military Assistance under the UN umbrella, could have an immediate favorable impact upon the stability of the Congolese Government. In addition, the United States has been providing equipment, and required military air and sea lift since 1960 in support of UN operations in the Congo. This support should be continued.
4.
In view of the political defeat which the United States and the United Nations would incur through collapse of the Central Congolese Government, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that additional actions should be taken to bolster the UN effort in the Congo in order to insure preservation of a Western oriented Congolese Government.
5.
In accomplishing this objective, a direct commitment of US forces under UN aegis should provide the support required to maintain the present government. It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, that such a commitment should be made only if it is determined that collapse of the Central Congolese Government is imminent. A decision to commit forces under these circumstances poses a degree of US involvement with such far-reaching political and ideological ramifications as to require serious consideration at the highest level before a decision is made to commit US forces.
6.
In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a.
The United States undertake to revitalize present UN political and military efforts in the Congo.
b.
Simultaneously with the revitalization efforts, the United States should, as soon as possible, implement the approved military assistance program for the Congo.
c.
If required to prevent the collapse of the Central Government, offer the UN a US military package consisting of one Composite Air Strike Unit with necessary support elements and the requisite base security forces. A commitment of US units should carry with it recognition that, if necessary, the United States will also furnish under UN auspices any additional forces required to tip the balance of power decisively in favor the UN forces in the Congo. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the objectives of such a commitment are to destroy or neutralize the Katangese air capability and to provide immediate political support for the Central Government. They recommend that US combat units be withdrawn as soon as these objectives are achieved.
d.
Accompany any of the foregoing with timely announcements that US actions are in support of UN operations in the Congo.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Curtis E. LeMay3

Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1162. Top Secret.
  2. Not attached to the source text.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.